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How do employment relations change even though the formal structure of 
employment relations institutions remains stable? This dissertation draws on an 
analysis of collective bargaining in three multinational auto companies in Germany, 
Spain and the United States to answer this question. The study traces the longitudinal 
changes of employment relations in each country as well as the emergence of similar 
employment relations practices across countries.  
Previous literature on comparative employment relations linked formal 
employment relations institutions to national patterns of employment relations. In 
contrast, this study argues that the ideas and ideologies of management and labor 
underpin the functioning and meaning of institutions. As the collective actors adapt to 
a changing socio-economic context, their ideas and ideologies change, which 
contributes to an evolution of institutional practices and a different enactment of 
institutions. First, management and labor make different use of their institutional rights 
and resources, e.g. they can apply forcing strategies with varying intensity and develop 
contentious, cooperative or market-oriented employment relations in identical 
institutional settings. Second, despite institutional constraints, the collective actors 
have a lot of leeway to develop new employment relations practices and instruments, 
 which then in turn can alter the functioning and meaning of institutions. Institutions 
are what actors make of them.  
This dissertation is a contribution to the literature on institutional change and 
comparative employment relations. Previous institutional literature assumed a rational 
foundation of actor behavior and focused on formal institutions. In contrast, this study 
suggests a constructivist institutionalism, which analyzes the mutual relationship 
between ideas and institutions. The dissertation inductively explored five mechanisms 
for ideational change that contribute to institutional change: leadership change, 
identity work, mimicking and learning, collective bargaining and generational change.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When the facts change, I change my mind 
What do you do, sir? 
John Maynard Keynes1 
 
This study argues that the ideas and ideologies of management and labor underpin the 
functioning and meaning of employment relations institutions. As collective actors 
adapt to a dynamically changing socio-economic context, their collective ideas and 
ideologies change, which contributes to an evolution of institutional practices and a 
different enactment of institutions on the ground.  
Ideas and institutions evolve as the collective actors adapt to a changing world. 
A changing socio-economic context, including dynamically changing markets, can put 
enormous pressure on management and labor and the employment relationship. In 
such moments of economic uncertainty, the collective actors may not be able to reach 
their goals any longer; they may even struggle to survive. This causes strains within 
the respective organization, on the management and labor side. Previous practices and 
ways of organizing employment relations may seem exhausted. A process of soul-
searching place as to how to adapt, and the actors tend to defend themselves by 
changing their collective ideas and ideologies, which contributes to a different use of 
institutions and the development of new institutional practices.  
This study examines how management and labor in three multinational auto 
companies adapted to changing markets and company structures and renegotiated 
employment relations in the United States, Spain and Germany and the since the 
1980s. In this period, markets changed and became more competitive through the 
                                                 
1 I found this quote in Culpepper’s article (Culpepper 2008).  
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entry of new competitors, increased liberalization and the expansion of markets. In the 
United States, competition became stiffer through the entry of new Japanese and 
German competitors and the integration of the United States auto market into a 
common North American auto market in the context of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the European cases, the national auto markets were 
integrated into a common European auto market, which expanded into southern 
Europe in the 1980s and to Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. Second, the 
company structure changed. While the different sites of MNCs (Multinational 
Companies) in different countries operated largely independently from each other in 
the postwar decades, the integration of production across borders increased in the 
wake of the lean production debate in the 1980s (Jürgens, Malsch, & Dohse 1993; 
Womack 1990). MNCs standardized production and built common production 
platforms across countries, which allowed management shifting production across 
countries. Changing markets and changing company structures were transnational in 
contrast to the previous national context of employment relations of the postwar 
decades. The largely national socio-economic context allowed labor to develop new 
ideas and push for continuous social and material improvements. However, the above 
described transnational changes of markets and company structures provided 
management with more leverage over labor in collective negotiations. In this new 
socio-economic context, management became the agenda setter in collective 
bargaining (Katz 1985) and developed new ideas and pushed for changing institutional 
practices, which often meant labor concessions. However, market changes also posed 
enormous challenges for the companies under study. Both, management and labor, 
struggled at times to pursue their particular interests and reach their goals. Labor and 
management were forced to adapt to this dynamically changing world and renegotiate 
the employment relationship.  
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Collective negotiations between management and labor regulate and determine 
wages, working time, working practices and other elements of the employment 
relationship. These negotiations are commonly called collective bargaining; however, 
this study uses also the wider term collective negotiations, because it as well examines 
collective negotiations over restructuring and assignment of production, which are 
often intertwined with collective bargaining in a more narrow sense. Collective 
negotiations are negotiated by different worker organizations in multinational 
companies including local unions, works councils and general works councils.2 
Studying collective negotiations with a focus on the company is important, because 
collective bargaining decentralized from the national and sectoral level to the company 
level (Katz 1993). In addition, collective negotiations by European Works Councils 
(EWC) have contributed to the greater importance of company level negotiations 
(Greer & Hauptmeier 2008b). 
Employment relations have changed significantly in Germany, Spain and the 
United States since the 1980s; a process that is described in the next section. Besides 
the longitudinal changes of employment relations, another important trend is the 
emergence of similar employment relations practices across countries. New ideas and 
employment relations practices spread within and between MNC across countries, 
including night shifts, introduction of global manufacturing systems, benchmarking, 
voluntary buy-outs, two-tier wage systems, outsourcing, whipsawing and bidding for 
production (see conclusion). The timing of the introduction of each element differed in 
some of the details, but its functioning was often similar across countries.  
The previous literature has difficulties in explaining these changes in 
employment relations practices. Most of the comparative literature in employment 
                                                 
2 In the introduction and conclusion, I simply refer to the different collective labor organizations as 
unions or labor. In the case studies, I use the specific term for the respective collective labor 
organizations.  
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relations focuses on national institutions and has the historical institutionalism either 
implicit or explicit as a theoretical base. According to this literature, national 
institutions shape distinct pattern of national employment relations. However, this 
institutional literature has problems accounting for the spread of very similar 
employment relations practices across countries, which can hardly be described as a 
path-dependent change of employment relations institutions. In addition, the 
institutional literature has difficulties in explaining changes over time in each country. 
In most historical institutional literature, the threshold for change is high. It happens 
through external shocks at historical junctures and leads to a radical change of formal 
institutions. However, as the formal structure of employment relations institutions did 
not change through external shocks or otherwise, this literature has problems in 
accounting for the gradual and continuous changes of employment relations 
institutions across and within countries over time.  
This static perspective on institutions is related to the rational choice 
foundation of actor behavior in the historical institutionalism. The collective actors are 
supposed to know what their interests are in a given material context. The actors have 
the rational capacity to make the best choices in a given material context. Changing 
actor behavior is directly linked to changes in the material context (such as markets 
and institutions). This approach leaves little room for a different use of institutions by 
the actors and the development of new institutional practices. This approach also has 
problems in explaining why actors behave very differently in a similar material 
context.  
This study departs from the above described previous institutional literature 
and rational foundation of actor behavior. The behavior of the collective actors is not 
only determined by formal structures of employment relations and by a rational 
adaptation to a changing material context, but also by what the actors believe in and 
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how they see the world. In a dynamically changing socio-economic context, in 
situations of economic uncertainty (Blyth 2002; Knight 1921), when previous 
practices no longer provide a clear indicator on how to cope with challenges, the 
rational capacity of actors is limited and their action is crucially guided by collective 
ideas and ideologies. Ideas and ideologies are roadmaps and help the actors to work 
through situations of economic uncertainty (Goldstein & Keohane 1993). This study 
traces the ideational changes of the collective actors as they adapt to a changing world 
and links them to a different functioning and meaning of institutions.  
Analyzing the mutual relationship and interaction between ideas and 
institutions, promises a more dynamic and fine-grained perspective on institutional 
change, which might be called constructivist institutionalism (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006). 
The specific contribution of this study to the emerging constructivist institutionalism is 
the inductive exploration of five mechanisms of ideational change, which contribute to 
a different functioning and meaning of institutions: leadership change, identity work, 
mimicking and learning, collective bargaining and generational change. The 
constructivist institutionalism laid out in this study for analyzing changes in 
employment relations (see as well the conlusion) builds on literature that combines 
ideational and institutional analysis (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006; Katzenstein 1985; March 
& Olsen 1989) and the literature on economic constructivism (Blyth 2003; Jabko 
2006; Seabrooke 2006; Woll 2009). 
 
The argument: Institutions are what actors make of them3 
The interaction between ideas and institutions shapes institutional change and changes 
in employment relations. The actors’ ideas and ideologies underpin institutions. As the 
                                                 
3 The idea for this title is taken from Alexander Wendt’s article “Anarchy is what states make of it” 
(Wendt 1992). I learnt a lot by reading Alexander Wendt’s book on social theory (Wendt 1999). 
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actors adapt to a dynamically changing socio-economic context, their ideas and 
ideologies change. Actors with different ideas and ideologies make different use of 
institutional rules and develop new institutional practices, which then in turn can 
change the functioning and meaning of institutions.  
A mutual relationship exists between actors’ ideas and institutions. Institutions 
have a regulatory and constitutive affect on the actors. Institutional rules, enforced by 
the state, regulate and shape actor behavior. For example, German works councils 
usually do not strike; Spanish unions can engage in both industrial action and political 
strikes and the strike rights of American unions is narrowly confined to collective 
bargaining. Institutions also constitute the basic features and rules of the actors’ 
organizations, their basic role in the employment relationship and the instruments at 
their disposal. German law constitutes works councilors at the company level with co-
determination rights, Spanish law constitutes a representative (or fragmented) worker 
representation structure at the company level with few limits on the right to strike and 
the United States laws usually constitutes one dominant union after a successful 
organizing drive. The regulatory and constitutive affect shapes the ideas and 
ideologies of the actors, because it gives the actors a sense of who they are, their role 
in the employment relationship and the opportunities and constraints they face.  
However, the regulatory and constitutive affect on the actors’ ideas and 
ideologies is not set in stone. The actors’ ideas and ideologies evolve based on past 
experiences and current contingencies; and the actors’ ideas and ideologies tend to 
change as they adapt to a changing socio-economic context. This study identified five 
mechanisms of ideational change: leadership change, identity work, mimicking & 
learning, collective bargaining and generational change. Changing ideas and 
ideologies contribute to a different use of institutions and the development of new 
institutional practices.  
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Only some dimensions of the employment relationship are firmly governed by 
institutiona l rules, such as the structure of worker representation, while many other 
employment relations practices and situations are not firmly shaped by institutional 
rules. This leaves the actors a lot of leeway to develop and explore new employment 
relations practices, which then in turn can contribute to a different functioning and 
meaning of institutions. An example is the introduction of whipsawing practices by 
management. At different times across the three countries, management began to play 
off plants against each other (within and across countries) in the context of investment 
and sourcing decisions in order to extract labor concessions. These whipsawing 
practices increased the leverage of management over labor, while some labor 
resources based on national instruments lost some of their punch. Whipsawing 
disrupted previous institutional practices and the logic of collective bargaining 
changed in all three countries from pure negotiations over social benefits and wages to 
an exchange between labor and management. Labor often agreed to certain wage 
levels and social benefits, often concessions, in exchange for new investments and 
production assignments.  
Second, the collective actors can make different use of their institutional rules, 
rights and resources. How actors use institutional rights and resources is shaped by 
their collective ideas and ideologies. Management and labor can forcefully make use 
of their institutionally based forcing strategies and fight each other, or they can use the 
same institutional rules to engage in a cooperative relationship. The previous 
comparative institutional literature suggests that national institutions lead to different 
logics of employment relations in different countries. The contentious character of 
Spanish employment relations, for example, is supposed to be related to the 
institutional competition between unions in collective negotiations. However, as two 
of the case studies show, when the ideology of the Spanish unions changed and 
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became more market-oriented, they developed cooperative relations with management 
at the company level. The low-trust relationship in American employment relations is 
supposed to be related to the low integration of labor in management decision-making 
processes. However, as the Saturn case shows, the United States employment relations 
institutions can also be used to develop a cooperative relationship, in which unions act 
as co-managers on the shop floor (Rubinstein & Kochan 2001; Rubinstein 2001). The 
greater cooperative character of German industrial relations at the company level is 
supposed to be linked to the co-determination rights of works councilors; however, 
collective negotiations in some of the examined cases grew quite contentious, when 
management whipsawed the German plants.  
An important element of the argument is economic uncertainty (Blyth 2002; 
Knight 1921). In a dynamically changing socio-economic context, e.g. such as highly 
competitive markets, actors cannot rationally calculate the best course of action or 
know how to best reach their goals. In these situations of economic uncertainty, the 
actors’ behavior is crucially guided by their collective ideas. What actors do is shaped 
by who the actors are and how they see the world.  
This study differentiates between two types of ideational factors: causal beliefs 
and ideology. Causal beliefs, which will often simply be referred to as ideas in this 
study, refer to ideas of actors on mean-ends relationship (Goldstein & Keohane 1993). 
Different actors have varying ideas of how the employment relationship works and 
they develop causal beliefs on how to reach their goals and interests. Management has 
different causal beliefs across times and countries on how to organize the employment 
relationship productively. Some managers believe that it is efficient and productive for 
a company to whipsaw unions; while other managers believe that transnational 
whipsawing might undercut cooperative workplace relations, which they might regard 
as essential for producing a high-quality car. Labor also has different causal beliefs. 
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Some unions believe that they can best reach their goal by cooperating with 
management and making the companies more productive in highly competitive auto 
markets. Other unions believe that they can best reach their goals by resisting 
concessions to management. These unions believe that agreeing to concessions would 
only undercut union wages at other companies, lead to wage competition and result in 
a downward spiral.  
Besides causal ideas, the basic ideologies of management and labor shape the 
employment relationship (Bendix 1956). The causal ideas and ideologies are 
somewhat interrelated as the basic ideologies of the actors influence their causal 
beliefs. An important element of the ideology is how actors see the other actor. 
Managers can see labor unions as illegitimate organizations at the workplace that 
interfere with management’s right to manage; or managers can see them as a useful 
asset in organizing production effectively. In addition, labor unions have different 
ideologies of the employment relationship. Some unions believe that workers and 
managers have common interests in keeping the company competitive to secure the 
social and material benefits for both sides, while other unions see themselves in 
ideological opposition to management. These unions see MNCs as capitalist actors 
that try to exploit workers (Guillén 2000). As actors adapt to a changing socio-
economic context, their ideas and ideologies change, which leads to a different 
functioning and meaning of institutions as will be shown below in the summary 
analyses of the three country cases.  
 
USA 
Employment relations at the Big Three evolved within the Great Depressions 
employment relations institutions and its postwar revisions. By the 1950s, the labor 
union UAW (United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
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America) had not only established a union presence at the Big Three, but had 
organized the complete auto industry in the United States until 1979 (Katz 1985). 
Thus, the UAW was able to take wages out of competition in the auto market. The 
ideological opposition between management and labor was greater at these auto 
companies compared to Germany. Ford and General Motors had tried to prevent a 
union presence by almost every mean and there existed a history of violent 
confrontation between management and labor (Lichtenstein 1995). The auto managers 
regarded a union presence at the workplace as an interference with their right to 
manage. The unions were aware that they existed at the workplace against the will of 
management. The union had no common agenda with management and had to fight for 
social and material improvements. The low-trust relationship between management 
and labor was developed into an increasingly detailed and voluminous collective 
bargaining agreement that laid out the rules of the employment relationship. Grievance 
procedures at the workplace channeled the local conflicts between management and 
labor. In an employment relationship in which management and labor did not trust 
each other, the collective bargaining agreement was the first line of defense for the 
labor union. When line managers sought to bend the rules of the collective bargaining 
agreement, the unions defended them staunchly through grievance procedures and 
strikes. In a continuously growing national auto market, despite sharp cyclical 
downturns, the UAW was able to set the agenda in collective bargaining rounds and 
gained higher living and working standards for its members until the late 1970s. 
Important innovations in collective bargaining were the introduction of a cost-of- living 
adjustment, retirement after 30 years of factory work (“thirty and you’re out”) and an 
annual improvements factor (Katz, MacDuffie, & Phil 2002). 
Changes in employment relations were triggered by changes in the auto 
market. The American auto market had been firmly in the hands of the Big Three until 
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the late 1970s. However, the foreign imports, in particular of Japanese producers, grew 
in the 1970s and became a major concern when the Big Three were hit hard by the 
auto recession in the wake of the second oil crisis in 1979. The Big Three and the 
UAW sought to limit the competition from the foreign car producers and successfully 
lobbied the government in the 1980s to impose import restrictions for Japanese car 
producers. These were circumvented by the Japanese companies by building plants in 
the United States. The Japanese producers managed to prevent a union presence, and 
thus introduced a non-union sector to the auto market. The market share of the 
Japanese continuously rose and put pressure on the Big Three to change employment 
relations. The managers wondered how they could compete and began to explore new 
ideas and strategies. Beyond a massive restructuring in the early 1980s, which is a 
rather typical response to market pressure in United States employment relations, GM 
sought to gain a competitive edge over the Japanese producer by pushing the high 
automatization of production. However, this idea did not produce the expected 
productivity gains and eventually failed. In addition, the Big Three sought to 
understand the reasons fo r the higher productivity of the Japanese producers. Industry 
analysts and academics found that the organization of production of the Japanese 
producer, which came to be known as lean production, was one of the central factors. 
Lean production inspired the reorganization of production. Lean production was partly 
an ideology that sought to reduce waste and slack in the production process (Womack 
et. al. 1990). Lean production had implications for employment relations as it 
considerably departed from previous employment relations practices. Employees were 
supposed to be given a greater voice in the production process and to work in teams. 
Ford and GM began to experiment with lean production. GM engaged in the joint-
venture NUMMI with Toyota (Turner 1991). GM’s most advanced independent lean 
production project became Saturn. The proponents believed that lean production was 
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an opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship between management and 
labor and to close the productivity gap with the Japanese producer.  
However, neither management nor labor completely embraced the idea of lean 
production and a greater involvement of workers in practice. As the new strategic 
ideas grew on past experiences, the long-time adversarial and low-trust relationship 
constrained the development of a cooperative ideology between management and 
labor. Within the UAW there emerged a debate and conflict over lean production. The 
case of the supporters within the UAW was most strongly made by Don Ephlin, the 
UAW vice president and head of the UAW’s GM department, and the key person on 
the union side involved in setting up the Saturn project. At Saturn the involvement of 
unionists in management decisions was unprecedented and unionists became co-
managers in running production (Rubinstein & Kochan 2001; Rubinstein 2001). On 
the other side, the New Directions Movement, an opposition movement within the 
UAW that grew stronger in the second half of the 1980s, staunchly opposed lean 
production and fought against its implementation. For them lean production was just 
another management strategy to exploit workers and they called it “management by 
stress” (Parker & Slaughter 1988). The 1989 convention of the UAW shaped the 
future orientation of the union towards lean production and its ideological position 
towards management. The ruling “administrative caucus” was able to beat the New 
Directions Movement decisively. However, at the same time, Steve Yokich replaced 
Don Ephlin as UAW vice president and head of the UAW’s GM department. The 
strongest supporters and opponents of lean production within the UAW were 
weakened in the 1989 convention. The national UAW leadership took the middle of 
the road and had a wide-open approach in practice to lean production. In the 1990s, 
the national UAW took part in joint-programs with management and supported locals 
that embraced lean production as well as locals that resisted it.  
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The approach taken by management was also not consistent. Besides some 
bright spots of labor-management cooperation, other managers continued to prefer a 
tough approach towards the UAW and forced changes in work rules necessary for lean 
production upon labor by whipsawing or threatening plants with disinvestments. These 
forcing strategies were in some cases able to achieve the necessary changes to work 
rules, but they antagonized unions and prevented the development of a more 
cooperative ideology. In the 1990s, differences between Ford and GM management 
became more visible. Ford had centralized labor relations in the hands of Peter 
Pestillo, head of labor relations and vice president, after some bitter strikes in the early 
1980s. He pursued a more cooperative relationship and sought to implement the 
necessary work rules for lean production together with the union. All important labor 
conflicts were handled from the top by Pestillo, which prevented hard-nosed local 
managers from battling it out with the union at the plant level. Over time Pestillo 
earned the trust of the union. In the 1990s, the UAW negotiated a difficult agenda with 
management, agreeing to more flexibility and outsourcing. The improved and more 
cooperative employment relationship at Ford is most clearly illustrated by the fact that 
the UAW did not strike at the company in the 1990s and 2000s. 
In contrast to Ford, there remained regular conflicts between management and 
labor at GM. In a number of plants, often greenfield plants, a more cooperative 
relationship developed between management and labor. However, when management 
did not achieve more flexible work rules and outsourcing in cooperation with the labor 
union, GM’s management used forcing strategies such as whipsawing and the threat to 
disinvest aggressively. This regularly sparked fierce resistance and strikes by local 
labor unions. Due to the greater integration of production, these strikes often shut 
down a large number of plants of GM’s North American operation. This tug of war 
between management and labor continued throughout the 1990s. Within GM 
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management, the ideological opposition to the union remained high and a number of 
managers did not believe in a more cooperative relationship with the union and the 
ideology of lean production. The idea persisted among management that it was best to 
break the union. In 1998, a faction within GM management, emboldened through 
record profits, gained the upper hand and pushed for a tougher line towards the union. 
In local conflicts in Flint, this tougher stance by GM management led to one of the 
fiercest conflicts ever between management and UAW (Babson 2004). The local strike 
lasted 54 days and shut down most of GM’s North American operation. The plan to 
break the union had failed. GM lost $2.5 billion in sales and market share that it never 
regained afterwards. The managers responsible for the hard- line approach towards the 
UAW were dismissed. An ideological change took place through a leadership change. 
One of GM’s European managers, Gary Cowger, who only recently had became the 
head of GM Germany, was ordered back to Detroit and asked to become the head of 
labor relations of GM’s North American operation. Cowger had experienced the 
advantages of cooperative working relations with labor during his tenure in Europe. In 
the following years, he set the tone for a more cooperative relationship with the UAW 
and sought to convince other managers within GM, as is illustrated in Cowger’s social 
partnership speeches at GM management conferences.  
Ford and GM returned to solid profits during the strong boom of the American 
economy between 1993 and 1999 and the related up swing of the North American auto 
market. Favorable for the Big Three was the high demand for SUVs (Sports Utility 
Vehicles). However, competitive pressure remained high as foreign automakers 
expanded production and gained market share during the 1990s. In the 2000s, the 
situation of GM and Ford in the North American auto market became much more 
difficult. Following September 11, the United States economy slid into a recession. 
Even after the recession was over, the saturated auto market did not grow and 
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stagnated at around 17 million sold vehicles per year. Troubling for Ford and GM was 
that demand for their most profitable products, the SUVs, decreased in the context of 
increasing gas prices. In contrast, the market share of foreign competitors rose 
continuously; however, the UAW was not able to organize any of their production 
facilities. At different times in the 2000s, Ford and GM were in serious trouble and 
made severe losses. The UAW wondered how to adapt to the changing environment 
and their orientation towards management gradually changed. The fate of the UAW 
was linked to Ford and GM as these two companies were the two largest union 
strongholds. The UAW always had a market orientation, but this was more geared 
towards figuring out the best possible improvements in collective bargaining. In the 
2000s, the market orientation of the UAW changed and it became more of a concern 
for the union to make the companies more competitive. The ideational orientation had 
begun to emerge in the 1990s when the UAW engaged in cooperative joint-programs 
with management, but became more pronounced under the crises in the 2000s and 
after a union leadership change took place from Steve Yokich to Ron Gettelfinger in 
2002. Yokich supported the joint-programs with management, but he could be 
contentious and when threatened by management, he would not shy away from strikes 
that economically badly hurt the company. Facilitated through a more cooperative 
approach by management, Gettelfinger slowly moved the UAW away from its 
ideological position in the 1990s. He continued to defend the material and social 
interests of the worker; however, the idea of helping the companies become more 
competitive gradually became a stronger orientation of the UAW under his leadership. 
Rank and file opposition criticized Gettelfinger for the cooperative relationship with 
management and concessions he made. However, he was able to convince a large 
majority of union members for his course and was reelected in 2006, even after 
agreeing to unprecedented concessions in 2005. Gettelfinger had agreed to open up the 
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collective bargaining contract and to radical concessions such as the introduction of 
co-payments for health costs in order to secure the survival of the companies (Katz 
2008). During the 2007 collective bargaining round, management and the UAW 
negotiated the removal of health insurance from the company books and transferred it 
to a union run Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association (Lipsky 2007). At GM, 
management financed the transfer of the health insurance by giving the union a 4% 
share stake in the company. The social insurances were the single most important 
reason for the productivity gap between the Big Three and foreign competitors. 
Industry experts argued that the new collective bargaining agreement closed the 
productivity gap with foreign competitors. After the 2008 financial crisis management 
and the UAW were struggling to keep the companies alive.  
 
Spain 
Until the mid 1980s, the Spanish auto market was sealed off from foreign competition 
because of trade restrictions. The only way for foreign producers to enter the national 
auto market was by having production facilities in Spain. Labor relations at Ford, 
SEAT and GM in the 1980s were shaped by the socio-economic context and previous 
experiences of the actors. The unionists were socialized through their fight against the 
Franco dictatorship and their struggle for democracy. After the transition to 
democracy, labor relations remained adversarial (Martinez-Lucio 1998). For the 
Spanish unionists it seemed to be natural to fight for material and social improvements 
in collective bargaining and they were quick to strike. A great variety of trade unions 
and ideological orientations existed at the company level. The most important unions 
were the socialist or social-democratic UGT (Union General de Trabajadores), the 
communist CCOO (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras) and the anarchist 
CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo) (Fishman 1990). The contentious union 
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approach to collective bargaining and the growth of the Spanish auto market 
continuously improved the social and material conditions of the autoworkers at the 
three companies. Labor relations were less settled than in Germany and the United 
States, and this gave management opportunities to explore new employment relations 
practices. A widespread causal belief of management and unionists in the 1970s and 
1980s was that auto production was physically too demanding for running round the 
clock production. This collective belief was first disrupted in Spain. GM negotiated 
three-shift production with the unions at the plant in Saragossa in 1988. Later this 
employment relations practice spread to Germany and the United States.  
The socio-economic context continued to change dynamically. In 1986, Spain 
joined the European Union (Hamann 1998, 2002). As part of the integration process, 
Spain had to remove trade barriers from the auto market. In the second half of the 
1980s, the imports of foreigner producers increased significantly and competition in 
the Spanish auto market increased. This did not have such a dramatic economic affect 
for Ford, VW and GM, because the Spanish auto market continued to grow solidly and 
the Spanish plants began to export into the European auto market. Collective 
bargaining rounds followed a similar pattern in the 1980s and early 1990s. The unions 
pushed for improvements, which management sought to resist, but when the unions 
threatened to strike or struck, management improved its initial offer for the collective 
bargaining rounds, although this remained below that demanded by the labor unions. 
The social and material conditions of autoworkers continually improved. The 
headquarters of the MNCs in Germany and the USA were not yet concerned about the 
higher labor costs as they started to rise from a low base and were still lower compared 
to other countries in the European Union. Labor relations were largely handled by 
local Spanish management. Management did not trust the labor unions and labor 
relations remained adversarial.  
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Labor relations began to change in the wake of the crisis of the European auto 
market in 1993 (Ortiz 1999). The company hit hardest during the 1993 crisis was 
SEAT. The management at the Volkswagen (VW) headquarters believed that the poor 
performance of SEAT threatened the economic existence of the whole company. The 
German headquarters stepped in and pushed hard for an unprecedented restructuring 
program. The unions responded with large-scale strike action, which constituted the 
largest company-based strikes in the history of democratic Spain. In the end 
management pushed through its restructuring program with the support of the regional 
and national governments. This was a dramatic defeat for the unions and labor 
relations had reached a low point. After the restructuring program, the influence of the 
headquarters increased and management regarded it as essential to repair the 
relationship with the unions. Management transferred some of the cooperative 
employment relations practices from Germany to Spain. For example, SEAT began to 
implement annual planning rounds, in which management and labor commonly 
discussed production and investments for the following year. In addition, management 
cooperated with the labor unions in the context of the European Works Council. 
Planning rounds and the EWC gave the unions more access to company information 
than they would have had under Spanish labor law. The idea by management of an 
“open book” approach was that the unions would become more cooperative as they 
got firsthand look at the economic situation and the constraints that the company 
faced. Furthermore, Spanish unionists were invited by IG Metall to trade union 
seminars in Germany and management hoped that this would also contribute to a 
“professionalization” of the Spanish unionists.  
Ford and in particular GM were less affected by the crisis of the European auto 
market in 1993 and more significant changes in labor relations at GM and Ford took 
place at a later stage. The competitive situation of the Spanish plants changed 
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significantly in the second half of the 1990s. The Spanish plants lost its lost cost/ low 
wage advantage in Europe through the expansion of the auto market to Eastern 
Europe. Wage and production costs in Eastern Europe were below that of Spain. 
Management became more concerned about increasing labor costs in Spain and the 
oversight of labor relations by headquarters also increased at GM and Ford. At all 
three companies, management had the prerogative to increase working time flexibility. 
However, the unions resisted the changes, as they had grown accustomed to the 
improvement of their social and material conditions over the previous two decades.  
The possibility of the introduction of weekend work, for example, was regarded as a 
big step backwards.  
Management at Ford grew increasingly impatient with the limited progress 
with respect to working time flexibility. This led to a major clash between 
management and labor in the 1998 collective bargaining round (Artiles 2002). The 
bitter and long-lasting collective bargaining conflict also brought out ideological 
differences between the unions. The UGT followed to some extent the causal belief by 
management that it was necessary to make the plant more competitive. The other 
unions rejected this logic; for them, this was just a further application of the MNC’s 
capitalist ideology that sought to exploit workers. They believed that they could best 
pursue the interests of the workers by resisting changes and concessions. In this 
collective bargaining round management whipsawed the Valencia plant with the 
German plant in Saarlouis; however, it made only very limited progress with respect to 
greater working time flexibility. In the following years, Ford’s management pursued a 
similar approach to labor relations at SEAT/VW and sought to facilitate more 
cooperative labor relations, but used different instruments. Management supported the 
more cooperative UGT, with which management shared the fundamental belief that it 
was necessary to make the plant competitive. Management increasingly hired UGT 
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members for new jobs, which increased the share of UGT union membership in the 
plant. In addition, UGT members were more readily promoted compared to members 
from other unions. However, the identity work of management was at first 
unsuccessful. In union elections, the UGT received fewer votes than they had 
members. Workers became a member of the UGT, because it was to their advantage; 
however, when they were alone in the voting booth, some of the UGT members 
expressed a different ideological position and voted for the more radical unions. 
However, incrementally the ideological composition of the workforce changed and the 
UGT won a majority of the votes in the 2003 union election, which gave labor 
relations at Ford a significantly different ideational foundation and made them more 
cooperative. Important dimensions of labor relations became more similar to the 
German Ford plant. The Spanish representatives jockeyed in cooperation with the 
local management for production from the European headquarters and cooperated with 
management in making the plant more competitive.  
Labor relations at GM developed in a different direction. GM’s European 
headquarters began to whipsaw plants aggressively in the 1990s. This was discussed in 
the meetings of GM’s EWC, in which the Spanish representatives had participated 
since its foundation in 1996. Following the disruptive transnational whipsawing of 
GM, an increasing number of EWC members shared the causal belief that GM’s 
practices could only be countered through a transnational union strategy. The GM 
representative built close ties with other members of the EWC and the interpretation of 
the EWC made sense to the Spanish representatives after they were whipsawed by 
management for the first time and rumors appeared about the closure of the Saragossa 
plant in the early 2000s. Spanish representatives and the EWC built a common 
ideology around fighting plant closures and engaged in common transnational work 
stoppages, so called European Action Days, in which more than 40.000 workers 
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participated. When GM Europe continued to make heavy losses, the EWC engaged in 
collective negotiations with the GM’s European management and negotiated 
concessions. The labor strategy was to solidaristically “share the pain” in order to 
prevent plant closures – and the Saragossa plant bore its part of the “pain”. Collective 
bargaining rounds at GM Saragossa continued to take place at the local level; however 
they were backed up by a transnational strategy and the Saragossa plant continued to 
take part in joint European action. The EWC and the Spanish unions’ response to the 
announced plant closure of the Portuguese Azambuja plant in 2006 showed how far 
the unionists had gone in constructing a common ideology around collectively fighting 
plant closures in Europe. Management intended to close the Azambuja plant and to 
transfer its production to the Saragossa plant. This was in the material interest of the 
Spanish unions. However, for them the solidarity was more important and they struck 
in favor of their Portuguese colleagues in the context of another European Action Day 
(Greer & Hauptmeier 2008b). 
At SEAT, the strategy by management was to engage with the unions in 
planning rounds and in the EWC, and later the WWC (World Works Council) in order 
to facilitate more cooperative labor relations; however this strategy was not initially 
successful. There were very few strikes in the second half of the 1990s, partly because 
of an improved economic situation of SEAT; however, conflicts broke out again in the 
early 2000s when management pushed for greater working time flexibility. The 
unions, in particular the older generation of union leaders, rejected this fiercely. In the 
collective bargaining round of 2002 management used a more heavy-handed approach 
and threatened to transfer 10% of the Ibiza production to the Bratislava plant in 
Slovakia (Artiles 2004). After the unions once more blocked increased working time 
flexibility, management made good on its threat and transferred production. This was a 
shock for the unions. Conflicts broke out in the union camp as to how to deal with the 
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situation. A number of older union leaders, some of them labor leaders from the 
1970s, decided to step down before the new union election and to clear the way for a 
younger generation. This younger generation of union leaders had a different ideology 
shaped by their different experiences. These unionists were socialized in union work 
during democratic times. For them working time flexibility was not so much of a 
thorny issue. A more cooperative relationship developed between the new generation 
of union leaders and management and the ideological opposition between the two 
decreased. Both shared the basic causal belief that it was necessary to make the 
companies more competitive. Management was finally able to implement greater 
working time flexibility as had previously taken place in Germany. Management 
praised the newly found cooperative labor relations at SEAT and management sought 
to engage labor unions proactively in production and investment planning.  
Labor relations in the context of the Spanish labor relations institutions 
changed over time and increasingly varied across the companies in the 2000s. Spanish 
labor unions have an institutional right to strike, which has few limitations and even 
includes the right to take part in political strikes. The proneness to strike of unions is 
closely linked to their causal beliefs  and ideologies. While the unions used the strike 
regularly in the 1980s and in the 1990s, the proneness to strike decreased in the 2000s. 
There were also important ideational changes on the management side across time, 
which increasingly started to vary in the 1990s. In the 1980s, the Spanish managers 
were stuck in a low-trust/ adversarial relationship with their labor unions. In the 1990s, 
their approach towards the unions became more sophisticated, which was based on a 
greater role and influence by international management of the MNCs. At SEAT and 
Ford management sought to pro-actively facilitate a cooperative orientation of their 
labor unions in the 1990s, combined with some robust whipsawing, which only 
facilitated more cooperative labor relations in the 2000s. Labor unions became more 
  
 
23 
market orientated and shared with management the causal belief that it was necessary 
to make the company more competitive. At GM, the unions believed that 
management’s aggressive whipsawing and restructuring could not be countered with 
national union strategies. The Spanish unions engaged in transnational union 
cooperation in the EWC and increasingly shared an ideology with their European 
colleagues around collectively fighting plant closures and dismissals.  
 
Germany 
Labor relations and collective negotiations in the auto companies were based on the 
compromise of the postwar compromise between state, employer associations and 
labor, which was called a social market economy. In the working out of this system, 
unions achieved a far-reaching institutional role in the governing of employment 
relations; unions were not divided any longer along party lines (as before World War 
II), but unitary unions were created that had affiliates from the conservative party as 
well as from the social democratic party (Streeck 1984). This contributed early on to 
moderate union and works council ideologies.  
Ford and GM grew strongly in the postwar decades. The works councilors felt 
constrained by sectoral collective bargaining and they demanded company collective 
bargaining as at VW, in order to take advantage of the positive economic 
development. This discontent was overcome by introducing a second collective 
bargaining round at company level. This was not defined by institutional rules and 
only developed in practice. As it was not grounded in labor law, management and 
unions avoided calling these negotiations collective bargaining and labeled it instead 
“an adaptation of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement to the specifics of the 
company.” In effect, works councils negotiated higher wages and social benefits at the 
company level from the 1970s onwards. These negotiations at the company level led 
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to roughly 25% wages of autoworkers in comparison to the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement in the early 1990s.  
Up to the 1980s, labor relations at the three companies could not really be 
described as cooperative, but the involvement of labor was rather confined to the 
legally defined minimum. Management at Ford and GM in Germany governed in a 
hierarchical and top-down fashion. Management at VW, due to its long-term state 
ownership, had more of a paternalistic approach to labor relations (Turner 1991). 
Ideational changes took place on the management side in the wake of the rise of 
Japanese producers. The Japanese producers with their lean production philosophy, 
including a greater voice for workers in the production process, were a threat to the 
management of the auto companies. This raised doubts among managers on how to 
manage employment relations effectively. Lean production practices were imported to 
the German plants from the United States. The German managers became more open 
to cooperation with labor and appreciated labor’s voice to a greater extent in the 
production process (Turner 1991).  
The socio-economic context began to change in the early 1990s and led to 
changes in employment relations. The integration of the European car market and the 
rise of new competitors in South and Eastern Europe lead to greater economic 
competition for the German production sites. In 1993, the German economy slid into 
one of the worst recessions of the postwar decades, which was partly triggered by the 
collapsing East Germany economy in the wake of unification. All three car makers ran 
into severe trouble and forced labor and management to renegotiate employment 
relations (Rehder 2003).  
During the crisis in 1993, management announced that VW had an employee 
excess of 30,000 employees. Management was committed to avoid redundancies; 
while labor was committed to make concessions to overcome the crisis. The labor 
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department suggested a radical working time reduction, which went against the trend 
in other companies in Germany, where management demanded rather longer than 
shorter working hours. Labor and management quickly agreed in the collective 
bargaining round on working time of 28.8 hours a week, which roughly equaled the 
labor excess of 30,000 employees (Seifert & Trinczek 2000). At the same time labor 
agreed to a 10% reduction in wages. VW and management continued to reduce 
working time and increased working time flexibility in the 1995 collective bargaining 
round. In 1997 management and labor further increased the productivity through a 
collective agreement on early retirement.  
Of the company cases examined across the three countries, the nature of the 
employment relationship changed the least at Ford. The causal beliefs and ideology of 
labor did not change significantly between the 1980s and 2000s. This stability in labor 
relationship was related to the strong leadership of Wilfried Kuckelkorn, who was the 
head of the works council between 1984 and 2001. Kuckelkorn robustly represented 
the material and social interests of the workforce, but accepted the role of labor in 
running the company productively. Management at Ford also robustly represented 
their interests towards labor, but they would not use forcing strategies as extensively 
as they would at GM. Ford seemed to value the predictability and stability of labor 
relations at their German plants.  
During the crisis of the auto market in 1993, labor at Ford had a different focus 
compared to GM and VW. The head of the Ford works council had the causal belief 
that only sufficient production for the plants in Germany could secure employment 
levels, wage levels and social benefits. If the plants would not run at full capacity in a 
shrinking auto market, the plants would not run efficiently and labor would inevitably 
have to agree to concessions and labor shedding. In the collective negotiations, labor 
demanded the assignment of specific cars and engine models to the German plants. 
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Management focused on wage and social benefits concessions from labor, in order to 
reduce the high labor costs in comparison to other countries. Labor and management at 
Ford negotiated a similar collective agreement in 1997. The works council demanded 
and won new production assignment for the German plants and agreed in exchange to 
more labor concessions.  
All three producers, Ford, GM and VW standardized production and built 
common production platforms, which increased the shared parts of different models 
and allowed the companies to drive down the costs for parts’ purchase. A side effect of 
the production platforms was that it was more easily possible to assign production to 
different plants as well as to shift production between plants. This allowed 
management to whipsaw different plants in collective negotiations. GM Europe was 
the first of the three producers to aggressively use this new employment relations 
instrument for extracting concessions from labor. In whipsawing rounds in Europe in 
1993, 1995 and 1998 management forced concessions from its German workforce 
(Schulten, Seifert, & Zagelmeyer 2002). Whipsawing was a powerful new tool in the 
hands of management in times of tight markets and underutilized plants. It gave 
management considerably more leverage in negotiations with labor.  
GM’s aggressive whipsawing disrupted previous institutional practices and 
changed the mindset of labor. The works council started to believe that labor responses 
based on national institutions would not be sufficient to counter the transnational 
whipsawing. After the 1998 whipsawing round, the German labor representative began 
to develop transnational strategies with unionists from other countries. When GM 
Europe began to make losses in the next downturn in 1999, the German labor 
representatives sought to act jointly with their colleagues in the EWC. The EWC and 
GM Europe negotiated restructuring agreements on the engine joint-venture with Fiat 
and on the plant closure in Luton, UK, in order to avoid forced redundancies in 
  
 
27 
Europe. The EWC negotiated another restructuring agreement with GM’s European 
headquarters. GM Europe made losses and when rumors about a plant closure 
emerged in 2001, the EWC engaged in collective negotiations with management  
(Herber & Schäfer-Klug 2002). Labor representatives were willing to agree to 
concession and “to share the pain,” in order to avoid a plant closure. The EWC 
representatives increasingly shared a common transnational ideology around fighting 
plant closures in Europe, which led to transnational collective agreements and 
common collective action.  
GM’s management was less committed to production in Germany compared to 
Ford and VW. GM Europe reduced the workforce drastically in Germany and built up 
new production capacities in Eastern Europe. GM’s manufacturing footprint moved 
east in Europe. In 2003, management announced that all new production decisions 
would be made solely based on bidding contests between the plants that share a 
production platform. The plant with the best tender would receive the new production. 
This introduced a within company market for the allocation and distribution of new 
production. The German representatives believed that the bidding process could not be 
stopped and countered through a national strategy and worked on improving 
transnational strategies. The EWC in cooperation with the EMF (European Metal 
Workers’ Federation) founded the Delta Group for the bidding process of the Delta 
production platform. Labor representatives from all the affected plants took part and 
the goal was to negotiate a fair distribution of production, which would allow all 
plants to survive. This transnational strategy was only partly successful as 
management secretly negotiated concessions with one of the local plants, which 
undercut the negotiation position of the Delta-Group. The restructuring of the German 
plants continued between 2004 and 2007. Concessions were negotiated at the local 
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level, which the German representatives sought to resist through a transnational 
strategy and common transnational action. 
Labor relations at Ford continued to be stable and followed previous patterns. 
Ford valued the predictability and stability of the German plants. While GM had a 
widespread production network, which allowed them to whipsaw plants in Europe and 
extract labor concessions, Ford believed that economies of scale could prove more 
efficient and concentrated production. In the recession of the European auto market at 
the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, Ford concentrated its European production to a 
larger extent in Germany. Ford closed production facilities in Eastern Europe and the 
United Kingdom. As the existence of the German plants was not threatened by Ford’s 
management, previous institutional practices continued. Neither did employment 
relations alter after the labor leadership change in 2001. In 2003, Ford Germany made 
record losses. In local negotiations the works council negotiated unprecedented 
concessions for the German plants to the amount of two billion euros. Despite the 
magnitude of the concessions, the agreement was quietly negotiated and went largely 
unnoticed by the German press and public. In another round of local negotiations, the 
Ford works council exchanged labor concessions in exchange for production 
assignments to the German plants until 2011. Labor agreed to voluntary buyouts and 
second-tier wages for newly employed workers.  
The recession of the auto market in Europe at the end of the 1990s triggered 
changes in labor relations at VW. In a context of high overcapacities and underutilized 
plants, management explored a tougher approach towards labor by introducing 
whipsawing practices more bluntly. Previously management had not pitted its German 
plants directly against its foreign plants, but this practice emerged in 1999. After the 
labor representatives did not agree to changes of the collective bargaining agreement, 
management decided to produce the new model at its Slovak plant in Bratislava. This 
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was the first time that a new car model of the VW brand was not first built in 
Germany; previously only older car models had been sourced to VW’s foreign plants. 
Only a year later, in 2000, management engaged in another attempt to lower the 
standards of the collective bargaining agreement. Management offered the production 
of another car model to the German plants, but only if labor would agree to a second 
tier collective bargaining agreement with considerably lower standards, otherwise the 
car would be sourced to a foreign plant again. Labor finally agreed to a lower second 
tier collective bargaining agreement in 2001, which was a renegotiation by 
management and labor of the institutional rule “same pay, for same jobs.” 
Collective negotiations in 2004 continued to take place in the context of 
management’s whipsawing practices. Labor relations became more contentious, which 
was illustrated through the rare strike action during the collective bargaining round in 
2004. Labor insisted in exchange for concessions, which included an expansion of 
lower tier wages, on detailed production assignment for its German plants. In 2005, 
management whipsawed for the first time two German plants. Management extracted 
concessions from the Mosel and the Emden plant in the context of a new production 
assignment. These whipsawing practices developed within the German institutions.  
 
How do ideas and ideologies change?  
This study argues that there is a mutual relationship between the actors’ collective 
ideas and institutions. Changing ideas and ideologies lead to a different functioning 
and meaning of institutions. This study inductively derived five mechanisms of 
ideational change through the analysis of the case studies: leadership change, identity 
work, mimicking & learning, collective bargaining and generational change. On a 
more general level, collective ideas are relational and collective actors work them out 
in relation to other actors (Geertz 1973) and they are based on past experiences and 
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current contingencies (Bendix 1959). The different mechanisms of ideational change 
are separately explained, but can overlap and occur at the same time in practice.  
Leadership change can trigger ideational changes. The leadership of an 
organization is in important position to shape the ideas and ideologies of the 
organization. When a company does not reach its goals and is in crisis, the board of 
directors or supervisory board can change the CEO and other top-management. These 
new managers might bring in new strategic ideas and pursue changes in employment 
relations. An example is the leadership change at GM in the United States after the 
Flint strike disaster in 1998. The strategic idea to take a tough approach towards the 
union and “break it” had cost the company $2.5billion. Managers responsible for that 
course of action were replaced by managers who were more in favor of cooperative 
labor relations. In addition, leadership changes on the labor side led to ideational 
changes within the labor organization. When the head of the works council at GM in 
Germany went into retirement, he was replaced by a labor leader who cooperated 
much more closely with labor unions from other countries and developed new 
transnational labor union practices.  
Identity work of the leadership can shape the collective ideas of an organization 
(Greer & Hauptmeier 2008a). This can be related to a leadership change, but can also 
refer to a change in direction of the existing leadership. The leadership of 
organizations has more resources and information than regular members have, and is 
thus in a better position to shape the collective ideas and ideologies of an organization. 
Obviously, there are differences in the identity work of a management and a labor 
organization. New strategic ideas by management are not usually challenged due to 
hierarchical structures and decisions of management. However, top-management seeks 
to convince other managers of certain strategic ideas and ideology such as lean 
production or cooperative relations with unions, which have to be broadly shared in 
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order to be implemented effectively. Literature on corporate identity describes how 
managers seek to develop shared beliefs and a common identity of organizations 
(Carter 2001; Pedersen, Jenssen, & Hayden 1998). Part of the identity work of 
management is directed at the labor organization. Management strategies seek to 
engender more cooperative labor relations by giving unions more resources for the 
representation of the workforce or engaging labor representatives in decision-making 
processes. Such negotiations and deliberation can make unions more aware of the 
constraints management faces. Unions do not try to influence management to the same 
extent; the identity work of union leaders is more geared towards its own membership. 
A crucial difference between management and labor is that labor leaders can be voted 
out of office if the workforce does not agree with new strategic ideas and policies. 
Thus, union leaders have to convince the workforce of new ideas and policies. Identity 
work usually takes time, as people tend to stick to their previous beliefs. However, a 
crisis of a company and strong market pressure can make it easier for the leadership, 
on the management as well as on the labor side, to convince their organizations of new 
ideas and practices.  
Another mechanism that contributes to ideational changes is the mimicking & 
learning of new employment relations practices. In times of economic crisis, previous 
employment relations practices can seem exhausted. At these times of economic 
uncertainty, management and labor leaders might not have a clear notion of how to 
deal with the situation and an exploration of new ideas and practices is taking place. 
One way to overcome such a situation of economic uncertainty is to copy employment 
relations practices from other plants in the company or its competitors (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983). In very competitive markets, there is an urgency to adapt such new 
employment relations practices in order to stay competitive. The copying of 
employment relations practices explains the spread and diffusion of employment 
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relations to different countries within and between MNCs. Management gradually 
adapted new ideas and practices over the previous decades including nights shift, 
transnational whipsawing, outsourcing and two-tier wage systems. However, unionists 
also look for ideas from other companies and examine how other unionists cope with a 
crisis. Did the other unionists try to hold the line and defend certain employment 
relations standards or did they agree to concessions? In buoyant economic times, the 
collective bargaining outcomes from other plants become a benchmark, which unions 
try to emulate. In the 1990s, the Spanish unionists used as an illustration the longer 
holidays of German workers and sought to catch up with this standard over time. This 
strategy has gone fairly well and the number of holidays at the Spanish auto plants was 
almost at the level of the German auto plants in 2007. The imitation and 
implementation of new ideas and employment relations practices can be a process of 
trial and error and learning experiences. These experiences, based on new practices, 
shape the actors’ causal beliefs and ideas.  
The outcome of the collective bargaining round is usually a compromise 
agreed upon in the collective bargaining contract. The compromise of collective 
bargaining has an important function for ideational changes. Signing the collective 
contract facilitates an implicit acceptance of the changes and new realities over time, 
even if one side only agrees grudgingly to the changes. Put in the terms of Burawoy, 
the process of collective bargaining and negotiating compromise contributes to the 
manufacturing of consent  of the changes in employment relations (Burawoy 1979). 
The differences in the Spanish cases are illuminating between the social democratic 
union UGT and the communist union CCOO, on the one hand, and the anarchist union 
CGT on the other hand. The UGT and the CCOO engaged in collective bargaining 
with management at MNCs in hard times. The process of collective bargaining and the 
negotiating of compromise seem to have contributed to the ideational changes of these 
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two unions, who departed significantly from their previous radical ideologies and are 
nowadays much more market-oriented. In contrast, the CGT rejected to engage in 
collective bargaining based on their anarchist ideology. As this union abstained from 
the manufacturing of consent and did not take responsibility for negotiating the social 
and material conditions in hard times, it was much easier for this union to stay 
ideologically pure. The CGT’s ideology has barely changed over the last 20 years.  
Another mechanism for ideational change is generational change (Kelly & 
Heery 1994). Generational change refers rather to long-term ideational changes. The 
causal beliefs and ideologies of unionists and managers are shaped by their 
experiences as well as by the specific challenges each generation faces. To some 
extent the specific experiences and challenges unionists and managers face are 
grounded in the specific history of a plant or company; however, they are also 
grounded in the broader societal and material changes. The Spanish case studies 
reflect most clearly how different generations of unionists have different ideologies. 
Many unionists in Spain in charge in the 1980s and 1990s were crucially influenced 
by their trade union work during the Franco dictatorship. Trade union work was illegal 
and dangerous as trade unionists were killed by the authoritarian regime. Trade union 
work was part of a broader struggle for freedom and democracy in Spain. After 
Spain’s transition to democracy, it seemed to be natural for these unionists to fight for 
social and material improvements in a contentious manner and regular strikes took 
place. In the 2000s, a trade union generation came into power with a very different set 
of experiences. They had only experienced trade union work in a democracy. These 
unionists were to a lesser degree ideationally opposed to management and strike action 
declined under their leadership. The generational changes in the United States and 
Germany were less salient as they were not related to a transformation of the political 
system, but they took place as will be shown in the case studies.  
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Besides these five mechanisms, the actors’ ideas and ideologies are shaped on 
a more basic level by their relations to other actors and past experiences and current 
contingencies (Bendix 1959). Such past experiences can be extraordinary events in the 
relationship between management and labor, such as dramatic and bitter bargaining 
contentions, and can have a long- lasting impact and shape the collective ideas and 
ideologies of the actors. These extraordinary events help to define who the actors are 
and what is important to them. They remain important reference points in the memory 
of the actors. Examples are the intense Flint conflict at GM in 1998 or the shooting of 
a SEAT worker in 1971. Beyond these extraordinary events, managers and unionist 
develop a relationship based on daily practices and interactions, which shapes their 
collective ideas and ideologies. Managers and workers develop a sense and internalize 
“how things are done.” However, the collective ideas and ideologies of the actors are 
not only shaped by experiences but also based on current contingencies. Changes in 
the socio-economic context such as changes in the auto market can lead to a crisis of 
the company and put pressure on the actors. Actors wonder how they can adapt to this 
changing socio-economic context, because previous ideas and ideologies might not 
allow them any longer to achieve their goals and an exploration and reformulation of 
collective ideas and ideologies takes place. 
Collective ideas are also relational and worked out in relation to other actors 
(Geertz 1973). Beyond the company level, there are number of other actors to which 
management and labor respectively relate. Company unions and works councils are 
part of national unions. At union conferences, polices and strategies are discussed. In 
times of crisis, company unions also regularly ask for guidance from national offices, 
as they know about workers at other companies who deal with similar challenges. On 
the management side, managers meet in the context of producer and employer 
associations. At these meetings, managers from different companies discuss common 
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challenges they face and exchange best practices. These communities on the 
management side, as on the labor side, develop certain ideas and policies on how to 
develop employment relations and cope with challenges.  
The relational dimension of collective actors has changed significantly. In the 
1970s, the collective actors of the company level related to other actors in the context 
of national institutions such as national unions and national employer associations. 
The collective ideas of the actors were mostly worked out in relation to other national 
actors. The national institutions were underpinned by national ideas and ideologies. 
This relational dimension of employment relations has changed over the last two 
decades and has become more transnational. A crucial aspect has been the integration 
and standardization of production of MNCs across countries as well as the integration 
and expansion of product markets. This allowed the emergence of new practices such 
as benchmarking or transnational whipsawing. In the context of new production or 
investment decisions, management whipsaws plants from different countries.  
These changes to the company structure and new management practices 
brought workers into new social relations across countries. Company unions no longer 
work out their collective ideas and ideologies in mere relation to national actors, they 
also relate to the action of unions from plants in other countries, with which they are 
benchmarked or whipsawed. Unions not only look for benchmarks with respect to 
social benefits and wages in other countries, but they also observe how unions from 
other countries deal with challenges and position themselves for upcoming production 
allocation. Other institutions that contribute to new cross-border relations are the 
EWCs, in which workers exchanged their experiences and strategized about the 
challenges faced from management. Through the discussion in the EWC, worker 
representatives learnt more about working standards and wages in other countries 
(Keller & Platzer 2003; Müller, Platzer, & Rüb 2004).  
  
 
36 
In addition, the development of ideas on the management side has become 
more transnational as well. A crucial element is the placement of managers abroad, 
which increased significantly in the 1980s. The increasing cross-border movement of 
managers within the MNC facilitated the diffusion and spread of new ideas. The 
practices and ideas of managers were related to experiences in other countries. 
Certainly, the systematic worldwide benchmarking and the introduction of a 
worldwide lean manufacturing shaped common ideas and ideologies of management 
about how to organize production effectively.  
 
Competing theoretical arguments and previous literature  
This section compares the argument of this study with previous literature. A focus is 
on different theoretical orientations such as institutionalism, rational choice and 
constructivism, but it also integrates important debates in comparative employment 
relations on convergence and globalization.  
The predominant literature in comparative employment relations has a focus on 
national institutions (Bamber, Lansbury, & Wailes 2004). Different national 
institutions shape nationally distinct patterns of employment relations. In its focus on 
formal institutions, the employment relations literature follows much of the historical 
institutionalism in political science, in contrast to the sociological institutionalism, 
which also includes informal norms, customs and mores. Formal institutions such as 
collective bargaining and worker representation are mostly made up of a number of 
formal rules and laws, which are enforced by the state. As the formal institutions 
barely changed, the literature observed fairly stable and nationally distinct patterns of 
employment relations.  
A point of departure and contention for much of the institutional literature were 
the strong convergence theses of the 1960s that argued the industrialization process 
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would lead to a convergence of economic activities across countries (Kerr 1960). Late-
industrializing countries would catch up; managers across countries would ultimately 
implement modern production techniques and develop mature employment relations. 
In contrast, early institutional studies in employment relations such as Dore’s study on 
Japanese and British factory work and Streeck’s study on Germany showed in detail 
distinct national patterns of employment relations and linked them to national 
employment relations institutions (Dore 1973; Streeck 1984). Turner argued in his 
comparison of the politics of work organization that different cross-national patterns 
of employment relations were related to how unions were institutionally integrated in 
the governance of companies and the political economy (Turner 1991). He observed a 
decline of unionism in countries where unions lacked such a role, while union 
membership remained stable in countries, in which unions had a say in decision-
making processes at the company level and in the broader political economy.  
A recent prominent institutional literature is the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall 
& Soskice 2001b). Hall and Soskice differentiate between liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs); prime examples are the United 
States and Germany. Based on different national institutions, the coordination of 
economic activities varies systematically. While economic activities in LMEs are 
largely coordinated via markets; they are to a larger degree based on non-market 
relationship and cooperation in CMEs. The institutional configuration of each type of 
market economy leads to different types of comparative institutional advantages. 
Based on fluid markets LMEs allow radical innovation, while the non-market, long-
term cooperation between state, companies and unions in CMEs allow incremental 
innovation. An analytical focus is on individual companies in the different types of 
economies and the strategic choices of their managers. Managers have to coordinate 
economic behavior in different areas including employment relations. The key 
  
 
38 
argument of Hall and Soskice is that managers seek institutional support for 
organizing their business activities and that they try to exploit the respective 
comparative institutional advantage, which results in distinct national pattern of 
business activities (Hall & Soskice 2001a).  
In the same way that the institutional literature of the 1970s and 1980s was a 
movement against strong convergence through modernization theses of the 1960s, the 
Varieties of Capitalism can be read as an argument against the convergence through 
globalization theses of the 1990s. The strong globalization thesis suggested that 
economies would have to liberalize and deregulate their economies, in order to attract 
investments from footloose MNCs (Omae 1999). Friedman’s book “The world is flat” 
suggests that dynamic economic forces and markets would “flatten out” institutional 
differences and leave little room for nation states to organize their economies 
differently (Friedman 2007). In contrast, the Varieties of Capitalism showed that there 
are continuing institutional differences between CMEs and LMEs. The different 
patterns are sustained by managers who tend to exploit the respective comparative 
institutional advantages.  
However, there was also important criticism leveled against the Varieties of 
Capitalism and comparative literature in employment relations (Hancké, Rhodes, & 
Thatcher 2007). The comparative institutional literature with its focus on national 
patterns of employment relations had little to offer to help us understand within 
country variation. This led to important empirical challenges of the institutional 
literature. Herrigel showed that two very different types of industrial order existed in 
Germany, in which employment relations were organized differently (Herrigel 1996). 
Locke in a study on employment relations in Italy found different sub-national 
employment relations pattern linking them to regional, socio-economic contexts 
(Locke 1992; Locke 1995). Building on Locke’s work, Harry Katz and Owen 
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Darbishire identified the spread of the four different patterns of employment relations 
within and across countries (Katz 1997; Katz & Darbishire 2000). This study showed 
that very similar employment relations patterns could exist in countries with very 
different institutions as well that very different employment relations pattern can exist 
within the same national institutional structure. While Katz and Darbishire looked for 
different employment relations patterns at the industry level, this study moved one 
analytical level down and examined specific company cases. The findings of this study 
are somewhat similar; however, the explanations are different. While Katz and 
Darbishire generally argue that the spread of employment relations patterns across 
countries is driven by economic internationalization and union decline, this study 
argues that institutions are underpinned by the collective ideas and ideologies of the 
actors, which change as the actors adapt to a changing socio-economic context. Actors 
with different collective ideas and ideologies can make different use of institutions and 
develop very different employment relations practices. Actors with similar ideas and 
ideologies across countries can development very similar employment relations 
practices in very different institutional contexts.  
Another criticism of the institutional literature is that it not well suited to 
explain change. As the analytical focus is on formal institutions, this literature has 
problems to account for changes if the formal structure of the institutions does not 
change. Most of the institutional literature that examines employment relations has 
historical institutionalism either implicitly or explicitly as the theoretical base 
(Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth 1992; Thelen 1999). Historical institutionalism 
emphasizes the path-dependent development of institutions. In most of the historical 
institutional literature in the 1990s, the threshold for change was high. Only external 
shocks at historical junctures could lead to a breakdown and a radical change of 
institutions. More recent institutional literature pointed out that institutions can also 
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change incrementally. Thelen in a study on training in Germany, the UK and Japan 
argued that institutions are constantly renegotiated between the actors. She emphasizes 
the role of shifting and changing coalitions behind institutions that drive a 
renegotiation of institutional rules (Thelen 2004). In a following contribution, Streeck 
and Thelen identified different mechanisms for institutional change (Streeck & Thelen 
2005). They emphasize that there is considerable leeway or “play” between 
institutional rules and their enactment by the actors. In addition, institutional rules are 
often not clearly defined and ambiguous, which leaves room for actors on the ground 
to bend rules or renegotiate (Jackson 2005).  
This study has some commonalities with these recent contributions, but the 
argument of this study differs in important aspects. This study agrees that institutions 
can change incrementally, that they are renegotiated over time and that there exists 
considerable freedom to change institutional practices. However, this study departs 
from the institutional literature in that it examines the role of ideational factors for 
institutional change. The recent institutional literature and generally much of the 
employment relations literature has a similar foundation of actor behavior: the actors 
of the employment relationship are rational and driven by their material interests. In a 
given material context, institutional and otherwise, the actors have the rational 
capacities to decide on the best course of action by following their material interests. 
A good example is the manager in the Varieties of Capitalism, in which managers 
have the rational capacity to exploit the respective comparative institutional 
advantages and decide on the best course of action. However, this approach runs into 
problem when actors with the same material interests in the same material context act 
differently.  
By taking ideational factors and economic uncertainty seriously, this study 
directly builds on the economic constructivism literature in political economy (Blyth 
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2002; Jabko 2006; Seabrooke 2006; Woll 2009) and tries to introduce an ideational 
analysis to the study of employment relations. Hall argued that Keynesian ideas were a 
key explanatory factor in shaping economic policies in western countries between the 
1930 and 1960s (Hall 1989). In a following study, Blyth examined how neoliberal 
economic ideas changed economic policies in Sweden and the United States between 
the 1970s and 1990s. Blyth shows how ideas help to overcome situations of economic 
uncertainty and lead to institutional change (Blyth 2002, Herrigel 1996; Herrigel 
2005). Herrigel showed in a study of the origins of German capitalism that local actors 
use the same institutional rules differently and how local practices and knowledge 
result in distinct types of industrial order (Herrigel 1996).4 In a study on business 
interests, Woll argues that business interests are not primarily shaped by their rational 
choices, but that ideas and identity shape the preferences of business actors (Woll 
2009). This study most directly relates and seeks to contribute to economic 
constructivist literature that seeks to combine an ideational and institutional analysis. 
Katzenstein argued that the responses of small states to economic internationalization 
are not only shaped by national institutional structures but also by a shared perception 
of vulnerability and an ideology of social partnership (Katzenstein 1985; Katzenstein 
2003). Schmidt seeks to establish a discursive institutionalism by showing how 
discourse shapes the functioning and meaning of institutions (Schmidt 2008). Colin 
Hay points to a constructivist institutionalism and suggests that ideas contribute to 
endogenous change of institutions (Hay 2006; Hay 2002). In an early institutional 
study, March and Olson argue that the actors’ identity and their shared “logic of 
appropriateness” constitute institutions (March & Olsen 1989). 
Literature in employment relations has largely shied away from examining 
ideational factors and assumed rational actors as pointed out above. However, there is 
                                                 
4 See as well Herrigel (2005).  
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an important older tradition of ideational analysis in employment relations, on which 
this study builds as well. Important work in this research tradition are Bendix’s cross-
national study on management ideologies (Bendix 1959), Sabel’s study on worker 
worldview (Sabel 1984) and Hyman’s work on social values and fairness (Hyman & 
Brough 1975). Notable more recent literature that considers ideational factors include 
Hyman’s comparison of union ideologies in Europe (Hyman 2001) and Piore and 
Safford’s (2006) argument that a change from a collective bargaining regime to an 
employment rights regime in the United States is underpinned by the rise of new 
identity groups that mobilize equal opportunity laws at the workplace (Piore & Safford 
2006).  
 
Studying changes in employment relations within and across countries  
Central methodological characteristics of this study are the comparative and 
longitudinal research design, the reliance on case studies to compile the data and to 
trace the variables and the focus on qualitative applied research methods (interviews 
and archival research). It follows a discussion of the variables, the case selection and 
the comparative and longitudinal research design. A detailed description of the data 
collection and sources is attached in the appendix.  
The study focuses on four variables. Employment relations practices are the 
dependent variables: ideas, institutions and the socio-economic context are 
independent variables. First, employment relations practices refers to the material and 
social outcomes of collective bargaining rounds as well as employment relations 
practices such as whipsawing, benchmarking or transnational worker cooperation and 
others. Second, the institutional variable focused on two interrelated employment 
relations institutions: collective bargaining and worker representation. These 
institutions are based on national labor laws as well as the rules of the collective 
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agreements between management and labor. Fourth, the study examines two ideational 
factors: ideas and ideologies (which are described in some detail above). Fifth, the 
study examined changes of the socio-economic context. A particular focus is on the 
changes of the auto markets (e.g. the expansion, liberalization and recession of 
markets) and changes of the company structure (transnational organization of 
production, production platforms), which were two crucial elements of a dynamically 
changing socio-economic context.  
The study focuses on three countries: Germany, Spain and the United States. 
These countries are chosen on the independent variable employment relations 
institutions with the logic to find the most different cases. This allows us to examine to 
what extent and how employment relations are shaped by national institutions and to 
what extent similar employment relations can emerge in countries with very different 
institutions. Following the institutional Varieties of Capitalism framework, the three 
countries are very different types of market economies. Germany is described as a 
coordinated market economy, the United States as a liberal market economy and Spain 
as Mediterranean market economy (Hall & Thelen 2009). In Germany, works councils 
at the company- level have different co-determination rights, works council do not 
have the right to strike and there exist comparatively high constraints on labor 
shedding. In Spain trade union representation is fragmented at the company level, 
labor unions have extensive strike rights and the state continues to play a significant 
role in the adjustment of labor. In the United States, only one union usually represents 
the majority of the workers after a successful organizing drive, strike rights are strictly 
linked to collective bargaining and there are few limits imposed through national laws 
with respect to the adjustment of labor. As the country cases already produce sufficient 
variation, the selection of the company cases is supposed to limit further variation and 
most similar companies are chosen. This study examines three of the largest 
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multinational auto companies: GM, VW and Ford. As VW no longer has production 
facilities in the United States, eight company cases are examined in total across the 
three countries. These companies produce a range of similar products in the same 
industry. They operate in the same national and regional auto markets (this study 
focuses on the European and North American auto markets), to which all three 
companies had to adapt. Another similarity is that workers at all three companies are 
represented through, compared to other sectors, strong and stable labor organizations 
in each country.  
The research design of this study has a longitudinal and a comparative 
dimension. First, the study longitudinally traces the change of employment relations in 
each country between the 1980s and 2007. These developments are placed in a 
historical context that goes further back; as past experiences and historical knowledge 
are important in understanding the evolution of employment relations (this is based on 
secondary literature). The summary analyses of the country cases in this introduction 
describe some of the key longitudinal changes of employment relations in each 
country. Second, the study compares employment relations practices across countries. 
The conclusion highlights the emergence of similar employment relations practices 
across countries.  
The following case studies on collective bargaining in multinational companies 
in the United States, Germany and Spain illuminate how the collective actors’ 
changing ideas and ideologies lead to changes in employment relations and to a 
different functioning and meaning of institutions. Institutions are what the actors make 
of them. Despite the regulatory and constitutive affect on the actors’ ideas and 
ideologies, the actors have a lot of leeway to make different use of institutions and to 
develop new institutional practices as they adapt to a changing world.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT GM AND FORD IN THE US 
 
GM and Ford were the two most important auto companies of the 20th century. Henry 
Ford founded the Ford Motor Company in 1903 and spearheaded the motorization of 
the American people with the Model T. GM was founded in 1908 and replaced Ford as 
the largest automobile producer in 1920. Both companies’ world headquarters were 
located in Detroit. Most of the production facilities of GM and Ford were set-up 
within a radius of 150 miles around Detroit, although some production sites were built 
in other regions of the United States after World War II. GM and Ford were among the 
first multinational companies and they established production bases in Europe in the 
1920s. In the United States, foreign competitors have increasingly challenged the 
dominant position of Ford and GM since the 1980s.  
 
The UAW and collective bargaining at GM and Ford  
The UAW (United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America International Union) represents the workers at GM and Ford in the United 
States. The UAW established a union presence in these companies at the end of the 
1930s and has retained it ever since (Lichtenstein 1995). In the postwar decades, the 
struggles and negotiations between the UAW and Ford and GM shaped the contours of 
a collective bargaining regime that set labor relations standards in the auto industry as 
well as in other industries in the United States (Katz 1985). Collective bargaining took 
place at national company and plant level. The national UAW negotiated a company 
specific collective bargaining agreement setting the compensation and fringe benefits 
as well as work rules such as overtime administration, employee transfer rights and 
seniority guidelines. Following the national collective bargaining agreement, local 
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unions negotiated the specific work rules such as the form of the seniority ladder, job 
characteristics, job bidding and transfer rights and health and safety standards (Katz & 
MacDuffie 1994). A key feature of the collective bargaining system in the auto 
industry was pattern bargaining. In practice, the UAW targeted one of the Big Three 
for negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.5 The first negotiated collective 
bargaining agreement became the pattern and was extended to the other companies in 
the auto industry (without exceptions until 1979).  
Another key feature of labor relations in the auto industry was the job control 
unionism of the UAW, which meant that the UAW sought to strongly defend the 
standards and norms of the collective bargaining agreement. The ideology that 
underpinned job control unionisms was typified by a low-trust and adversarial 
relationship between management and labor. More than in Europe, a deep- rooted part 
of the ideology of American managers was that the ‘natural state of being’ at the 
workplace was the rule by management. Management never really accepted union 
representation in the postwar decades at GM and Ford and constantly challenged the 
UAW on the shop floor, trying to regain lost territory. It was also clear to the union, 
that management would get rid of them if they had the chance. In such a situation 
where the UAW never really could let down their guard, it developed an ideology that 
narrowly focused on defending its organization and the norms of the collective 
agreements, which is well summarized by the term job control unionism (Katz 1985). 
Under pressure in the 1980s and 1990s, UAW and management at Ford and GM 
sought to develop joint-programs and more cooperative relations. Given the long-
lasting adversarial relationship and ideological positions of management and labor at 
GM and Ford, it is not surprising that only limited progress was made in this period.  
 
                                                 
5 The Big Three are the large American auto companies GM, Ford and Chrysler.  
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Changing markets and employment relations in the 1980s  
The postwar collective bargaining regime remained stable as long as the market and its 
competitive pressure remained stable. Between 1950 and 1979, there was a perfect 
match between the product market and union representation. Car production rose from 
5 to 13 million annually between 1946 and 1979, while imports to the United States 
market remained limited (Katz, MacDuffie, & Phil 2002). The Big Three dominated 
this constantly growing market allowing them to make continuous profits despite 
frequent cyclical downturns, while the labor unions earned continuously higher wages 
and won greater benefits.  
In the 1980s, the Big Three and the UAW increasingly lost control of the 
United States auto market. This process began in the 1970s when the imports of 
Japanese cars began to penetrate the United States market. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the profitability of the Big Three eroded and the long-term future of the 
companies seemed to be at stake, e.g. Chrysler filed for bankruptcy in 1979. The Big 
Three turned to the national government seeking to limit competitive pressure and 
import penetration by Japanese car producers. Although the pro-free-market Reagan 
administration was in power, the call of the big auto producers and the UAW was 
heard. However, this partial success did not decrease the competitive pressure as the 
Japanese car producer circumvented the import restrictions by building new plants in 
the United States (Turner 1991). While the auto imports decreased overall, the share of 
the Japanese car producers increased in the American auto market in the 1980s. The 
crucial change for the collective bargaining regime was that the Japanese car 
producers introduced a non-union sector to the United States auto market. Most of the 
Japanese plants were built in southern states and the UAW was not able to organize 
the workers in that region of the United States. Thus, wages, social benefits and 
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working conditions were not taken any longer out of competition in the United States 
auto market, as had been the case before 1979 (Katz 1985). 
Increased market pressure drove management to deve lop coping strategies in 
different management areas including employment relations. Management at Ford and 
GM pushed hard to lower labor costs and gain concessions from labor. In addition, 
management closed plants and shed labor. Another crucial change was that control of 
the agenda shifted from labor to management (Katz 1985). In the context of 
heightened market pressure, management began to drive the employment relations 
agenda. Beyond cost cutting, which was a ‘quick fix’ solution for the losses, Ford and 
GM tried to figure out what made the Japanese car producers more competitive. 
Research by industry analysts, the companies and academic researchers revealed that 
the distinctive way Japanese producers organized production, which came to be known 
as lean production (Womack et. al. 1990), was an important aspect of their competitive 
edge. Katz, MacDuffy and Rubinstein describe lean production as  
a different way of thinking about production goals (quality and productivity as 
mutually attainable, not a trade-off) with new production methods aimed at 
boosting efficiency through the elimination of waste (reducing buffers through 
just- in-time inventory systems; “building in” rather than “inspecting in” 
quality) and human resource practices aimed at motivating workers and 
developing their skills (work teams, job rotation, problem-solving groups; 
increased worker training, performance-based pay bonus pay; reduction of 
status barriers) (Katz, MacDuffie, & Phil 2002). 
Management at Ford and GM tried to learn more about lean production. For example, 
GM and Toyota engaged in the joint-venture NUMMI. Ford engaged in a similar 
joint-venture with Mazda at Flat Rock. Based on these experiences, GM and Ford 
sought to imitate lean production and its different instruments across plants, although 
the speed of implementation varied (Turner 1991). GM and Ford reduced buffer in the 
production process and introduced teamwork at greenfield sites, however the 
implementation at brownfield plants required a renegotiation of work rules with local 
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unions on seniority rights and job classifications. Along with teamwork, Ford and GM 
initiated joint labor-management programs with the national UAW. Many observers of 
the auto industry, including academics, believed that the key elements of lean 
production – teamwork and a greater responsibility of the workers in the production 
process – had the potential to transform the traditionally adversarial labor-management 
relations (Womack et. al. 1990).  
 The leadership of the UAW initially responded positively to the joint-programs 
and lean production. Owen Bieber, the UAW’s president, regarded them as part of an 
important strategy to counter the success of the Japanese car producers. However, 
Bieber remained cautious and did not completely embrace these strategies, in 
particular after opposition within the UAW emerged against cooperatimg with 
management. Don Ephlin, one of the UAW’s vice presidents, and the person who 
headed the UAW’s GM department, took the ideological leadership within the UAW 
in favor of lean production and joint-programs. Under his leadership, the UAW 
actively engaged in the NUMMI joint-venture with Toyota and helped to establish a 
new labor-management relationship at Saturn, where unionists became co-managers in 
the production process (Rubinstein & Kochan 2001; Rubinstein 2001). Based on his 
positive experiences in these projects, Ephlin argued in favor of a strategic shift for the 
UAW in favor of a more cooperative employment relationship, teamwork and joint-
programs with management.  
However, strong opposition emerged within the UAW. For the critics, the 
joint-programs with management became inextricably linked to concessions in the 
1980s. They argued that the more cozy relationship with management had resulted in 
concession bargaining. In the mid 1980s, a grass-roots opposition emerged within the 
UAW, which came to be known as New Directions (Köhnen 2000). This opposition 
organized protest across many union locals and won a seat in elections on the 
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executive board of the UAW in the late 1980s. Jostled between opposition from the 
left and proponents of joints labor-management programs, Bieber and the 
administrative caucus, a dominant group within the UAW from the time of Walter 
Reuther, took the middle road and connected to the previous ideological position of 
the UAW. On the one hand, the powerful UAW bureaucracy crushed the challengers 
of the new Direction Movement in union elections (Lichtenstein 1995). On the other 
hand, Don Ephlin, the staunchest supporter of the joint-programs, was replaced in the 
1989 UAW convention by Steve Yokich, who was more a traditional unionist. The 
convention also drew a line between management and labor, when it stated that 
“working men and women (…) are often in the best position to participate in making 
intelligent, informed decisions, at the same time, we oppose efforts by companies to 
use democratic sounding programs as a smokescreen designed to undermine collective 
bargaining and workers’ rights” (cited in: Babson 1995). 
In practice, the UAW maintained a wide-open position on the joint-programs 
and supported locals that embraced changes linked to joint-programs and teamwork as 
well as locals that resisted them. The actual implementation depended on the ideology 
of the local unions and their willingness to bargain for changes in work rules in local 
negotiations. For example, at Saturn, unionists became co-managers in the running of 
the plant, while the Flint strike in 1998 represents a case of adversarial labor relations 
(these two cases are discussed below). At the national level, the UAW continued to 
participate in joint-programs as is indicated through the joint training centers at GM 
and Ford. Nevertheless, the joint-programs and teamwork did not transform labor-
management relations at GM and Ford. The joint-programs more closely resembled 
the traditional bargaining exchange, e.g. the joint-programs improved health and 
safety considerably and in exchange, some local unions negotiated concessions in 
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work rules. The UAW retained a focus on defending its organization and working 
standards through grievance procedures and collective bargaining.   
The management approach to the UAW also contributed to the result that the 
joint-programs did not transform labor relations in this period. Despite the preaching 
of top management at Ford and GM in favor of a more cooperative relationship and 
the initiation of joint-programs, many lower level managers at plant level were 
suspicious of them and continued to see the union as an opponent based on their 
experiences with labor unions. In addition, it did not seem to be conducive for 
developing a more cooperative relationship that management sometimes forced 
changes in work rules related to lean production upon the local unions through the 
whipsawing of plants in the context of product and investment decisions (Turner 
1991).  
 
Collective bargaining at GM and Ford in the 1990s  
The auto market continued to change in the 1990s. The scope of the auto market 
expanded because of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The 
United States and Canadian auto market were already closely integrated from the mid 
1970s. NAFTA reduced remaining trade barriers between the two countries as well as 
with Mexico. The geography of production in the North American auto market had 
already begun to change in the 1980s. Japanese car producers outsourced a greater 
proportion of their production to lower cost countries. Ford and GM copied this 
practice and built part plants in Mexico or outsourced production to suppliers, which 
helped to increase productivity in their assembly plants in the United States. GM and 
Ford only built a limited number of assembly plants in Mexico while the largest part 
of GM and Ford’s car production remained in the United States. The greatest pressure 
on employment relations at GM and Ford stemmed from the expansion of the non-
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union sector in North America. The Japanese car producers continued to expand 
production and were joined by Mercedes and BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke), 
who set up production facilities in the South of the United States. These changes in the 
auto market unfolded throughout the 1990s; however, a more imminent market 
pressure for the 1990 collective bargaining round were the recession and estimated 20-
30% overcapacities in the North American auto market (Katz, MacDuffie, & Phil 
2002). 
In 1990, the UAW decided to negotiate first a collective bargaining agreement 
with GM. GM had lost market share in the North American auto market throughout 
the 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, GM had returned to profitability, but profit 
margins had begun to decrease again from 1989 onwards. Industry experts estimated 
that GM had an employee excess of 60,000. GM had already begun to decrease 
overcapacities after the last collective bargaining round in 1987 and had closed down 
four plants. This took place despite a plant-closing moratorium in the 1987 collective 
bargaining agreement. However, GM stopped production at four plants, which it called 
“permanent idling” (Mann 1987). The UAW regarded this as a breach of the collective 
bargaining agreement and criticized the way GM handled the plant closures as 
“semantic cynicalism” shortly before the 1990 collective bargaining round.6 In view of 
the dramatic job losses in the previous years, the UAW put job security at the top of its 
bargaining agenda. 7 Management’s goal was to cut labor costs and it sought to fend 
off restrictions on following workforce reduction. 
Shortly before the UAW picked GM as the target, a strike at a parts plant in 
Flint became a proxy for the collective bargaining round. Officially, the local union 
struck over health and safety issues and work practices; however, at the core of the 
                                                 
6 Financial Times: Locking horns at contract time in Detroit. Newspaper article. September 7, 1990.  
7 UAW: Solidarity. On the road to the next contract. Union magazine. May 1990.  
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conflict was management’s plan to downsize the plant by 832 workers.8 On the fifth 
day of the strike, GM had to close down three truck plants and another car plant that 
depended on parts from Flint – other GM plants were also in imminent danger of 
being forced to stop production. Just- in-time production and the reduction of the 
inventory had made GM more vulnerable. On the sixth day of the strike, management 
agreed to the demands of the local union and promised job security to the workers at 
the Flint plant. Although the national UAW was not directly involved in the local 
negotiations, it had approved the local strike.9 It showed that the UAW was both 
serious about job security in the upcoming collective bargaining round and easily 
capable of shutting down GM’s North American production.  
The negotiations quickly settled a number of issues such as health and safety; 
while on the other hand there was not much disagreement about compensation. The 
most contentious issue was job security. An agreement was not reached by the expiry 
date of the previous collective bargaining agreement, after which the union had the 
right to strike. However, the UAW president advised the workers “to stay on the job 
and report for work on their regular shift until further notice.”10 At the same time, he 
set up a meeting with 300 local union leaders for Monday, September 17, in which he 
intended to mobilize the local union leaders for a strike. In this context, management 
and labor engaged in a negotiation marathon over the weekend and hammered out an 
agreement by Monday morning.  
A compromise was found with respect to job security. GM retained the 
flexibility to adjust the workforce and dismiss workers; however, the collective 
bargaining agreement would make labor shedding expensive as $4 billion were 
                                                 
8 New York Times: Strike at 2 GM plants closes Ohio Operation. Newspaper article. August 10, 1990.  
9 New York Times: GM strike in Michigan imperils industry talks with unions. Newspaper article. 
August 12, 1990. 
10 Chicago Tribune: UAW strike deadline pushed back. Newspaper article. September 15, 1990.  
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earmarked for income security measures.11 The UAW was hoping that higher costs for 
labor shedding would increase the economic incentive for GM to retain employees. 
The contract restricted layoffs to 36 weeks for any worker over the life of the three-
year contract. At the same time, social benefits and training programs provided the 
workers with an alternative income. Workers with less than 10 years seniority would 
receive 26 weeks of supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB); workers with more 
than ten years seniority would receive up to 52 weeks of SUB. As in most of the 
collective bargaining agreements of the 1980s, a 3% wage increase was only 
guaranteed in the first year; while in the following two years, the worker would 
receive a profit-based lump sum. In addition, the collective bargaining agreement 
introduced early retirement and voluntary buyouts programs.12 
As the UAW was not able to define stable employment levels, the union 
sought to limit job losses through a number of further contract clauses. The collective 
bargaining agreement established a consultation right for labor in the case of 
outsourcing. The GM parts plants would be given the opportunity to make a better 
offer than external producers. In addition, the contract required the employment of one 
new employee for every two layoffs and put a penalty on overtime, which had been 
extensively used by GM in recent years.13 On the other hand, management convinced 
the UAW that it was necessary to introduce night shifts in order to run plants 
productively.  
Management is looking at increasing productivity and would like to pursue a 
system similar to Europe," said a Lordstown union official who did not want to 
be identified. He said the five-person group traveled to Spain and Belgium 
                                                 
11 UAW: Solidarity. A blueprint for job security. New UAW-GM contract ratified. Union magazine. 
October 1990. 
12 New York Times: Layoff Provisions buy auto union. Newspaper article. September 19, 1990. 
13 UAW: Solidarity. A blueprint for job security. New UAW-GM contract ratified. Union magazine. 
October 1990. 
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where GM operates plants on the three-crew system. They also visited a plant 
in Germany. 14 
A three-shift system was first introduced in Europe at GM’s Saragossa plant in Spain. 
The new collective bargaining agreement made it possible to negotiate additional night 
shifts at GM’s local level in the United States.  
In early October, the membership of the UAW ratified the new collective 
bargaining contract at GM. This collective agreement set the pattern and the UAW 
sought to extend the same contract to Ford. Ford management quickly agreed to the 
collective bargaining contract as the terms were much cheaper for Ford than GM. Ford 
had a lower employee excess and thus Ford would have to pay less money for income 
protection. Furthermore, the healthcare provisions would be cheaper for Ford. The 
agreement at Ford was signed in October and Chrysler followed the pattern in 
November 1990.15 Under pressure in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was some 
variation between the collective bargaining outcomes of the Big Three; the 1990 
agreements indicated a return to a narrower interpretation of pattern bargaining (Katz 
2008). 
In the early 1990s, GM was hit hard by the recession of the North American 
auto market. GM’s plants were running at 60% of their capacity, which drove the 
company into the red. GM lost $2 billion in 1990 and $4.5 billion in 1991.16 The board 
of directors put pressure on management and demanded decisive action. In December 
1991, management presented a far-reaching restructuring program and announced 21 
plant closures and 50,000 layoffs.17 In addition, GM streamlined the company 
structure and concentrated the three different national business divisions into one new 
North American business division. Another change was the transfer of Lopez from 
                                                 
14 Automotive News: 3-crew setup an issue in GM talks. September 3, 1990.  
15 UAW: Solidarity. Pattern, no pickets. Union magazine. November, 1990. 
16 GM: Annual company report. 1991.  
17 Financial Times: GM’s revolution turns into a race against time. Newspaper article. October 15, 
1992. 
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their European operation to Detroit. He became responsible for purchasing in North 
America. Under his leadership, GM began to pit parts suppliers, including GM’s own 
parts plants, against each other and forcefully drove down parts costs and labor 
standards. The restructuring program drew angry responses from the UAW.18 The 
UAW did not have the immediate leverage to counter outsourcing, but announced to 
mobilize local unions individually.  
In 1992, local conflicts broke out over the implementation of GM’s 
restructuring plan. A small GM parts plant in Lordstown, Ohio, employing only 240 
workers resisted the closure of the plant at the end of the year. The parts produced at 
that plant were either supposed to be transferred to other GM plants in the United 
States or outsourced to Mexico. This was a sensitive issue for the union. In the context 
of the imminent NAFTA, the union feared job losses to Mexico. When the strike 
broke out, the plant was still supplying parts to many GM plants. Even on the first day, 
the strike managed to cause a production stop at the Saturn plant, which depended on 
parts supply from Lordstown. By the ninth day, the strike idled ten assembly plants 
and more than 42,000 workers. GM lost the production of 26,090 cars.19 On the same 
day, the local union won the concession that the plant would be kept open at least until 
the end of 1993.20  
In the same period, management also played hardball with the union. 
Management whipsawed different locals. For example, management pitted the Willow 
Run plant in Detroit against a GM plant in Texas. The local union in Detroit mobilized 
the workforce and agreed to concessions hoping to keep the plant open. However, 
when the UAW local in Texas agreed to more flexible work practices, management 
                                                 
18 New York Times: Making a difference; playing rough. Newspaper article. December 29, 1991 
19 Automotive News: Lordstown settlements show GM, UAW grit. Newspaper article. September 14, 
1992.  
20 Labor notes: Auto union wins outsourcing protection after nine-day Lordstown strike. Journal article. 
October, 1992 
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quickly closed down the Willow Run plant.21 In the fall of 1992, management and the 
UAW was engaged in a tug of war. The UAW could not stop the downsizing of the 
company, but in some local conflicts, the UAW found leverage to stop outsourcing, 
which could involve considerable expenses for GM. In December 1992, management 
and the UAW tried to soften the downsizing and limit the conflict by agreeing to a 
voluntary retirement program for about 10,000 employees.22 
Before the collective bargaining of 1993, the recession seemed to be over and 
the North American auto market began to grow. Beyond the return to solid profits, it 
was promising for GM and Ford that they were able to regain some market share that 
was lost to the Japanese companies in the 1980s. GM and Ford began to have an edge 
over Japanese producers through offering Sports Utility Vehicles (SUV). This type of 
motor vehicle became more popular with American consumers in the 1990s; helpful 
were as well tax subsidies for SUVs by the American government.  
At the beginning of the 1993 collective bargaining round, it was not yet clear 
how robust the economic upswing would be. GM tried very hard to become the 
bargaining target of the UAW, which would put it into a better position to shape the 
bargaining agenda.23 GM sought to address rising healthcare and pension costs as well 
as to avoid any limitations on plant closure and labor shedding, while these issues 
were less of problem at Ford. GM showed its will to bargain in good faith, when it 
announced the re-transfer of 70,000 to 100,000 units of car production from the GM 
plant in Romas Arizpe, Mexico, to the Lansing plant in Michigan.24 The UAW 
welcomed this step as it was the first time that auto production had been transferred 
                                                 
21 Financial Times: Survey of world car industry. Newspaper article. October 20, 1992.  
22 New York Times: GM and its union plan to encourage early retirement. Newspaper article. December 
15, 1992. 
23 Financial Times: GM to shift capacity back to US. Newspaper article. June 23, 1993. 
24 Financial Times: GM to shift capacity back to US. Newspaper article. June 23, 1993.  
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back from Mexico to the United States, however, the UAW chose Ford as the 
bargaining partner and expected that it would be easier to establish a pattern at Ford.  
In its bargaining goals the UAW focused mainly on defending social standards 
and employment, which was a defensive posture considering the improving economic 
situation. 25 The UAW had been involved in bruising conflicts over the last couple of 
years, e.g. GM’s company restructuring decreased the unionized workforce. At the 
same time, the UAW lost an important strike at Caterpillar in 1992. The UAW’s 
Solidarity magazine summarized the goals of the UAW’s collective bargaining 
convention on the front page with the words: “Holding the line.”26 This very much set 
the tone for the collective bargaining round with Ford. Ford management argued that 
the pensions for UAW retirees were no longer sustainable. In 1960, the ratio of 
workers to retirees was 60 to 1, while in 1993 it was only 2 to 1. Nevertheless, the 
UAW was able to retain the standards for healthcare and pensions.27 The job and 
income security funding mirrored those of the 1990 collective bargaining agreement. 
After management and labor struck an agreement at Ford, negotiations began at GM. 
The GM management tried hard to deviate from the pattern set at Ford as healthcare 
and pension provisions would be more expensive for GM. In the context of the 
improving auto market, the UAW was indeed able to hold the line, but it was not able 
to make important gains.  
In the following years, differences in labor relations between Ford and GM 
became more obvious. Labor relations remained more contentious at GM as indicated 
through a higher number of local strikes compared to Ford. The UAW had the same 
approach to both of the companies. The UAW headquarters organized the national 
                                                 
25 New York Times: Auto union seeks to deter Detroit from new layoffs. Newspaper article. May 2, 
1993. 
26 UAW: Solidarity. Bargaining for a brighter future. Union document. May, 1993.  
27 New York Times: Retirees figure big in Detroit maths. Newspaper article. September 14, 1993. 
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collective bargaining at each company and the national president headed the respective 
company bargaining committees. The variation in management strategies between the 
two companies seemed to be important in shaping different labor relations. Even after 
returning to profits in North America, GM continued to restructure more aggressively 
and pushed outsourcing harder than Ford. Outsourcing of production and whipsawing 
were also issues at Ford, but management pursued its agenda less aggressively and this 
provoked fewer strikes. The different management structures were also an important 
factor. GM had a more decentralized structure and gave lower level management more 
leeway in its dealing with labor.28 In contrast, Ford had a more centralized structure. 
No crucial labor relations decisions would take place without the approval of the labor 
relations manager, Peter J. Pestillo.29 He was one of the four executive vice presidents. 
This high rank for this management task indicated the importance Ford gave to labor 
issues. Pestillo developed a good working relationship with the union and when 
serious local conflicts emerged, he would handle them by himself. This centralized 
management structure and decision-making process made labor relations at Ford more 
consistent, while at GM lower level managers sometimes tried to bend the norms of 
the collective bargaining or seek concessions from local unions, which provoked the 
UAW to strike at GM more regularly. 30 GM lost money through the strikes. Alone 
between the end of the collective bargaining round in 1993 and January 1995, GM lost 
54,000 units.31 A case in point is the strike at the Buick City plant in Flint in 
September 1994.  
                                                 
28 Union interview. UAW. March 22, 2004.  
29 New York Times: GM's rocky labor ties: Do rivals have it easier? Newspaper article. June 15, 1996.  
30 Interview industry expert. October 17, 2007 
31 Automotive News: Labor lost. Newspaper article. January 30, 1995 (January 1994: 5-day stoppage at 
Shreveport, La., assembly plant costs 2,600 units; March 1994: 3-day stoppage at Delco Chassis in 
Dayton, Ohio, costs 14,220 units; August 1994: 3-day stoppage at Inland Fisher Guide in Anderson, 
Ind., costs 18,800 units; September 1994: 9-day stoppage at Buick City in Flint, Mich., costs 11,700 
units; January 1995: 3-day stoppage at AC Delco Systems/Delco Electronics in Flint costs 6,800 units). 
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The UAW local 599, representing 11,500 workers at Buick, complained 
several times about the excessive use of overtime and temporary workers. The UAW 
reported to management that the workforce was worn out and asked for permanent 
new employees. Injuries of workers increased throughout 1994 and 8.7% of the 
workers were on sick leave, which is twice as much as the average for all GM plants.32 
The local union had already threatened to go on strike during the summer, but when 
the use of overtime and injury level did not improve by September, the local union 
called a strike. 
Sooner or later you’ve got to say enough is enough,” said Jerry Kimmel, who 
makes transmission parts (...). Kimmel recently tore a muscle in his arm trying 
to unjam a part that was stuck in one of the three machines he runs. Then he 
cut his hand on a piece of wire. “There used to be two men on my job, but now 
I’m by myself,” said Kimmel. “It’s not safe at all. We’ve tried to work together 
with [management], and it hasn’t worked? 33  
After the union went on strike, management began to take the issues more seriously 
and negotiated with the union. The negotiations quickly reached an impasse when the 
local management rejected the employment of new workers. The strike quickly idled a 
number of assembly plants, because they were dependent on supplies from the Buick 
City complex. Top management and the national UAW mediated in the conflict and by 
the ninth day of the strike, GM agreed to hire 779 permanent employees for the Buick 
complex. Through strike GM lost 12,000 produced vehicles and ahout $50 million in 
lost profits.34 In this local conflict, the local union was able to push through its 
demands, while in other local conflicts UAW locals had to agree to painful 
concessions in order to prevent outsourcing.  
                                                 
32 Detroit Free Press: UAW strikes GM over hiring/ production. Newspaper article.  September 28, 
1994.  
33 Detroit Free Press: UAW strikes GM over hiring/ production. Newspaper article.  September 28, 
1994. 
34 Automotive News: GM hirings after strike won’t hurt say analysts. Newspaper article. October 10, 
1994.  
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When a local union of a parts plant went on strike, it was difficult for 
management to win such a conflict.35 In most cases, management had to give in to 
some of the unions demands. GM sought to reverse this trend in a 16-day strike at a 
brakes producing plant in Dayton, Ohio, in March 1996. When the strike dragged on 
for more than a couple of days, it became obvious that the conflict would be a signal 
for the upcoming collective bargaining round in 1996 and show if the UAW could 
effectively address the twin issues of job security and outsourcing. The strike broke 
out when management announced the outsourcing of brakes to the German company 
Bosch. The UAW argued that this violated the 1994 collective contract, when the 
union agreed to meet new productivity standards and in return brake production was 
supposed to remain at the two Dayton plants. In contrast, management argued that the 
two Dayton plants were simply outbid by Bosch.  
The strike quickly affected GM’s North American production. Although the 
two plants were relatively small employing only 3,000 employees, they supplied 
brakes for almost all GM’s North American assembly plants. By the twelfth day, the 
strike closed down 24 of 29 assembly plants and about 12 parts plants in North 
America.36 GM felt the pressure and fought back by temporarily dismissing 124,700 
workers. At the same time, GM lobbied individual states not to pay unemployment 
benefits to the striking workers – such a decision is taken at the state level in the 
United States – hoping that this would weaken the strike fund of the UAW. The 
negotiations reached a complete impasse and outside actors became involved in the 
conflict. Federal labor secretary, Robert Reich, and the president of the United States, 
Bill Clinton, asked the two sides to return to the negotiation table and to resolve the 
issue.37 
                                                 
35 Interview industry expert. October 17, 2006. 
36 New York Times: Across nation. Scores of workers affected. Newspaper article. March 15, 1996. 
37 New York Times: Administration calls for end to strike. Newspaper article. March 16, 1996. 
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On the seventeenth strike day, management and union reached a compromise. 
Management was allowed to outsource the brakes; in exchange, the union won job 
security for its workers and other assignments for the Dayton plants. Management won 
some outsourcing in this conflict, but  paid a high economic price for this outcome. 
The strike had become the worst work stoppage in the North American auto industry 
since 1970. It shut down 26 of GM’s 29 North American plants, idling 177,375 
workers. The strike cost GM about $1 billion in profits and GM’s market share 
dropped by 2.2% in March 1996 in the context of a growing auto market.38  
Shortly later, the new bargaining season started in April 1996. Two thousand 
UAW representatives from locals across the country met for the bargaining convention 
in Detroit. Job security was once more established as the key UAW bargaining goal. 
”Job security is everything,” UAW president declared in his opening address: “If good 
jobs are not secure, then neither is anything else. You can’t fight about what a job pays 
if the job isn’t there in the first place.”39 Beyond job security, the union sought to gain 
higher wages and pension benefits. Union delegates at the convention pointed to the 
record profits at the Big Three in 1995 and demanded a fair share for workers.  
The UAW chose Ford to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement. 
Negotiation went smoothly and an agreement was reached two days after the 
expiration of the previous contract on September 16, 1996. The UAW did not threaten 
to strike at any point during the negotiation. The UAW won greater job security in the 
collective bargaining agreement.40 Ford guaranteed 95% of the 105,000 workers a job 
for the duration of the contract. In the 1990 and 1993 collective bargaining 
agreements, the UAW was only able to secure a continuous income stream for its 
members, but not to secure specific employment levels. The UAW won higher wages 
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and pensions compared to the previous collective bargaining rounds. In the first year, 
wages increased by a $2000 lump sum followed by 3% wage increases in the second 
and third year. These were real wage increases as the cost-of- living adjustment 
continued. During the three-year duration, an average worker would earn about 
$13,900 more.41 The job security clause was exceptional, but it did not seem to be 
much of a risk for Ford. The boom of the North American auto market was in full 
swing and Ford did not anticipate major restructuring for the duration of the contract.  
The situation at GM was more complicated. The job security provision seemed 
to be unacceptable to management, because the company intended to continue to 
restructure and to close at least two more plants during the duration of the contract.42 
In addition, the negotiation at GM overlapped with a very contentious collective 
bargaining round between GM and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW). The CAW 
went on strike in early October, which shut down several plants in the United States. 
Negotiations between the UAW and management continued, but at a slow pace. The 
conflict at GM Canada was settled after a three-week strike. Immediately after that, 
the UAW announced a strike deadline.43 The UAW expected problems with the GM 
management and decided to turn on the heat immediately. GM was in a vulnerable 
position, because the inventory stocks were empty after the strike in Canada. In the 
negotiations, GM management agreed to all issues of the collective bargaining pattern, 
except the 95% job security provision. The union went on strike targeting GM’s 
highly profitable light truck and SUV production. The strike shut down the SUV 
assembly plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, and a metal fabricating plant in Indianapolis 
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that was producing parts for several SUV and light-truck models.44 The strike at this 
plant quickly idled four other light-truck and SUV plants. By the fifth day of the strike 
a compromise was reached. The UAW was not able to secure 95% of the jobs as at 
Ford and Chrysler. GM was in greater need of a workforce reduction; the contract 
allowed for the early retirement of up to 35,000 workers.45 This would secure the 
income of workers, but not the jobs themselves. This was much closer to the 1990 and 
1993 job security provisions than the Ford and Chrysler collective bargaining 
agreements in 1996.  
 
Local employment relations – between co-management and conflict  
In the 1990s, a great variety of employment relations pattern existed across GM and 
Ford’s plants in the United States. In some cases, local unionists became co-managers 
taking on responsibility for organizing production and participating in decision-
making processes, but in other cases, adversarial employment relations remained. 
These different patterns of labor responses existed at Ford and GM; however, the most 
extreme cases emerged at GM. This section discusses the Saturn project (an example 
of co-management) and the 1998 Flint strike (an example of adversarial employment 
relations). 
Saturn was the most far-reaching attempt to establish co-management by labor 
unions in the United States (Rubinstein & Kochan 2001; Rubinstein 2001). GM’s 
Saturn project was a response to market pressure and high losses in the early 1980s. 
Under pressure, GM looked for successful coping strategies. As worker involvement 
was a crucial part of lean production, the Saturn project was jointly developed by 
management and UAW – a group of 99 unionists and managers did much of the 
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research and planning of the project starting in 1983 (O'Toole 1996). Within the big, 
bureaucratic organizations UAW and GM, the project had two staunch supporters who 
tried to push this project forward: GM’s vice president of human resources, Al 
Warren, and the UAW’s vice president and director of the GM department, Don 
Ephlin. Saturn chose the small farm town Spring Hill, Tennessee, as the location for 
the new plant, and production started in 1990. Workers were chosen from the pool of 
dismissed UAW workers as well as from GM’s current workforce. These workers 
were interested in starting something new and working in teams – many of them 
relocated from the industrial Detroit area to the 600 miles distant and 17,000 people 
small Spring Hill (Sherman 1994). 
Under Ephlin’s leadership, the UAW negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement at Saturn that was independent from the pattern collective bargaining 
agreement in the auto industry. The Saturn collective bargaining agreement 
established the role of unionists as co-managers in the production process (Rubinstein 
& Kochan 2001). Workers took part in decisions and planning at all levels. At the 
corporate level, which included two other Saturn plants, the joint Strategic Action 
Council made the decision on corporate planning and relationship with suppliers. At 
the plant level in Spring Hill, the joint Manufacturing Action Council organized local 
production. At the workplace level, workers organized themselves in self-directed 
teams. An important difference to other GM plants was that there existed no 
supervisors and shop stewards in the traditional sense. At the other GM plants, this 
was the point where most conflicts occurred and management and labor confronted 
each other using grievance procedures. At Saturn, several teams shared a pair of 
advisors – usually one union and one management representative – who would try to 
resolve problems in a cooperative manner. The far-reaching involvement in decision-
making processes is summarized in the Saturn philosophy at the preamble of the 
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collective bargaining agreement: “We believe that all people want to be involved in 
decis ions that affect them, care about their job and each other, take pride in themselves 
and in their contributions, and want to share the success of their efforts” (cited in: 
Rubinstein & Kochan 2001). The limit of co-management at Saturn was that GM 
headquarters at Detroit decided on new investments and products. 
Other differences of the Saturn agreement compared to the collective 
bargaining pattern were much fewer work rules and no seniority. 20% of the wages 
were merit-based, which linked the productivity of the plant to the workers’ economic 
interests. Workers could also identify themselves more strongly with the company, 
because the contract excluded dismissals. Management and labor did not engage in 
frequent collective bargaining, rather the Saturn agreement was an open, living 
agreement and changes would be made by both parties as they went along. Labor and 
management could cancel the collective bargaining agreement at any time within 30 
days. As management and labor worked out the Saturn project, it seemed to be that 
labor developed a distinct ideology compared to other GM plants. The president of the 
local UAW, Michael Bennett, stated in a speech  
that in today’s world, long-term employment security cannot be negotiated 
independent of the economic performance of the firm or solely through 
collective bargaining (…). Rather, his view is that employment security can 
only achieved over the long run by contributing to economic performance of 
the firm and directly in business planning and decision-making processes to 
ensure that workers interests are given appropriate consideration (Rubinstein & 
Kochan 2001). 
Saturn had the enormous task of establishing a new brand and reputation with 
customers from scratch. This worked fairly well. In its third production year, in 1993, 
Saturn broke even. In addition, Saturn had established its cars as among the most 
reliable in the car industry. Rubinstein and Kochan attribute the high quality of Saturn 
to the motivation of the employees (Rubinstein & Kochan 2001). Co-management and 
worker involvement produced positive economic results.  
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Despite these early successes, the Saturn project came under pressure. In the 
1980s, the UAW’s Ephlin and GM’s Warren had sought to keep Saturn out of the orbit 
of the UAW and GM headquarters for as long as possible.46 They were aware that the 
culture at GM and the UAW was very different – more hierarchical and more 
adversarial – and this would not be conducive to the Saturn project. However, changes 
in the leadership of the UAW and GM drew Saturn closer to Detroit and Saturn’s 
independence and different ideology came under pressure. On the one hand, Ephlin 
was replaced by Yokich as head of the Director of the GM department in 1989, and in 
1995 Yokich became the president of the UAW. He was more combative than the 
previous UAW president Bieber. Yokich was a traditional unionist and did not 
completely embrace co-management and joint-programs. However, Yokich did not 
oppose the Saturn project as such either, but part of his lacking support was also based 
on his complicated relationship with the local union president at Saturn. 47 Yokich 
interfered several times in the 1990s and called for votes over work rules. The 
majority of the Saturn workforce defended worker involvement and fewer work rules 
against interferences by the national UAW. On the other hand, Saturn lost supporters 
at the GM headquarters in the early 1990s and the inclination declined to provide the 
necessary resources for new investments at Saturn. Another problem was that there 
was little continuation in the local management at Saturn. Many managers only stayed 
for a couple of years, using it as a brief stepping-stone on their way to Detroit, which 
did not facilitate strong identification with the Saturn project.  
In a tumultuous period at GM and Saturn in the second half of the 1990s, labor 
relations began to change. In July 1998, the local union addressed the concerns of the 
workforce and issued an unprecedented strike warning demanding new investments 
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and products for Saturn. 48 This situation had come to a head because several previous 
discussions with headquarters had not produced any results. In addition, headquarters 
had been pushing Saturn to increase outsourcing as it did at other GM plants. This was 
particularly troublesome for Saturn, because an element of Saturn’s production 
philosophy was to produce most parts in-house in order to ensure high quality. 
Lacking sufficient investment and new production lines, workers felt increasingly 
insecure and turned to an opposition slate that demanded more work rules and job 
security. 49 The opposition ousted the long-term union president in the 1999 union 
election. If job security could not be achieved through economic performance and 
worker involvement due to insufficient investment by headquarters, then stricter work 
rules and contract based job security seemed to be the best idea for the workforce. Co-
management and worker involvement continued after the election (Rubinstein & 
Kochan 2001), but it took place on a different footing and moved closer to labor 
relation at other GM plants.  
A contrasting case to Saturn were labor relations in Flint, which culminated in 
a 54-day strike at two GM plants in 1998 in Flint, Michigan, which shut-down GM’s 
North American operation (Babson 2004). In 1904, the first Buick factory was built in 
Flint and the city became one of GM’s major production centers in the 20th century. 
Flint’s population grew along with the expansion of auto production from 38,550 in 
1910 to more than 190,000 in the 1960s and 1970s. At the end of the 1970s, General 
Motors employed 80,000 workers in Flint – about 20% of its total workforce in the 
United States. Dramatic restructuring and plant closures in the 1980s and 1990s 
decreased the number of GM workers to 23,000 by the late 1990s. This had a 
devastating economic and social impact on Flint, which the filmmaker Michael Moore 
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captured in the documentary Roger and Me (Moore et al. 2003). The joint-program 
ideology did not change labor relations decisively in GM’s Flint plants, despite the 
preaching of UAW’s vice president and director of the GM department, Don Ephlin, 
in favor of a cooperative relationship with management. This ideology did not 
resonate with the experiences of the workers in Flint. Massive plant closures and the 
outsourcing of production in the 1980s left a sense of betrayal in this autoworker 
community. 50 With the respect to the joint-programs, workers asked themselves: “How 
can it be that we’re in this together if GM is dismissing thousands of workers and 
shifting production to Mexico?”51 The workers’ experience in Flint was that they had 
to go head to head with GM in order to get something (a union, respect, wage 
increases, prevent outsourcing etc.), and this was the core of the ideology of Flint’s 
GM workers. This harked back to the Flint sit-down strike in 1937 that established the 
UAW as a union at GM – and was reinforced through the many subsequent local and 
national conflicts and strikes (Lichtenstein 1995). This ideology was also carried over 
from one generation of autoworkers to the next. One example was Rick Almand, a 
worker at the Flint Metal Center, who took part in the 1998 Flint strike. He described 
how his father took him to the picket line in the six-week long national strike at GM in 
1970 – walking the picket line with his father left a deep impression on him.52 The 
socialization of future unionists took place in the many families dependent on auto 
work in Flint.  
When the strike in Flint in 1998 began, it looked like other local strikes that 
had happened at GM plants throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, the local strike 
escalated and became the most serious labor conflict at GM since 1970. On June 5, 
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1998, the workers at the Flint Metal Center walked off their job.53 The conflict was 
about outsourcing and changes in work rules, which were common sources for local 
conflicts at GM in the 1990s. In the previous month, GM had intended to outsource 
body parts production arguing that the costs at the Flint plant were not competitive. 
The local UAW rejected this and pointed to a local agreement in 1995, in which the 
union agreed to far-reaching changes in work rules, in order to make the plant more 
productive. In exchange for these concessions, management promised production for 
the plant. When management did not get the union’s consent for the outsourcing 
decision in 1998, it acted unilaterally and removed dies from the factory over the 
Memorial weekend and installed them at another plant.54 In effect, this terminated the 
body parts production and made workers redundant. This bold and unusual 
management action caught the workers by surprise when they returned to the factory 
after the holiday. The union felt provoked by the management action and regarded it 
as a breach of the contract. The union went on strike.  
The strike spread to the nearby Flint East parts plants.55 The union cited work 
rule dispute as a reason for the strike, but at the core of the conflict was the 
downsizing and possible closure of the plant. The local strikes quickly turned into a 
national conflict and a battle between the national UAW and GM Company. Both 
sides, management and labor, were deeply dissatisfied with developments at GM in 
recent years and the tensions had grown stronger.56 Management was dissatisfied with 
the performance of its North American operation as it lagged behind in productivity 
compared to its competitors in the North American auto market – and the GM 
management came under a lot of pressure for this from their investors. Management 
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tried to address this productivity gap by imitating strategies of its competitors (e.g. 
have lower in-plant content and increase outsourcing). In this reorganization of 
production, the union was seen as an obstacle and management grew increasingly 
frustrated with the union imposed restrictions on the management of inevitable 
changes. In order to move ahead with its agenda, management became increasingly 
aggressive towards the union.  
On the other side, the union was dissatisfied with the aggressive downsizing of 
plants.57 In many cases, the unions agreed to local concessions, helped to considerably 
improve the productivity of individual plants and took part in joint-programs only to 
find out after some time that management would outsource production or close down 
plants anyway. Another issue was that the UAW felt that management did not respect 
the norms of local collective contracts. These broader issues at GM were respectively 
on the management and union’s minds when the conflict in Flint broke out. 
Management and UAW were each determined to take a strong stance and battle it out 
in the local Flint conflicts.  
The UAW strike hit GM at a vulnerable point in its North American 
production ne twork. Almost all of GM’s North American assembly plants were 
dependent on parts from the striking Flint plants. As the strike went on, one assembly 
plant after another was forced to shut as they were running out of parts. After one 
month, the strike had shut down 26 of GM’s 29 assembly plants and more than 100 
parts plants, which idled more than 160,000 workers in the United States, Mexico and 
Canada. Management fought back by lobbying states not to pay unemployment 
benefits to the striking workers, a strategy that only worked in the southern states. In 
addition, management sued the UAW for conducting a national strike based on a local 
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conflict, which would have been a violation of United States labor law. If management 
had won this legal battle, it could have sued the UAW for reparations.  
Before the summer vacation in July, the negotiations reached a complete 
impasse and both sides were hoping to wear the other side down. UAW president 
Yokich announced at the UAW convention in Las Vegas that the “UAW would last 
one day longer,” while management hoped that they could starve out the union 
members.58 A worker on strike would receive in total about $500, ($300 
unemployment benefits and $200 from the UAW strike fund), which was barely 
enough to keep a family. However, union members in Flint did not falter. Many of 
them had been unemployed and endured hardship before. Another important aspect 
was the broad public support for the striking workers. In local polls, 70% of the Flint 
population supported their cause.  
After the two-week summer break, both actors realized that they could not 
overpower the other. Serious negotiations began for the first time and both sides 
looked for a way out of this conflict without losing face in this high stake drama. After 
54 days, on 29 July 1998, a compromise was reached. Management was able to go 
ahead with some of the outsourcing, while other parts production was promised to the 
two plants instead. The UAW maintained higher employment levels than were 
originally planned, however some workers left through an early retirement program.59 
The outcome was a compromise similar to previous local conflicts at GM in 
the 1990s, but it came at a tremendous price. Commentators argued that both sides 
lost.60 Management lost $2.5 billion in profits and market share, which GM never 
regained. This weakening of GM’s economic base was also troubling for the UAW as 
GM was the union’s most important membership base. However, the UAW felt that 
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something more was at stake. Based on its job control ideology, the union defended 
itself against attacks from management by defending the norms and standards of the 
collective agreements. When management violated previous collective contracts in the 
Flint conflict, this hit the core of UAW’s ideology. If management could ignore 
existing collective agreements, the most important line of defense had fallen. This is 
why the UAW conducted an all-out strike even though it would decrease union 
membership by hurting GM economically.  
 
Collective negotiations at Ford and GM, 1999 – 2007  
1999 was the eighth year of the economic boom in the United States and the North 
American auto market. Ford announced a record profit for 1998. All producers had 
problems keeping up with demand and plants were running at full capacity. This was 
the extraordinary positive economic context of the collective bargaining round in 
1999. GM and Ford’s foremost goal was to avoid a strike. GM tried to improve its 
relationship with the union. In October 1998, the GM board of directors had reshuffled 
the operative leadership and replaced some managers responsible for the Flint disaster. 
Gary Cowger had became GM’s new manager for labor relations.61 This position had 
been upgraded and Cowger had become one of GM’s executive vice presidents. His 
task was to mend the relationship with the UAW. Before the collective bargaining 
round, Cowger struck a conciliatory tone with the unions. He suggested life-long 
employment for UAW members with high seniority. In addition,  Cowger suggested 
stopping the Yellowstone Project. This was a new lean production system for a new 
small car. For the union, this production system stood for extreme outsourcing. In 
order to avoid another showdown with the UAW, GM put this project on halt.62 
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Despite the improved tone in the relationship between the UAW and GM, the 
UAW did not choose GM to negotiate the pattern. Neither did the UAW choose Ford 
as it expected difficult negotiations about the spin-off of Ford’s parts division Visteon. 
The UAW decided to negotiate with all three companies at the same time, in order to 
keep all options open. The UAW negotiated the first contract with Chrysler, which had 
seldom happened before, as Chrysler was the smallest of the Big Three. Chrysler had 
merged with Daimler in 1998 to become the new DaimlerChrysler cooperation. In 
1999, the post-merger process between Daimler and Chrysler was ongoing and the 
new company tried to figure out how to best use its synergies. The UAW was aware 
that the new company was dependent on cooperation with the union to make the 
merger work.63 This was an opening for negotiating a good contract with 
DaimlerChrysler and setting the pattern.  
In this record production year and in the context of solid profits for the Big 
Three, the UAW pushed for substantial gains. For the first time in twenty years, the 
UAW gained the full 3% annual wage increase that had been the standard before the 
crisis in the early 1980s. The wage increases were backed up with a cost-of- living 
adjustment. The UAW gained a similar percentage increase for pensions and 
healthcare. Over the four-year term of the contract, the total economic gains of an 
average assembly worker at Daimler would add up to $29,300.64 The duration of the 
collective bargaining contract had been three years since the 1960s and changed now 
to four years. Management was interested in a longer duration of the contract and the 
UAW was not keen to bargain in the middle of a leadership change that was supposed 
to take place in 2002.65 Besides the above-mentioned economic gains, the UAW 
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improved job security substantially compared to previous agreements. The new 
contract excluded plant closures and the agreement stated “that DaimlerChrysler won’t 
close, sell spin-off, split off or consolidate any plants, asset or business unit 
represented by the UAW for the life of the agreement.”66  
The agreement defined as well how to replace workers: If employment 
dropped below 80%, DaimlerChrysler would have to hire one new worker to replace 
one, below 90% to hire one worker to replace two and below 100% to hire one worker 
to replace three. In addition, the UAW negotiated higher supplemental unemployment 
benefits, so that labor shedding would become more expensive for the company. 
Shortly afterwards, the UAW extended the pattern set at DaimlerChrysler and signed a 
similar contract with General Motors and Ford. The UAW called the new collective 
bargaining agreement the best in 20 years.67 
The 1999 collective bargaining agreement was the last negotiated during the 
economic boom period of the 1990s. In contrast to previous boom periods, the number 
of unionized workers did not rebound. Ford’s workforce numbered 158,501 in 1992 at 
the beginning of the boom and stood at 165,081 in 2000. The workforce reduction was 
even more substantial at GM. GM had to cope with greater overcapacities and 
outsourced more parts production to Mexico. However, overall employment in the 
United States auto industry increased from 1,130,014 to 1,310,186 in the same period 
(Katz 2008). The employment gains mostly took place in the non-union sector, e.g. 
through new plants of Japanese and German producers in the South of the United 
States. 
Despite the positive economic development of the North American auto market 
in the 1990s, Ford and GM were under pressure from foreign competitors and their 
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share of the North American market continued to shrink. At the same period, the 
market share of the Japanese car producers rose constantly. A number of factors 
contributed to this trend and one of them was labor relations. Each car produced at 
GM was $1,300 more expensive than at Toyata simply due to the social benefits of 
union members.68 In addition, the Japanese producers had newer plants with a younger 
workforce. This was part of the market pressure Ford, GM and the UAW faced 
throughout the 1990s and it grew stronger when the next slump period arrived in the 
2000s.  
The union’s responses in the 1990s were still very much rooted in the ideology 
of the postwar decades and continued to have a focus on the job control unionism, but 
this slowly began to change. The UAW gradually took on greater responsibility for the 
productivity and competitiveness of the company. Strikes that would hurt a company 
economically disappeared from the strategic repertoire of the UAW from the late 
1990s on. The UAW increasingly had an eye on the competitiveness of the company 
and this would include commonly negotiating concessions with management for the 
workforce. In sum, the following factors contributed to the changes in the UAW’s 
responses and ideology: (1) market pressure, (2) management strategy, (3) a leadership 
change in the UAW and (4) the joint-programs with management. Each of these 
factors will now be taken in turn. 
First, changes in the market made it more difficult to sustain the way the UAW 
defended labor contracts against challenges from management. Until the late 1970s, all 
producers in the auto market were unionized. When the union was defending the 
collective bargaining contract against attacks by management, it was not a big step for 
them to start an all-out strike against one company. If this company lost market share, 
another company that also had UAW representation could pick it up. In contrast, the 
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all-out Flint strike caused losses in the GM market share that were never fully regained 
afterwards. This market share was won by non-union companies and increased non-
union employment in the sector.  
Second, management strategies changed at GM and Ford. GM had inconsistent 
approach to labor relations in the 1980s and 1990s.69 On the one hand, GM engaged 
with the UAW in extensive joint-programs and co-management projects such as 
NUMMI and Saturn and sought to develop a more cooperative relationship with the 
union. On the other hand, top-management and lower level management pushed the 
union hard in collective negotiations using forcing strategies such as whipsawing or 
closing down factories without consulting the union. This management approach 
provoked strong reactions from the UAW and resulted in a number of costly strikes. 
The management strategies at Ford stood in stark contrast to GM. After some strikes 
in the 1980s, Ford developed a better relationship with the UAW. There was an 
understanding at Ford that lean production, teamwork and the production of high 
quality cars needed the cooperation of the union. 70 Central to Ford’s approach was the 
idea of bundling all labor relations issues in the hands of one powerful manager (with 
the rank of executive vice president) who kept a low profile. Pestillo steered labor 
relations at Ford until 1999. He handled all major labor conflict by himself – a basic 
but central element of his approach was that he respected the UAW. In addition, he 
removed some managers at plant level who did not maintain good relations with the 
union. During his leadership, there were no labor strikes at Ford from 1986 onwards. 
Third, a greater focus on keeping the companies more profitable became more 
pronounced after the leadership change from Steve Yokich to Ron Gettelfinger in 
2002. Yokich was promoted to a higher union position by the UAW president Walter 
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Reuther in the 1960s and then he gradually rose up the ranks of the UAW. He was 
very much aware of the UAW’s core identity and ideology and he would defend it 
staunchly against attacks by management. On the other hand, Yokich also participated 
in the joint-programs of the Big Three and helped to establish a more cooperative 
relationship with management after the Flint strike. However, the more cooperative  
orientation of the UAW showed itself more clearly under the new president 
Gettelfinger. The UAW took greater responsibility for the productivity of the 
companies in the 2000s.71 Gettelfinger negotiated far-reaching concessions for the 
workforce and sought to keep the companies competitive.  
Fourth, the joint-programs created a different breed of unionists.72 GM and 
Ford built big training centers in Detroit to train thousands of workers and to improve 
the skill- level of the workforce. The UAW and management jointly governed these 
training centers at Ford and GM. In addition, many unionists participated in joint-
programs at plant level and took part in the management of issues such as health and  
safety and quality programs at plant level. A majority of the released unionists were 
financed by the joint-programs. These unionists were appointed and not elected, and 
so they were little exposed to union politics and elections.73 They pursued a common 
agenda with management and the mentality of these appointed unionists was more 
cooperative than that of UAW members on average.  
In the early 2000s, the economic context became tougher for Ford and GM. 
Particularly troubling was the decline in SUV and light truck sells, which were key to 
the high profits in the second half of the 1990s. After September 11, 2001, oil and gas 
prices skyrocketed and consumers demanded more fuel efficient  cars. The market 
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slump drove Ford into the red and the company lost $5.45 billion in 2001.74 In early 
2002, Ford responded with a turn-around plan that included the closure of several 
plants.75 However, the strong language on plant closings of the 1999 collective 
bargaining agreement prevented any plant closure for the duration of the contract. 
Until then the companies had the option to retire workers. GM’s economic situation 
worsened as well. GM continued to reduce the workforce through retirement, which it  
pursued faster than Ford, because its workforce had a higher average age. Between 
2000 and 2003, GM’s workforce decreased from 196,000 to 157,000 (including 
Delphi).76 The economic context for the 2003 collective bargaining round was 
therefore extremely difficult (McAlinden 2004). 
Two topics became the most important issues of the collective bargaining 
round: healthcare and the reduction of overcapacities. In previous years, healthcare 
costs had skyrocketed at GM and Ford. After the national government, GM was the 
second largest provider of healthcare in the United States. GM’s healthcare programs 
covered about 1.1 million people that included the current workforce, pensioners and 
family members.77 The increasing number of retirees was the key reason for the rising 
healthcare costs. GM’s workforce was on average 49 years old and in the previous 
years thousands of workers had already retired. Ford and GM aimed during the 
negotiations at stopping the rising healthcare costs. In addition, both companies sought 
to reduce their overcapacities and limit job security provisions in the new contract.  
The economic situation of the companies made it very difficult for the UAW to 
fend off both healthcare concessions and workforce reduction. In statements made 
before the collective bargaining round the UAW president Ron Gettelfinger made it 
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clear that the union would focus on preventing healthcare concessions. Job security 
was not the central bargaining objective of the UAW, which it had been in collective 
bargaining rounds during the 1990s. In this collective bargaining round, the UAW 
focused on defending the social benefits of its members. A growing number were 
already pensioners and thousands of workers were expected to retire in the following 
years.  
The UAW decided to negotiate again with the Big Three at the same time. The 
UAW decided to come to an agreement with a company, wherever it would be easiest. 
As in 1999, the UAW reached an agreement with DaimlerChrysler first.78 Shortly 
afterwards, the UAW extended the pattern to Ford and GM. The UAW achieved its 
goal of preventing any substantial healthcare cuts, and in exchange, the UAW agreed 
to significant concessions in other areas. The language on job security was weaker 
compared to the 1999 agreement. The maximum employment reduction level was 
lower and GM and Ford could reduce its workforce by up to 30%.79 In addition, the 
plant-closing moratorium included several exceptions. The protection through 
supplemental unemployment benefits for workers remained high and would make it 
expensive for the companies to dismiss workers; however, expected attrition through 
retirement allowed Ford and GM to pursue the objective of workforce reduction and 
bring down production capacities. In addition, the UAW agreed to second-tier wages 
for new entries at GM and Ford’s parts division. These second-tier wages would lower 
labor costs significantly over time at Visteon and Delphi. For the assembly sector, 
wage gains were low. The UAW agreed to a wage freeze for the first two years of the 
agreement. Wage increases and cost-of- living adjustments would only add up to an 
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increase of 11.1% during the four-year term of the contract and the hourly wage would 
only rise for an average assembly worker from $25.72 to $28.43.80 
The economic situation remained difficult in the following years. The United 
States auto market seemed to be stuck on a plateau with little fluctuation either up or 
down. In 2001, 17.2 million light vehicles were sold in the United States and sales 
stood at 17.1 million in 2007.81 Thus, there was no relief to be found through a 
growing market. At the same time, the profit margins per vehicle for GM and Ford 
decreased dramatically. The dramatic recovery in the second half of the 1990s was 
based on having an edge in the highly profitable light truck and SUV market niches. 
However, foreign producers moved into the same market segments in the 2000s.82 
Competition grew stronger and drove down profit margins. GM and Ford sought to 
counter decreasing sales by offering unprecedented discounts, which reduced profit 
margins further.  
General Motors’ sales plummeted in 2005 and losses accumulated rapidly. By 
the end of the year, GM had made $10.3 billion losses.83 Healthcare costs continued to 
rise and in mid 2005, management anticipated a $1 billion increase alone for 2005. 
GM was in the middle of a severe company crisis and in order to ensure the long-term 
survival of the company, management asked the UAW for concessions. GM’s 
president of the North American operation, Gary Cowger, argued: “[W]e must make 
progress this year on healthcare costs, which are spiraling out of control. In a market 
with unmatched competition, and where so much of the competition doesn’t carry this 
same burden, moving forward at the present state is simply not feasible.”84 In this 
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severe company crisis, the UAW agreed to the unusual step of opening up the 
collective bargaining process in the middle of the contract term. The UAW approved 
about $1 billion of healthcare concessions, which were later also granted to Ford (Katz 
2008). 
The crisis at Ford was even more dramatic. Ford’s losses mounted up to $12.6 
billion in 2006.85 A decreasing market share forced Ford to cut its overcapacities and 
workforce dramatically. Ford planned to close six plants and to reduce the workforce 
by more than 30,000 employees over the following six years. UAW and Ford agreed 
on workforce reduction through voluntary buyouts and early retirement programs. 
Workers could leave with up to $140,000 depending on seniority. 86 The restructuring 
and workforce reduction at GM and Delphi that had started in 2006 was even more 
dramatic. GM’s spun-off parts company Delphi had filed bankruptcy in 2005. Delphi’s 
management engaged in difficult negotiations with the union that threatened to shut 
down GM if management simply closed plants and dismissed workers. Finally, GM 
agreed to similar buyout packages as offered at Ford. GM offered buyout packages at 
Delphi to 13,000 of the 24,000 workers as part of its plan to shutdown 21 of its 25 
North American plants. In addition, GM planned to reduce the workforce by 30,000 
and to close 12 plants by 2008. In interviews, managers expressed their belief that the 
union was very realistic about the seriousness of the company crisis.87 The UAW 
agreed to the dramatic job cuts and to the restructuring under way at Ford and GM. 
The UAW helped to implement the changes and ensured that this took place without 
labor protest, and in return the UAW won the right for workers to leave the company 
voluntarily. “By the fall of 2006 at Ford, 38,000 UAW members had opted to accept a 
buyout or retirement package (46% of Ford’s hourly workforce) and 35,000 workers 
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accepted similar options at GM (31% of GM’s hourly workforce)” (Katz 2008). A 
large proportion of the losses at Ford and GM in this period were related to the 
enormous costs of restructuring. At Ford, employee buyouts and plant closing 
accounted for $9.9 billion of the total $12.7 losses in 2006.88 
The massive restructuring underway and the economic troubles at Ford and 
GM formed the context of the 2007 collective bargaining round. Management and the 
UAW had a common understanding of the market pressure and crisis at both 
companies. In the negotiations, the UAW focused on securing employment and social 
benefits, but was also interested in making the companies more competitive. Only this 
– went the logic of the UAW leadership – would secure employment in the United 
States.  
[UAW vice president] Bob King has basically laid out to his members and the 
leaders of the locals that you're betting the company on this contract, and 
something that is halfway there is not going to do it, he said. “A surviving, 
profitable Ford is the only thing that is a good deal.”89 
The UAW chose GM to negotiate the first collective bargaining contract. Negotiations 
proceeded slowly and moved beyond the strike deadline of September 15. At the very 
last stage of the negotiations, Gettelfinger called a national strike, something that had 
not happened at GM since 1970. GM production immediately came to a standstill, 
which clearly showed that the UAW still possessed the capability to organize a 
national strike. However, the strike was over after only 42 hours. Later, the UAW also 
struck Chrysler. This strike only lasted 6 hours. There are different interpretations 
about the rationale for these strikes.90 One interpretation was that the leadership of the 
UAW was further ahead in agreeing to concessions than the membership, which had to 
agree to the labor contract in a ratification vote. Conducting a short strike did not hurt 
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the companies economically, but sent a signal to the membership that the union had 
fought for a contract. Concerns about the ratification were also apparent in the high 
signing bonus that amounted to $3,000 for each union member.91 That these concerns 
were justified and the vote on the contract by the Chrysler workforce only passed by a 
very small margin.  
The collective bargaining agreement at GM addressed one major competitive 
advantage of the Japanese producer: healthcare costs. GM and the UAW agreed to a 
union-managed Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association for the healthcare 
benefits of the UAW pensioners. GM’s healthcare cost liabilities would be completely 
transferred to the VEBA by 2010. In order to get the healthcare costs off the books, 
GM had to finance the VEBA with $29.9 billion plus an additional $5.4 before 2010 
(Lipsky 2007). GM partly financed VEBA by making the UAW a 16% shareholder of 
the GM Company, which was worth about $4.4 billion. 92 This made the UAW the 
largest shareholder of GM. However, taking on the responsibility for a healthcare 
VEBA also bore enormous risks for the UAW as such union managed funds had gone 
bankrupt in the past (Lipsky 2007). 
Another major concession by the union was the introduction of a two-tier wage 
at assembly plants for none core production jobs. These two-tier wages were modeled 
on the previous Visteon agreement. New entries would receive about 40% lower 
wages compared to assembly line workers and lower social benefits.93 Wage gains for 
the UAW were moderate and mostly took place in terms of lump sum payments, 
which did not increase the basic wage. Other wage increases were merit-based and 
linked to performance in the product market. In exchange for these concessions, labor 
sought greater employment security. A plant-closing moratorium attached to the 
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collective bargaining agreement stated that GM would not be allowed to close down or 
sell any plants beyond those that both parties had previously agreed upon. A new 
instrument on employment security was the assignment of specific products to plants, 
which was based on the idea that employment would only be secured if the individual 
plants had sufficient production. 94 
Another new development in the 2007 collective bargaining round was that the 
UAW had less of a focus on enforcing a bargaining pattern across companies. The 
UAW did not only allow more variation between the assembly and parts sectors as in 
the 2003 agreement, but also more variation between the companies. A number of 
contract norms were identical between the two firms, but the Ford agreement included 
a number of provisions that fitted the specific economic needs of Ford. The 
negotiation at Ford included one on one negotiation between UAW president Ron 
Gettelfinger and Ford CEO Alan Mullaly. Healthcare costs were less of a problem at 
Ford and less financial resources would go into the new VEBA compared to GM and 
Chrysler. This money was used for the renovation of Ford plants and kept two more 
plants open that had previously been earmarked for closure. Another departure from 
the GM agreement were differences with respect to the second tier wages, which 
applied at Ford for all new entrants including assembly workers.  
Buyout programs at GM and Ford continued. Compared to the 1980s, Ford and 
GM were now much smaller companies, but the negotiated changes made the 
companies much more competitive and the UAW had an active role in this. It had 
become part of the UAW’s ideology, more than ever before, to make the companies 
more competitive.95 UAW dissidents criticized the cooperative relationship between 
UAW leadership and management and called the concession a sell-out.96 Various 
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analysts argued that the 2007 collective bargaining round meant transformational 
change at Ford and General Motors.97 However, it was unclear after the financial and 
economic crisis if GM and Ford would survive.  
 
Summary  
Employment relations between the UAW and management at Ford and GM evolved 
within the institutional framework of the United States. The employment relations 
practices were shaped by the collective actors’ economic ideas and ideologies. 
Management believed that it had the right to govern at the workplace and did not 
accept unions as legitimate actors. Based on this ideology, management fought the 
UAW using virtually all means; an approach that resulted in a series of violent 
confrontations between management and the UAW. The UAW established a union 
presence at Ford and GM and forced collective bargaining upon management through 
strike action. Even after the collective bargaining agreements were signed, local 
management often challenged the norms of the collective agreements. As the union 
was aware that it existed at the workplace against the will of management, a 
cornerstone of the union ideology was a narrow focus on defending the norms of the 
collective bargaining agreement through grievance procedures and strike action; a 
labor orientation, which has been described as job control unionism (Katz 1985). 
Management’s anti-union ideology and the UAW’s job control orientation 
underpinned a pattern of adversarial, low-trust employment relations at Ford and GM 
in the first few postwar decades. In addition, the UAW was able to organize a union 
presence at all companies throughout the auto industry in the United States. The UAW 
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement at one of the Big Three, which it then 
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extended to other companies in the auto industry. The UAW was able to take wages 
out of competition until 1979.  
 The economic context changed in the 1980s. Imports and competition from 
Japanese producers grew stronger. Management from the Big Three and the UAW 
sought to limit the competition by successfully lobbying the United States government 
to create trade barriers. However, the Japanese producers circumvented them by 
building plants in the United States. They predominantly built plants in southern 
states, where the ideological landscape allowed companies to avoid a union presence 
despite organizing efforts by the UAW. This introduced a non-union sector into the 
United States auto industry and put pressure on employment relations at Ford and GM.  
 There was some uncertainty about how to adapt to the increased competition, 
and management had different ideas about how to respond to the challenges. A first 
response in the late 1970s and early 1980s, during a slump of the auto market, was to 
shed labor and close plants, which was a traditional management response and in line 
with previous employment relations practices. Another idea management pursued was 
the automatization of production via industry robots. This strategy did not prove 
competitive. Industry robots were expensive and inflexible and smaller defects could 
lead to long production stops. In addition, Ford and GM tried to figure the reasons for 
Japanese producers’ success. An important element seemed to be lean production. 
This was a different way of organizing production, which included just- in-time 
production and teamwork. Lean production principles reflected a management 
ideology, which regarded worker involvement and partnership with workers as key 
elements for the competitive organization of employment relations and production 
(Katz, MacDuffie, & Phil 2002). 
 Lean production ideas stood in stark contrast to previous hierarchical and top-
down management ideologies at Ford and GM. However, management at Ford and 
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GM recognized the importance of lean production and started to experiment with it. 
GM engaged in the joint-venture NUMMI with Toyota; its most advanced 
independent lean production project became Saturn (Turner 1991). However, 
management’s approach towards labor was not consistent. In some cases, management 
engaged in a cooperative relationship around lean production with labor; but then 
sometimes whipsawed workers to gain, for the sake of lean production changes in the 
work rules. These forcing strategies were not in line with the cooperative spirit of lean 
production and they did not seem conducive to engender ideological changes in the 
UAW.  
 It was also not easy for the UAW to embrace the ideology of lean production 
given the long-term adversarial relationship with management and its job control 
orientation. Besides this historical background, the UAW’s ideological position on 
lean production was shaped by the politics within the UAW. Vocal supporters and 
opponents emerged within the UAW. On the one hand, Don Ephlin, the vice president 
of the UAW and head of the GM department, became a strong advocate of the lean 
production and sought to convince other unionists of the benefits of this ideology. On 
the other hand, the UAW opposition group, New Directions, strongly opposed lean 
production. New Directions associated lean production with concession bargaining 
and “management by stress” (Parker and Slaughter 1988). The 1989 UAW union 
convention consolidated the position of the UAW on lean production (Babson 1995). 
The strongest supporters and opponents were weakened during the convention. New 
Directions was decisively defeated in union elections; and at the same time, Steve 
Yokich, a more traditional unionist, replaced Don Ephlin, the strongest advocate of 
lean production within the UAW. In the aftermath of the convention, the UAW 
leadership developed a balanced orientation. The UAW leadership engaged in joint-
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programs with Ford and GM at the national level and at the same time it supported 
local groups at the plant level that opposed or embraced lean production.  
 At the local plant level various patterns of employment relations evolved 
within the United States employment relations institutions during the 1990s. The 
employment relations practices were crucially shaped by the local union and 
management ideologies. The most contrasting examples of labor relations were the 
Saturn project and the Flint conflict in 1998. At Saturn, management and labor 
negotiated a separate collective bargaining agreement and labor representatives 
became co-managers in the governing of employment relations and production 
(Rubinstein 2001, Rubinstein & Kochan 2001). Labor representatives were given a 
far-reaching say in decision-making processes. Management and labor shared the 
belief that cooperation was necessary and shared responsibility for the productivity of 
the plant and the jobs of the workers. For developing the cooperative ideology and 
new employment relations practices at Saturn, it seemed to be helpful that the plant 
was located in Springhill far away from the hierarchical and legacy-laden headquarters 
of the UAW and GM.  
In contrast to Saturn, at the GM plants in Flint adversarial and contentious 
employment relations remained. Historical experiences crucially shaped the ideology 
of the local unions. The unions believed that they had to go toe to toe with 
management in order to accomplish anything (e.g. respect, wages and benefits, 
defending jobs and the existence of the union itself). This orientation can be traced 
back to the Flint sit-down strike in 1937, which established the UAW (Lichtenstein 
1995). During the 1980s and 1990s, the Flint union locals were severely hit by 
dismissals, outsourcing and plant closures. Not surprisingly, the local unions did not 
believe in the lean production ideology as it did not resonate with their experiences. 
Several conflicts broke out during the 1990s at the plants in Flint, which culminated in 
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a 54-day strike in 1998 that shut down most of GM’s North American operation 
(Babson 2004). The severity of the strike was also related to management at GM 
headquarters. Managers with an anti-union ideology gained the upper hand and they 
believed that the Flint strike was an opportunity to break the union. Both sides, 
management and labor, lost severely in the conflict. GM lost market share, which was 
picked up by non-union competitors.  
 Changes in management contributed to changes in employment relations. 
Significant differences between the management of Ford and GM appeared in the 
1990s. After some bruising conflicts with the UAW, Ford changed its approach to 
labor relations. Ford put all labor relations decisions in the hands of the HR manager, 
Peter Pestillo, whose importance was indicated through his rank as vice president. He 
sought to establish a cooperative relationship with the UAW and earned the trust of the 
union over time. Pestillo often directly engaged in local conflicts between labor and 
management. The strong supervision of labor relations at the local level by 
headquarters prevented any hard-nosed local manager from battling it out with the 
union. After 1986, there were no more strikes at Ford, and cooperation between Ford 
and the UAW increasingly distinguished itself from past labor relations. Following the 
Flint disaster at GM, a leadership change took place. Managers with an anti-union 
ideology, which had failed and cost the company severely, were replaced with 
managers who were more open to cooperating with the UAW. Gary Cowger became 
the HR manager of GM’s North American operation. Cowger had experienced the 
upsides of labor-management partnerships during his tenure in Europe and he sought 
to convince other GM managers of the need to cooperate with the UAW.  
 The changes on the management side at Ford and GM facilitated gradual 
ideational changes of the UAW. The UAW engaged in a joint-program with 
management at the national level, even though the job control ideology remained and 
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clearly came to the fore when management challenged the UAW. The leadership 
change in 2002 from Steve Yokich to Ron Gettelfinger contributed to further 
ideological changes of the UAW. Yokich would not hesitate to strike, even if this hurt 
the company economically and drove down productivity. Following the leadership 
change to Gettelfinger, the UAW accepted greater responsibility for the productivity 
of the companies, and strikes that economically hurt the companies disappeared in the 
2000s. Gettelfinger negotiated unprecedented concessions in 2003, 2005 and 2007. He 
believed that the union had a common agenda with management. The Big Three were 
the last strongholds of the UAW and only if these companies were productive, this 
would secure the future of the union. Industry analysts argued that the collective 
agreements of the 2000s closed the productivity gap with the Japanese producers.98 
Despite unprecedented concessions, Gettelfinger was able to convince the majority of 
the workers of the benefits of his cooperative approach with management, and he was 
reelected in the 2006 union election. In the aftermath of the financial crisis at the end 
of the 2000s, management and labor at Ford and GM struggled to keep the companies 
alive and adapted employment relations to a radically changing world.  
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CHAPTER 3 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT FORD IN SPAIN  
 
Ford started its engagement in Spain in Cadiz in 1919, producing the Ford Model T. 
Cadiz’s harbor facilitated the delivery of auto parts from the United States. The Franco 
dictatorship interrupted Ford’s stay in 1952 when it nationalized the auto companies in 
Spain. In the early 1970s, the Ford Company planned to return and lobbied the Franco 
regime to license car production (Sancho 2003). The regime granted the license in 
1973 with the condition that Ford had to export 75% of its Spanish production. As the 
location for the new plant, Ford chose the small village Almussafes, close to Valencia. 
Production started in 1976 after Franco’s death and during Spain’s transition to 
democracy (Sancho 2000). The first car to be produced was the Fiesta, which has been 
Ford’s bestselling car in Europe. Besides car production, Ford set up one of its major 
European engine plants in Valencia. In 2007, the assembly plant produced the car 
models Focus, Fiesta and Ford Ka.  
 
Labor Representation at Ford Spain  
In order to understand the collective negotiations at Ford Spain, it is necessary to take 
a look at the origins of labor relations. Ford regarded it as essential to be close to one 
of the industrial centers. Management chose to put the plant in the small farming 
village of Almussafes – about 20 miles south of Valencia. Ford tried to keep some 
distance from the urban labor movement. Their fight against the Franco dictatorship 
had ideologically shaped these unionists, and for them it was natural to conduct 
collective bargaining in a contentious manner. A great variety of different unions 
appeared in the factory including communist, anarchist, socialist and anti-monarchist 
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(Collado 2001). Collective bargaining was fought out bitterly in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and included extensive strikes and lockouts by the company. An 
indication of the severity of the labor conflict was the hunger strike by Ford workers 
(Collado 2001). Parallel to the consolidation of democracy in Spain during the 1980s, 
labor relations became less contentious. However, these early strikes and fights with 
management are still present in the collective memory of the workers. They help to 
understand why severe protest occasionally erupted during the collective bargaining 
rounds of the 1990s.  
By the early 1990s labor representation was less divided at Ford, and as in 
most other large companies in Spain, the social-democratic UGT (Union General de 
Trabajadores), the communist CCOO (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones 
Obreras) and the anarchists CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo) became the 
predominant labor unions (Sancho 2000). Between 1990 and 2000, UGT and CCOO 
together received at least 60% of the voters, and thus were the most important unions 
for collective bargaining with management. CGT was the most important opposition 
union, receiving about 15% of the vote. During the 1990s, CCOO was struck by 
internal conflicts, which let to secessions and the foundation of SPV (Sindicato del 
País Valenciano) and PUT (Plataforma Unitaria de Trabajadores). Another smaller, 
management-oriented union was FAMIF (Sindicato de Administrativo de Ford), 
which represented white-collar workers.  
In the 2003 and 2007 union elections, UGT won the majority in the comité de 
empresa (henceforth works council), and this changed labor relations.99 CCOO was 
weakened through the secessions in the context of the fierce collective bargaining 
conflicts in 1998 and 2001. Since then, labor relations have been more cooperative, in 
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which the majority union, UGT, looks beyond defending labor interests and takes 
responsibility for the productivity of the plant.  
 
Management Strategies at Ford Spain  
Early on Valencia became the swing or flex assembly plant within Ford’s European 
operation.100 In the 1980s, the Valencia plant produced the car models Fiesta, Escort 
and Orion – making it the only plant in Europe that produced three different car 
models.101 In the early 1990s, Valencia shared the Fiesta production with Cologne 
(Germany) and Dagenham (United Kingdom) and the Escort/Orion production with 
Saarlouis (Germany) and Halewood (United Kingdom). Ford started to standardize 
production in the wake of the lean production debate and began later to implement 
common production platforms as part of the Ford 2000 management strategy. 102 
Parallel production, standardization of production, and common production platforms 
made it possible for management to whipsaw labor in collective bargaining. Although 
Ford had this capacity in Europe early on, management did not begin to use this as 
leverage before the 1998 collective bargaining round in Spain.  
In the late 1990s, Ford began to restructure its European production and 
drastically reduced its overcapacity by terminating the car production of the Ford 
brand in Dagenham and Halewood.103 It also closed down a plant in Poland and left 
the joint-venture AutoEuropa with VW in Setubal (Portugal). The downsizing of 
Ford’s European operation thus left only four car assembly plants producing the Ford 
brand in Europe: Cologne, Saarlouis (both Germany), Genk (Belgium) and Valencia. 
Though less parallel production existed than before, management occasionally 
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whipsawed the Valencia plants. Ford management did this less aggressively than 
General Motors in Europe.  
A strategy employed by management was to communicate directly with the 
workforce during collective bargaining.104 Management informed the workforce 
through leaflets about its position and the state of the negotiations – as the individual 
unions did during collective bargaining. The labor unions presented the result of the 
collective bargaining agreement to a vote of the workforce. Through this democratic 
vote, the position of the unions was only as strong as the workforce that backed it up. 
That is why management sought to influence directly the opinion of the workforce 
through leaflets.  
In addition, management strategy sought to divide labor representation and 
treated the unions differently. 105 On the one hand, management tried to support the 
moderate union UGT by giving it more resources than required by law. For example, 
management released a greater number of works councilors from work than required 
by law. This gave UGT more staff for the representation of their members and for 
signing up new union members. On the other hand, management punished and 
marginalized the more radical unions. For example, Ford dismissed the president of 
CGT in 2005. This case was pending in the Spanish Supreme Court. 106  
 
Collective negotiations, 1990 – 1997 
The economic situation of the Valencia plant had continuously improved since its 
foundation. Car production increased between 1977 and 1990 from 213,897 to 
334,418. Benefits had consolidated in the 1980s and in 1988-89 Ford made record 
profits, earning 39,547 million and 32,656 million Spanish pesetas respectively. 
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Employment reached a record high in 1990 with 10,884 employees.107 Based on this 
positive economic outlook, the unions were continuously able – through collective 
bargaining – to improve the economic and social situation of Ford workers. Two cases 
in point were the collective bargaining rounds in 1990 and 1992.  
The 1990 collective bargaining agreement increased the wages in 1990 by 
2.5% and in 1990 by 2% above the inflation rate.108 The wage increases were secured 
through a revision clause that would adapt the wages if the anticipated inflation rates 
were higher. Making sure that the wage increases were effective was an important 
consideration for the unions, because the inflation rate was comparatively high in 
Spain. The 1992 collective bargaining agreement increased the wages by 2% in 1992 
and by 1.5% in 1993 plus inflation rate.109 In addition, the unions were able to gain 
other social advances, e.g. Ford workers started with 19 holidays a year in 1977. In the 
collective bargaining agreements in 1990 and 1992, the unions gained additional 
holidays in each collective bargaining round and by 1993, the unions had reached 26 
annual holidays. An important gain for the unions in the 1990 collective bargaining 
round was the permanent employment of 600 temporary workers. In each of the 
collective bargaining rounds, the unions supported their demands with strikes, in 
which the workforce massively participated. A general pattern in this period was that 
management gave in to some additional union demands after strikes started and sought 
to avoid an escalation of the conflict – after all – the cost of wages in Spain were still 
much lower than in other Western European countries.  
In the second half of 1992, the demand for Ford cars decreased substantially. 
The European and the Spanish car market slid into recession. 110 Due to the slump in 
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demand, Ford reduced car production by 31% in 1993 and Ford in Spain experienced 
the first losses in its history. 111 In order to cope with the crisis, management intended 
to shed labor through an early retirement program. Management wanted 1,300 workers 
who were older than 58 years old to retire. According to the proposed retirement 
program, workers would receive about 90% of their previous wages.112 According to 
Spanish labor law, management has to apply for temporary or permanent dismissals 
called expediente de regulaction de empleo (henceforth: employment regulation) with 
the State Labor Ministry. These employment regulations were usually approved if 
management got the approval by the works council. The employment regulation in 
1992 was opposed by CGT and CCOO and only backed up by UGT. Although 
management did not get the official approval by a majority of the works council, the 
State Labor Ministry accepted the suggested employment regulation. CGT and CCOO 
were furious about the support of the labor shedding by UGT, and therefore they 
dismissed the president of the works council and replaced him with a candidate from 
CGT.113 
The economic context for Ford Spain remained difficult during the 1994 
collective bargaining round. In the previous collective bargaining rounds, the unions 
had constantly gained higher wages, benefits and working standards. Management’s 
goal for the 1994 collective bargaining round was to stop this upward trend, which 
would help the company to recover from the recession. 114 Negotiations started 
between management and the works council, compromised of delegates from UGT, 
CCOO and CGT in January 1994. In the initial statements, the unions presented the ir 
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common position. 115 It included a 5% wage increase, a working time reduction and the 
payment of a bonus. This bonus was first introduced in 1990, when the company had 
made high profits. In the initial statement of the collective bargaining round, 
management strongly emphasized the recession of the auto markets and Ford’s losses. 
The unions recognized the economic problems of the company, but pointed to the 
recovery of the auto market in 1994.  
In the following four months, little progress had been made. Management 
proposed its final offer on April 22, 1994 suggesting a 2% wage increase for 1994, an 
increase of 85 % of inflation for 1995, and an increase of 100% of inflation in 1996.116 
This would have meant lower purchasing power for the workers. However, the works 
council unanimously rejected this proposal, although there was a rift between the 
unions.117 On the one side, UGT was more inclined to find a resolution with 
management and to cut back on some of the union demands. In its statement, UGT 
accepted the description of the economic crisis by management. On the other side, 
CCOO and CGT were determined to fight for further social and economic 
improvements. Since the management position had not significantly improved over the 
last months, CCOO and CGT decided to mobilize the workforce for strike action. A 
workforce assembly was scheduled for May 19, in which the workforce had to decide 
by vote for strike action. UGT opposed strike actions and preferred to continue 
negotiating with management. Before the workforce assembly, management 
threatened workers with the announcement that each strike day would reduce the wage 
increase by 0.5%. In the vote about strike actions, 5,499 workers took part, and 3,230 
were in favor of a two-hour strike in each shift – resulting in a total loss of six work 
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hours.118 The negotiations between management and labor resumed after the strike 
action on June 1. The management of Ford wanted to avoid the escalation of the 
conflict and made a final offer to the unions, which included a number of smaller 
suggestions made by the unions. Management began to move towards the union side. 
CCOO and CGT rejected this offer, while UGT suggested considering the 
management proposal. CGT and CCOO continued the mobilization and gradually 
increased the strike action. In June, workers struck 2.5 hours in each work shift. 
Following this strike action, management submitted its final and ultimate offer,119 
which was accepted by UGT and CCOO shortly later, only one day before further 
strike action was scheduled. The collective bargaining agreement with management 
was submitted to a vote by the workforce at the end of June. The new contract was 
accepted by 75% of the workers, while it was opposed by 22%.120 
Considering the difficult economic context, the bargaining result can be seen as 
success by the labor unions. Each of the two strike days resulted in an improved offer 
by management. In total, 19 hours of work were lost through strike action. UGT was 
readier to find a compromise with management and regarded the strike action as 
premature and risky. Management was not able to limit the wage increases although 
they were below the increases in previous collective bargaining rounds. The increase 
in 1994 was 3.5 % and the revision clause would make sure that the wage increase was 
at least on the level of the inflation rate. The wage increase for 1995 was 1% above the 
inflation rate. In addition, labor was able to get a bonus for 1994 and 1995 in the 
amount 47,500 Pts and 49,000 respectively.121 In addition, the labor unions were able 
to get a number of additional social benefits such as increases for weekend work, 
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support for meals of workers – and among other things – a social benefit for 
handicapped workers. A success for management was that the labor unions agreed to 
the implementation of teamwork.122 
The 1994 collective bargaining round took place in the shadow of the union 
elections scheduled for October. Directly after the collective bargaining round, a fight 
broke out within CCOO. The majority of CCOO had supported the final vote of the 
workforce, while a smaller section was in favor of continuing strike action. This 
smaller section decided to split away from CCOO and to found a separate union called 
SPV. Such secession had taken place for the last time in 1982 and since then a 
consolidation of the union landscape had taken place towards the three big unions. The 
union election in September was a vote on the strategy of the unions in the last 
collective bargaining round as well as the early retirement program in 1993, which had 
remained a controversial topic. UGT won the election and got fourteen seats in the 
works council followed by CCOO (twelve seats), CGT (five seats), SPV (three seats) 
and FAMIF (two seats). UGT became the largest union largely due to the secession of 
the SPV from CCOO. In contrast to the previous composition of the works council, 
CCOO and CGT did not have a majority any longer.123 
In 1994, the Ford world headquarters introduced its Ford 2000 restructuring 
program dividing Ford’s global operation in different competence centers. This 
restructuring program had few repercussions on labor relations at Ford Spain in the 
short run. The new global competence centre for cars and engines produced in 
Almussafes were in Germany and in the United Kingdom. Another element of the 
Ford 2000 program was the worldwide standardization of production. A standard for 
lean production had become just-in-time production, increasingly organized through 
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adjacent supplier parks. Such a supplier park was founded close to the Valencia plant 
in 1995. In addition, a new motor plant was inaugurated in 1995 and two production 
decisions took place in favor of the Valencia plant. Production for the car model Ka 
and the engine Zetec were supposed to start in 1996. Labor was not involved in these 
sourcing decisions. Spanish labor representatives did not have or seek the access to the 
European headquarters in the UK124or the world headquarters in Detroit as did labor 
representatives in the UK and Germany during this time. The Valencia plant was not 
close to the historical production centers in Germany and the UK. The ideology of the 
Spanish labor unions – with the exception of UGT – did not make lobbying for new 
production very likely. An important reason for the sourcing of the car model Ka was 
the high productivity of the Valencia plant. There was no evidence that the production 
decision was linked to the collective bargaining round at the Valencia plant in 1994 
and 1996. Such a link between collective bargaining and production decision had 
already become very strong in the 1993 collective bargaining round at Ford Germany.  
The economic context  of the 1996 collective bargaining round was better 
compared to the 1994 collective bargaining round. Ford had returned to profitability in 
1994 and 1995 – despite a slight slump in the second half of 1995.125 The more 
positive economic context was reflected in the new investments. Accordingly, the 
unions were assertive and intended to push for economic and social improvement in 
the collective bargaining round tha t started in January 1996.126 The works council 
demanded wage increases of 5.5%, more holidays, and a regrouping of workers into a 
higher wage groups. Both management and unions looked to plants in other countries 
as an orientation or benchmark for its own position and strategies. In a leaflet CCOO 
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pointed to a statement by the chair of Ford Europe who said that labor costs of the 
Valencia plant were about half of that of the Cologne plant. In turn, management tried 
to limit the increases in labor costs and asked the unions in its leaflets to be 
reasonable. Management presented its first offer for a collective bargaining agreement 
by the end of February and its final offer by the end of March. 127  
During this negotiation, the cooperation between UGT and CCOO was stable 
and the two largest unions steered the course of the works council. In early April, the 
works council started to use low key forcing strategies and announced a boycott of 
overtime, a strategy regularly used by German works councils. Another low-key 
forcing strategy was a one-hour demonstration in front of the administration building. 
Despite these forcing strategies by labor, management stayed calm and continued to 
negotiate with the works council. Management argued that all labor demands would 
add up to a 30% labor cost increase. On April 19, management made its final and 
ultimate offer, which was closer to the union demands, e.g. management suggested 
increasing wages by 4% in 1996.128 After some further minor concessions by 
management, UGT and CCOO accepted the offer. After an agreement was reached, 
the works council prepared a ballot vote by the workforce. Workers could either 
choose between accepting the collective bargaining agreement (suggested by UGT and 
CCOO) or rejecting the agreement and supporting a strike (suggested by CGT and 
SPV). The two smaller unions CGT and SPV started to lobby among the workforce in 
favor of a strike.129130 They also pushed for more ambitious union demands. Although 
the two largest unions UGT and CCOO supported the collective bargaining agreement, 
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it was only confirmed by a slight margin. 3,810 (54.8%) workers voted in favor of the 
new collective bargaining agreement and 3,035 (45.1%) workers against it.131 
The 1996 collective bargaining agreement increased the wage for 1996 by 
4.5% and for 1997 by 4%. The agreement also included a revision clause in case of a 
higher inflation rate. The revision clause would secure that wage increases were 1.5% 
above the inflation rate. The holidays increased from 27 to 28 days a year. Unions 
accomplished the regrouping of blue-collar workers to at least the wage group five, 
which affected more than two thousands workers. In addition, management and labor 
agreed on a pension plan for early retirement and a merit-based benefit in the amount 
of 52,000 Spanish pesetas for 1996 and 53,000 Spanish pesetas in 1997.132 
In recent years, the labor conflict had decreased compared to the 1970s and 
1980s. Only 19 strike hours were lost during the 1994 collective bargaining round and 
only one hour in 1996. The collective negotiations were arduous and took several 
months, but this was mainly a job of the labor relations department while the other 
management departments and the European and world headquarters accepted the 
results of the collective bargaining agreements. Labor costs were below the plants in 
Germany and the UK. In addition, the Valencia plant was constantly rated among the 
five most productive plants in Europe. Because of the high productivity, Detroit made 
another production decision in favor of the Valencia in 1997. The follow up model of 
the Escort, the Ford Focus, would no longer be produced in Halewood (UK), but 
launched in Valencia and Saarlouis in 1998. The production volume transfer to the 
Valencia plant threatened 1,300 jobs in Halewood.133 
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Transnational whipsawing and local resistance, 1998-2001 
The next collective bargaining round started in January 1998 (Artiles 2002). There 
were some early signs that this would become a difficult collective bargaining round. 
Labor representation had further fragmented. The largest union, CCOO, suffered 
another secession. In 1994, former delegates had already founded the SPV. In 1997, 
four more delegates of CCOO in the works council left the union. Three of these 
members founded the PUT and one former member joined CGT. 134 This meant that 
five different unions were directly involved in the negotiations (Sancho 2000). In 
addition, the collective bargaining round took place in the shadow of the union 
election in early 1999.  
Management and union positions were very distant, which was nothing 
unusual in an early stage of a collective bargaining round. However, in previous years, 
the main question was to what extent wages would increase and social improvements 
would take place. The unions tried to push as far as possible, while management tried 
to limit the increases. In the 1998 collective bargaining round, management and unions 
touched points, which brought out differences that were more fundamental. A 
fundamental goal of management was to gain working time flexibility. Ford had 
almost not been able to gain any working flexibility in previous years.135 This was a 
concern for management because they looked at other competitors in the Spanish auto 
market that had already begun to increase working time flexibility in recent years. 
Management demanded two specific measures. Management asked for 10 Saturday 
shifts and a change from collective to individual breaks, which would allow the 
continuous running of machines.136 
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On the other side, the unions asked for substantial material improvements. In 
past collective bargaining rounds, a close by launch of a new car had usually resulted 
in a positive collective bargaining outcome, and thus the coming of new Focus spurred 
union ambitions. One key demand was the regrouping of workers. The unions had 
established wage group five as the minimum level for all production workers in the 
last collective bargaining round. In 1998, labor sought to establish wage group six as 
the minimum, which would upgrade the wages of more than 3,000 workers. Another 
demand was the 35-hour workweek.137 
In the following months, the positions between management and labor did not 
get closer. An insurmountable disagreement existed with respect to working time 
flexibility, in particular Saturday work. The unions were not easily willing to sacrifice 
the free weekend in this collective bargaining round. On the other hand, management 
pointed to other car producers in the Spanish auto market that had introduced working 
time flexibility and argued that Ford Spain would lose its competitive edge if it would 
not follow.  
In May and June 1998, the unions started to mobilize the workforce and some 
strike action took place. A pattern in previous years had been that after the 
mobilization of labor unions had started, management would agree to more 
concessions and then an accord would be struck. However, in this negotiation 
management wanted to gain working time flexibility and the majority of the unions 
(with the exception of UGT) rejected the topic without even discussing it. For the first 
time, management and labor did not reach an agreement before the several weeks long 
summer holiday in July and August.  
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Management and labor resumed negotiations in September.138 The conflict 
between management and labor began to escalate and the dynamic of the negotiations 
changed. The national Spanish newspapers and television began to cover the conflict. 
Usually, media with national coverage were not interested in a local collective 
bargaining round, but after not finding an agreement for 9 months, the media zoomed 
in, expecting a dramatic showdown between management and labor. This made the 
negotiations more difficult. Both sides became more concerned about a loss of face. 
Another change in the negotiations was the direct involvement of Ford’s world 
headquarters in Detroit, which had never happened before (Artiles 2002). 
After several negotiation rounds in September 1998 no new advances had been 
made, and negotiations completely broke down on September 25. Consequently, 
management threatened to transfer production from Valencia to the Saarlouis plant if 
the unions would not change their position. 139 In addition, management unilaterally 
decided to increase working time flexibility and to change the organization of the 
breaks from collective to individual-taken breaks. This change of the breaks would  
allow to run production continuously and to produce 15,000 additional cars each year.  
All unions agreed in principal on strike action as a response to the threat by 
management to transfer car production. 140 However, there the unions disagreed on 
how to organize it. UGT suggested having on two days each week a 2-hour strikes in 
each shift, while CGT suggested striking on a daily basis half an hour in each shift 
until October 21. The strike action was supposed to culminate in a demonstration in 
the city centre of Valencia on October 22. The strike schedule of CGT was confirmed 
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by the works council with the votes of CGT, CCOO and SPV. The auto market had 
picked up in 1998 and the loss of car production through strikes directly resulted in 
lower sales, which economically hurt the company. Management responded with the 
definitive transfer of the Focus to the Saarlouis plant in Germany, which would 
supposedly result in the loss of 1,500 of the 8,000 jobs at the Valencia plant until 
2003.141 
At this point, there was no direct communication between management and 
labor and outside actors intervened in the conflict. The national Spanish government 
publicly asked the two parties for an ultimate effort . The governor of the state 
Valencia offered to mediate in the conflict.142 Furthermore, German unionists and the 
EWC got involved. The large national newspaper El Pais had reached out to unionists 
at the Saarlouis plant and asked about the transfer of production. A works councilor 
was quoted as saying: “We are running at full capacity and we can’t take on more 
production. Moreover, we don’t do scab work.” 143 This position was confirmed by 
official letters from the German works council in Saarlouis and Ford’s EWC. 
The mediation efforts by the regional government brought management and 
labor back to the negotiation table although the daily strikes continued. The 
negotiation continued without making substantial advancement. Shortly before the 
scheduled demonstration in Valencia and a 24-hour strike, management presented its 
final and ultimate offer, which included some improvements. On the eve of the 
demonstration, labor discussed the management proposal. UGT suggested calling off 
the strikes and demonstrations in Valencia in order to examine the new offer. In 
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contrast, CGT and CCOO called the management proposal insufficient and the 
majority of works council decided to go ahead with the protest.144 The 24-hour strike 
took place on the following day. 5,000 workers took part in the demonstration in the 
city center of Valencia (Collado 2001). 
At this point, the world headquarters lost its patience. The vice president of 
Ford, David Thursfield, talked via videoconference from Detroit to the works council 
in Valencia.145 He called the workers “pirates” and gave them an ultimatum – if the 
unions would not agree to the collective bargaining agreement, Ford would close the 
Valencia plant. This would not take place in a couple of days but gradually through the 
transfer of production to other plants. Two unionists responded briefly to Thursfield 
and then the connection between Valencia and Detroit broke down. Thursfield’s 
appearance via videoconference caused the newspapers to compare him to Big Brother 
in Orwell’s novel 1984.146 The message hit hard and concerns among the unionists 
grew. In order to make further negotiations possible, the unions called off scheduled 
strike action for the next days. In the following week, negotiations continued based on 
the final and ultimate offer. Management made some further concessions and finally 
management struck an agreement only with UGT. This was only approved by a 
majority in the works council because one radical union, PUT, did decide not to take 
part in the meeting, and CGT and CCOO decided to vote on separate proposals. This 
deliberate division between these unions, made it possible to confirm the agreement 
with the 14 votes of UGT. After ten months of negotiations, the workforce confirmed 
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the collective bargaining agreement with a vote. 4,822 workers (70.4%) voted in favor 
and 1,922 workers (28.1%) rejected the collective bargaining agreement.147 
Both management and labor were able to gain important demands in the 
collective bargaining agreement. For management it was essential to gain working 
time flexibility, which had been the main point of contention. Finally, labor agreed to 
ten Saturday shifts on a voluntary basis and the above-described changes from 
collective to individual breaks. Other important points for management were the 
extension of the duration to three years and that collective bargaining rounds were off 
the union election schedule in the following years. On the other hand, management 
agreed that 430 temporary workers should get a permanent contract, a concession that 
decreased management’s flexibility. In addition, unions were able to reduce the 
weekly working week to 35 hours by 2001 while the holidays increased to 29 days in 
2000. Thus, weekly working hours and holidays had almost reached the level of 
collective bargaining contracts in Germany, which was an important orientation mark 
for Spanish unionists. Surprisingly, wage increase had not been a big issue in the 
collective bargaining round and wages increased 0.5% plus inflation rate in 1999 and 
2000 (Artiles 2002).  
In interviews about the 1998 collective bargaining round, managers of the 
labor relations department stated that one of the lessons learnt was to handle the 
introduction of new production differently. 148 In 1996 and 1998, management had 
announced the introduction of a new car before the collective bargaining round. In 
following negotiations, new car production would only be promised if an acceptable 
collective bargaining agreement could be reached, otherwise the production would be 
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transferred to another plant in Europe. The world headquarters in Detroit played a 
crucial role in developing this new whipsawing practice for the Valencia plant.  
Before the 1998, the unions could more easily be united for a better collective 
bargaining agreement despite all divisions that had remained. However, responses to 
competition about new product would bring out important ideological differences 
more clearly. Two ideological perspectives existed parallel in this period and none of 
them gained the upper hand. On the one hand, UGT sought to defend the interest of 
the worker, and if necessary through strike action. However, a new discourse took also 
hold in the union and arguments appeared that the Valencia plant had to be more 
competitive in order to get new production. In addition, UGT accepted a greater 
responsibility of worker representatives in running the plant productively. They 
increasingly believed that employment could only be secured if the plant would run 
productively.149 On the other hand, CCOO, CGT, PUT and SPV resisted the link 
between collective bargaining and new production. They also did not accept 
responsibility for running the plant productively. Their main interest was to improve 
the situation of working people and defend their rights. These unions tried to reach 
these goals through local resistance.150 Their main tool was strike action. The unions 
were not easily impressed by management offers about new products for the Valencia 
plant.151 
The ideology of the workforce was manifested in union elections, which took 
place in February 1999. As happened after the relatively contentious 1994 collective 
bargaining round, the more moderate UGT won an additional delegate and had 15 of 
the total 35 representatives in the new works council.152 Due to its secessions, CCOO 
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got only seven seats. The two unions that split away, SPV and PUT, won three seats 
respectively. CGT was represented with five representatives and FAMIF remained 
with two representatives in the works council. The politics of the works council did 
not change since UGT and the yellow union FAMIF stopped one seat short of winning 
the absolute majority in the works council. 153  
In the second half of 1999, management’s sourcing decision for a new engine 
became an important topic. Other plants in Germany and the UK were also interested 
in the new product and management sought to play the different plants off against each 
other. UGT engaged in this game as well, arguing that the Valencia plant had a higher 
productivity than the other European plants. In addition, the government of the state 
Valencia promised subsidies for the new engine production and an extension of the 
motor plant.  
Meanwhile, a conflict broke out about the dismissals of a CGT union member. 
CGT, CCOO, SPV and PUT protested against this management decision and regarded 
it as attack on their representation rights.154 The unions organized a strike in which 
half of the workforce participated. UGT did not support this strike and argued that this 
would lower the chances to get new production. Despite the regular labor protest and 
conflicts in this period, the production decision took place in favor of Valencia. After 
all, productivity at the Valencia plant was – in comparison with other Ford plants – 
reasonably high and new investments decisions were backed up with subsidies by the 
regional government.  
In 2000, Ford launched a major restructuring program in Europe called 
European Transformation Strategy (cf. chapter Ford Germany).155 Ford underwent 
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losses in Europe since 1999. In 1999, Ford had the capacity to produce 2.2 million 
cars, but  actually only sold 1.7 million cars. The goal of the restructuring program was 
too match demand and production by decreasing the installed production capacities in 
Europe. The most dramatic element was that Ford stopped producing cars in the UK, 
and the Dagenham plant was transferred to Jaguar. Thus, Ford stopped producing cars 
with the blue oval after 80 years of production in the UK. In addition, Ford sold the 
Azambuja plant (Portugal) to GM, discontinued the joint-venture with VW in Setubal 
(Portugal), closed the Plonsk plant in Poland, and discontinued car production at the 
Obchuk plant in Minsk (Belorussia). In terms of car production, the Valencia plant 
was not affected by the restructuring program. After the closures of facilities across 
Europe only three car assembly plants remained in Europe besides Valencia: 
Saarlouis, Cologne (both Germany), and Genk (Belgium). The importance of the 
Valencia car assembly plant within Europe increased through the restructuring 
program.  
The next collective bargaining round started in 2001. The economic situation 
of Ford in Europe had only slightly improved, but the Valencia plant made profits. It 
was running close to its full capacity in 1999 and 2000. The plant reached new 
production records and produced 342,047 cars in 1999 and 343,794 in 2000. The 
atmosphere between management and unions was tense right from the outset. 
Management sought to couple the negotiations with the sourcing decision for the new 
Fiesta. After the discontinuation of the Fiesta production in the UK, a decision by 
Ford’s management was due on where to produce the new Fiesta model besides 
Cologne. The Fiesta would only be produced in Valencia if the unions would agree to 
greater working time flexibility. 156157 
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In the collective bargaining round, the unions had two main points. The union 
tried to establish that the wage group six would become the minimum pay for 
production workers. This had already been one of the principal demands of the unions 
in the 1998 collective bargaining round. In addition, the unions ultimately tried to 
reduce the weekly working time to 35 hours a week. Management and labor had 
agreed to the implementation by 2001 in the last collective bargaining agreement, but 
it had not been implemented yet. Thus, it became again a main point of the union 
agenda. In contrast, the main demand by management was again working time 
flexibility. Management asked for additional Saturday shifts, a working time corridor, 
and a reduction of the collective summer vacation.  
In the first two months of the collective bargaining round in 2001 no advances 
were made. The dynamic of the negotiations changed in March. The main strategy of 
the negotiating managers at the Valencia plant had been to make concessions by labor 
as a precondition for the production of the new Fiesta. This strategy collapsed in 
March. The European and world headquarters could not wait any longer and had to 
move ahead with production assignments and investments, in order to organize 
production for the coming years in Europe. The European management announced not 
just the investments and production volumes for the new Fiesta, but also the 
production of a Mazda model at the Valencia plant in 2003.158 Ford’s European 
Transformation Strategy had decreased production overcapacities and it existed less 
parallel car production. Compared to GM Europe, Ford had less whipsawing capacity. 
This episode showed that Ford was not easily able to shift production around in 
                                                                                                                                            
paid the difference between the unemployment insurance and full wages, which meant that the workers 
would not have to work and still receive full pay. Management rejected for the first time to pay this 
difference, which was about a 30% differential to the full wage. Parallel to the negotiations, the unions 
responded with short work stoppages, and a smaller demonstration in front of the Regional Labor 
Ministry, which had approved the employment regulation.  
158 El País: Los nuevos proyectos para Ford Almussafes desbloquean el convenio colectivo. Newspaper 
article. March 6, 2001. 
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Europe no matter what labor relations problems existed. From this point in the 
negotiations, it was clear to the unions that the Valencia plant had plenty of production 
assignments (three models) for the following years, and that the previous threat by the 
local Ford management to move production was without credibility. The new 
production assignment would also lead to the introduction of the night shift in the fall 
2002. The introduction of the night shift had been a demand by the labor unions since 
1995.  
As management had tried before to whipsaw the unions, the unions too used 
forcing strategies early on, which made finding a negotiated solution more difficult. 
On April 7, the works council decided on a mobilization schedule and strikes for June, 
in case management would not have agreed to the union demands by then. 159 The 
strikes were supported by CCOO, CGT and PUT; and were opposed by UGT that 
preferred to continue negotiating with management and regarded strike action as a last 
resort. In June and July, the labor strikes took place, and it became clear that a solution 
would not be reached before the collective summer holiday. In July, management 
considered changing the holiday schedule unilaterally, but this was prevented by the 
union threat to shut down production for one week.   
The negotiation resumed in September and quickly ended in a deadlock. As in 
the collective bargaining of 1998, the conflict began to escalate in September. On 
September 7, the works council decided to increase the pressure on management. 
CCOO, CGT and PUT decided to stop all overtime and to set a new strike schedule 
with two hours strikes in each shift on September 25 and 27. For October 18, the 
unions planned 4-hour strikes in each shift. In the morning and afternoon shift, the 
workforce was supposed to march on the highway to the 20 miles distant downtown 
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Valencia. The culmination of the mobilization was supposed to be a 24-hour strike on 
October 25, which coincided with the 25th anniversary of Ford Spain. Ford had 
planned a celebration, in which the King of Spain, Juan Carlos I, had confirmed his 
attendance.  
After labor announced new mobilizations, the European headquarters got 
directly involved in the conflict. As a first response, management completely called 
off the 25th anniversary celebration due to the intransigence of the unions.160 In 
addition, the president of Ford Europe invited the head of the works council and the 
chair of each union to a meeting at the European headquarters in Cologne, Germany 
on September 18.161 In this meeting, Ford’s European top management tried to make 
clear that if labor conflicts in Valencia did not decrease, the Valencia plant would have 
no future. The European management laid out their plans for new assembly plants in 
Petersburg (Russia) and Ottosan (Turkey) and threatened the Spanish labor unions that 
production could be transferred from Valencia to these new plants in the near future.  
The meeting made a strong impression on the unions – in the sense that they 
felt confirmed in their narratives and ideology about the conflict with Ford. In the 
narratives of CCOO, CGT and PUT, the conflicts had become a battle between a 
powerful and ruthless multinational corporation on the one side – and working people 
on the other. They saw themselves standing up against the multinational corporation 
and holding firm as good as they could. The difference to UGT had become more and 
more obvious in recent years. UGT tried to understand the constraints and problems of 
managers working within competitive markets; and UGT was willing to cooperate 
with management. The UGT believed that employment for the workers could only be 
secured if the plant was competitive.  
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After the meeting in Cologne, CCOO, CGT and PUT decided not to give in to 
the multinational, and to move ahead with the planned mobilization at the end of 
September and October, while UGT was in favor of stopping the mobilization. 162 In 
early October, collective bargaining did not resume and the regional government of 
Valencia tried again to mediate in the conflict. This was partially successful as both 
sides came back to the negotiations table. However, labor decided to go ahead with the 
planned strike action. Management responded with an announcement of a set of 
employment regulations, which would result in an income loss for the workforce in 
case it was approved by the regional labor ministry. On October 18, 2,500 workers in 
the morning shift laid down work and took part in the march to the regional 
government in downtown Valencia. The subtitle to the pictures of the striking workers 
in the newspapers commented that this was the way the Ford workforce celebrated the 
25th anniversary of Ford Spain. 163 On October 25, more than 4,000 workers took part 
in another demonstration in downtown Valencia, which was part of a 24-hour strike. 
At the end of October, the impasse of the collective bargaining round  was 
complete and no side was willing to make a first step. In this situation, management 
tried out a new strategy, and started separate negotiations with UGT, which was the 
largest union, but lacked the  majority in the works council. Management and UGT 
reached an agreement in November. Then UGT sought the confirmation of the reached 
agreement from its more than 2,500 union members in a union assembly. The great 
majority of UGT union members confirmed the position of the union leadership.164 
UGT – with the support of its union members – then went into the works council, and 
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sought to convince the other unions of the deal struck with management. The other 
unions were disappointed that UGT had negotia ted outside the official representation 
body, and that is why CCOO, CGT and PUT rejected UGT’s proposal. However, 
CCOO did not block the initiative of UGT and agreed to a democratic vote by the 
workforce. The workers could decide either to vote for the negotiation position of the 
majority of the works council (CCOO, CGT, and PUT) or for the collective bargaining 
agreement that UGT had negotiated single-handedly with management. Before the 
vote, the two union camps started to campaign for their proposals. On November 28, 
the workforce decided to accept UGT’s collective bargaining agreement. 3,359 
workers voted in favor it (56.77%) while 2476 workers supported the alternative 
proposal (41.85%) which called for further negotiations with management. After 11 
months, the longest collective bargaining round in the history of Ford Spain was over 
at last.  
The result of the collective bargaining agreement indicated that both sides, 
management and labor, accomplished few of their key negotiation goals.165 The 
worker’s side was neither able to reduce the weekly working time during the four 
years term of the collective bargaining agreement nor to establish the wage group six 
as a minimum for a production worker. On the other side, management was barely 
able to increase working time flexibility. Neither did management get the agreement 
for a working time corridor nor additional Saturday shifts (which remained on a 
voluntary basis). The only advancement was the reduction of the collective summer 
holidays, which were allowed to run in times of higher seasonal demand. The wage 
increases were set 0.5% above the inflation rate for each year. A success for labor was 
the extension of holidays to 31 days per year; while it was a success for management 
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to have a four-year duration for the collective bargaining agreement lasting. 166 The 
local management did not stay within the pre-approved margins for the collective 
bargaining round set by the world headquarters, so they had to seek approval 
subsequently.167  
 
Cooperative and market-oriented employment relations at Ford Spain, 2002 – 2007 
An early indication of a closer relationship between UGT and management had been 
the last weeks of the 2001 collective bargaining agreement, when management and 
UGT negotiated the collective bargaining agreement outside the works council. The 
relationship between management and UGT ultimately changed labor relations at Ford 
Spain and they became more cooperative.168 
The second largest union at Ford Spain, CCOO, exchanged its leadership in 
2002. The newly general secretary of CCOO said, with respect to the last collective  
bargaining round, that it was “extensively long” and “not in favor of the workers”. The 
reshuffle of the leadership only took place 10 months before the next union election.  
The watershed for changing labor relations was the union election in February 
2003. UGT won the majority of the seats on the works council.169 UGT was able to 
gain three seats compared to the 1999 union election and was represented by 18 of the 
total 35 union representative. Despite this new majority, none of the other unions lost 
any seats. CGT and PUT received the same result as in 1999 and were represented 
with five and three delegates. CCOO was even able to win another seat. The yellow 
union – FAMIF – lost one seat. The SPV, which had won three seats in the last 
election, did not exist any longer. UGT was able to win a majority, because it 
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increased its share of the vote by 9%, while CCOO, CGT and PUT only increased 
their votes by 3%. 
An important factor behind the power shift seemed to be changes in the 
membership of the different unions between 1999 and 2002. Overall, more than 80% 
of the workforce was affiliated with one of the unions, making it one of the highest 
union densities, within a large company, in Spain. During this period, CCOO and CGT 
lost union members. The union membership of CCOO decreased from 1567 in 1999 to 
1,406 in 2002, while the union membership of CGT decreased from 686 in 1999 to 
504 in 2002. In contrast, UGT won a large number of union members, and the 
membership increased from 2,990 in 1999 and to 3,805 in 2003.170 This very 
significant shift of the union membership towards UGT can be explained by at least 
two factors.  
First, UGT was more concerned with organizing than other unions. UGT 
accurately kept track of the union membership in the different sections of the 
company, and constantly focused on signing up new members. This was less of a 
concern for the other unions. The membership losses of CCOO can partly be explained 
through the retirement of older workers. CCOO was the largest union with the greatest 
membership in the 1970’s. Some of the old activists retired and were not replaced with 
a sufficient number of young union members.  
Second, the membership gains by UGT were significantly related to 
management strategies. Since the end of the 1990s, after the contentious 1998 
collective bargaining round, management began to support UGT and do favors for its 
members. According to Spanish labor law, management is required to release a small 
number of each union represented on the works council for their own union tasks. 
Management followed the legally required minimum for most of the unions, but 
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released a greater number of UGT members of the works council.171 Thus, UGT had 
more resources with which to organize workers. Members of UGT would also be more 
easily considered for promotions within the factory. Family members of UGT 
members would have a greater chance to get a job at Ford.172 However, the number of 
union members of UGT was much higher than the number of votes. In 1999, UGT had 
2,990 union members, but only received 2,644 votes. In 2003, UGT had 3,805 union 
members, but received only 3,115 votes.173 It was to the advantage of the workers to 
be a union member of UGT, but that did not mean that all the workers actually gave 
their vote in a secret ballot to UGT. CCOO, CGT and PUT usually gained more votes 
than they had union members. The membership gains by UGT lagged behind the 
number of votes in union elections, but the membership gains up until 2003 were 
ultimately high enough to gain a majority of the votes in the union election.   
The absolute majority of UGT in the works council meant that UGT and 
management could negotiate labor relations without the other unions. Shortly later, the 
general secretary of UGT gave an interview with the newspaper El Mundo, in which 
he laid out some of the objectives and perspective of his union:  
Within Ford they always said that we were a good plant in terms of quality and 
productivity, but that we had many labor conflicts. The European headquarters 
asked us to change the situation. Well, we’ve done that, we’ve changed. Now, 
we want to have a dialogue with them without confrontation, but we need more 
investments.174  
The general secretary also demanded a rejuvenation of the workforce by replacing 
older with younger workers. He suggested voluntary buy-outs and early retirement for 
workers above the age of 60. He argued: “With the average of the Ford’s workforce 
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[…], which is about 50 years, we can’t reach major productivity levels. […] With the 
replacement of workers above 60 […], we can improve the efficiency […].”175 
In the fall 2003, several production decisions were due in Ford’s European 
operation. The Valencia plant was interested in producing the new Ford Focus. First, it 
looked as if the decision would take place against Valencia and the Ford Focus would 
be assigned to the Genk plant. UGT’s general secretary criticized this, saying: 
“[Decisions] are taken from a political point of view, not based on the productivity of 
product, which is what the multinationals should do if they would like to overcome the 
losses.”176 Later Ford revised its production decision and assigned the new Ford Focus 
to the Valencia plant.177 However, there was no evidence that the above-mentioned 
protest note had anything to do with it. The high productivity and the flexibility of the 
Valencia plant seemed to be the most important reasons why the Focus was ultimately 
assigned to the Valencia plant.  
After the assignment of the new Ford Focus, the Valencia plant was in good 
shape. The Valencia plant was supposed to produce four different car models: the 
Fiesta, Focus, Ka and the Mazda 2. The plant was running at full capacity and reached 
a new production record. Meanwhile, other Ford plants in Europe experienced 
substantial problems. Ford shed 3,000 jobs at the Genk  plant (Belgium) in October 
2003.178 Ford Germany underwent a record loss in 2003, and labor had to agree to 
substantial concessions early 2004. In contrast, UGT did not make any concessions for 
getting the Focus production. When the demand in the European car market picked up 
in 2004 and exceeded production levels, UGT agreed to 10 additional Saturday shifts. 
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Management publicly praised the cooperative relationship with UGT and the newly 
found labor peace at the Valencia plant.179  
The next collective bargaining round began in January 2005. All sides – the 
different unions and management – were interested in a shorter and less contentious 
collective bargaining round than in 1998 and in 2001.180 Management and the 
opposition labor unions in the works council expected that UGT would be more 
cooperative and conciliatory in this collective bargaining round. Nevertheless, the start 
of the collective bargaining was difficult. News had reached Valencia from the 
automobile saloon in Detroit that Mazda would stop producing the Mazda 2 in 2007. 
The representatives of UGT reacted furiously to this news and thought that this was an 
intentional strategy by Ford to put pressure on the union in the new collective 
bargaining round.181 However, there is no evidence that management did this 
intentionally and that there was coordination between the higher management levels 
and local management. The news coincidently came out during the collective 
bargaining round in 2005. It was spread by a European news agency that reported 
from the International Auto Show in Detroit. The perception of UGT was a different 
one. The union regarded it as a forcing strategy by management and responded in 
kind. Only on the third day of the negotiations, UGT announced a 30-minute strike in 
each shift at the motor plant. It was a measured response because it did not affect the 
assembly plant where the launch of the Ford Focus was underway.  
In the following days and weeks, the atmosphere between management and 
UGT again calmed down. The management at Ford and Mazda renounced the transfer 
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of production and stated that no decision had yet been made.182 Compared to previous 
collective bargaining rounds, management and labor made less excessive demands. 
The works council, lead by UGT, focused on the permanent employment of temporary 
workers and working time reduction. 183 Management sought to limit the increase in 
labor costs and to get more working time flexibility. Both sides had the goal to 
rejuvenate the workforce through early retirement.184 
In the following weeks, the negotiations between management and labor 
quietly continued. Some progress was made, but big differences remained such as the 
permanent employment of temporary workers. By the end of April, UGT changed its 
strategy and intended to put pressure on management in the negotiations. UGT 
announced a boycott of extra hours for May 2 and 24-hour strikes for May 4 and May 
11.185 Shortly before these strikes, management and labor reached an agreement in the 
negotiation. During the collective bargaining, only some very limited strike action had 
taken place in January at the motor plant. The workforce accepted the collective 
bargaining agreement by vote. Although the two largest unions, UGT and CCOO, 
supported the agreement, only 66.4% of the workforce voted in favor of it.186 
The result of the collective bargaining agreement included advances for both 
sides. Management and labor found a compromise with respect to the temporary 
workers, which had been the most contentious issue of the collective bargaining round. 
The 598 affected workers would not be permanently employed immediately – but 
rather successively – until the end of the collective bargaining agreement in 2009. The 
collective bargaining agreement had a four-year term, and the wage increases for each 
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year were supposed to be 0.5% above the inflation rate, which would be secured as in 
previous years, through a revision clause. The company gained some working time 
flexibility. The company could use four days, either by calling workdays off or by 
adding an additional workdays, in order to adapt to the fluctuation of the market.187 
In the last couple of years, the focus by UGT on securing new car models for 
the Valencia plant worked fairly well. Valencia was the only plant in Europe that 
produced four different models: Focus, Fiesta, Mazda 2 and Ka. A clear advantage for 
the Valencia plant was its status as a flex plant. The plant was capable to absorb some 
production volume from other plants in times of high demand. The Valencia plant had 
run in recent years very close to its full capacity.  
However, after the collective bargaining round in 2005, it was not entirely 
clear if the Valencia plant would have sufficient production in the following years. 
Ford decided to transfer the Ford Ka to a plant in Tychy (Poland), which was a new 
joint-venture with FIAT. In addition, rumors remained about the ending of the Mazda 
2 production in Valencia. This would leave the Valencia plant with only two of its 
previous four models. UGT was concerned about these developments and demanded 
new products and investments for the Valencia plant. In this period, the contact 
between UGT and the European headquarters intensified. To seek access to the 
European and world headquarters had been a strategy by unionists at Ford in 
Germany; and UGT decided to pursue a similar strategy. A meeting took place 
between the European headquarters and UGT. UGT met with the president of Ford 
Europe, John Fleming, on September 21 in Frankfurt, Germany. 188 The next meeting 
between UGT and the president of Europe took place on November 21 in Madrid, 
Spain. In these meetings, Fleming sought to calm down the excited and concerned 
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unionists arguing that Ford had no plans to scale down production at the Valencia 
plant.189 However, he could not offer any specific car models. In the following 
months, the request for new production continued and the Valencia workforce 
remained in a state of uncertainty, even though the actual production levels remained 
very high.  
Meanwhile, collective negotiations took place at Ford Germany (cf. chapter on 
Ford Germany). The collective agreement on employment security ran out by the end 
of 2005 and there was the same uncertainty about future production at the German 
plants. The German unionists pushed for a new collective agreement, in which 
management and labor exchanged labor concessions with new production assignments 
and employment security until 2011. The negotiations of such a collective agreement, 
or social pact (as it is also called in the Spanish language), was concluded by March 
2003.  
The collective agreement became known to the unionists in Valencia.190 Of 
particular concern to them were the specific assignments of Fiesta and Focus 
production levels for the plants in Cologne and Saarlouis. These were precisely the 
two remaining car models at the Valencia plant if Mazda 2 and Ford Ka would indeed 
discontinue. In the following months, the Spanish unionists forcefully demanded a 
social pact like that Ford had negotiated in Germany. They specifically asked for 
assured production levels and for employment security. At the end of March 2006, 
some of the members of UGT occupied one of the buildings at the plant. To end this 
protest and to calm down the unions and the workforce, the European management 
again invited UGT to the European headquarters in Cologne to help resolve the issue. 
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The European management, however, was still not able to make promises about new 
production.  
Finally, in the fall 2006, management agreed to the union demand to negotiate 
a social pact. Management asked for a wage freeze and more working time flexibility, 
while the union demanded to set car production at 400,000 units and engine 
production at 650,000. In addition, the unions asked for employment security for 
seven years. By the time of the union election in February 2007, the negotiations 
between management and UGT were still ongoing. The dominant topic of the union 
election was the uncertainty about future car production. UGT clearly won the 
election. In the new works council, UGT had 20 of 35 seats, two more than in the 
previous works council.191 CCOO received seven seats, CGT five and PUT three seats 
in the new works council. By 2007, 79% of the workers were a member of UGT. 192 
Labor relations began to look more as they did at Ford Germany – despite the 
institutional differences. A large union dominated the respective works council and 
negotiated for employment security and production assignments within Ford Europe.  
 
Summary 
The Franco regime licensed Ford to produce cars in Spain in 1973. Ford built a new 
assembly plant in the small village of Almussafes, 20 miles outside Valencia. The 
decision to locate in this area was also related to labor relations considerations. 
Management sought to keep some distance from the clandestine union movement in 
Valencia. However, when Ford started production in 1976 after Franco’s death, many 
of the formerly illegal unionists signed up for work at Ford. The suppression and 
persecution of unionists during the Franco dictatorship were formative experiences for 
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them. As the union were used to fighting for social improvements, they used the new 
Spanish employment relations institutions – developed at the end of the 1970s 
between employer associations, labor unions and government – to push assertively for 
social and economic improvements. If necessary, the unions would back up their 
demands with strike action. Management was in ideological opposition to the labor 
unions in the 1980s. Managers grudgingly dealt with the unions, but they 
predominantly regarded them as a nuisance as they were used to managing 
employment relations hierarchically. In an expanding Spanish auto market and 
economy, the unions continuously gained higher wages and social benefits, which 
management resisted as far as possible. In this period, management regularly chose to 
make some concessions to the labor unions in order keep production going and avoid 
strike action.   
 The economic context gradually changed in the 1990s. Spain had joined the 
European Union in 1986 and new competitors entered the Spanish market; however, 
Ford Spain continued to grow and make profits in the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. Competition became stronger in the 1990s and the large auto 
multinational companies, including Ford, built up production capacities in Eastern 
Europe. The Spanish production sites lost their low-wage/ low cost advantage to 
competition from Eastern Europe. The Spanish auto market continued to grow, but the 
European auto market became increasingly saturated.  
 In this socio-economic context, employment relations remained adversarial at 
Ford Spain and followed the pattern of the previous decade. Ford Spain was not as 
strongly affected by the slump of the European auto market in 1993 as SEAT. The 
unions continued to push for higher wages and social benefits and backed this up with 
robust strike action in 1994. However, the regular labor conflicts were not an obstacle 
to high productivity. The plant remained one of the most productive assembly plants 
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in Europe. However, during the 1990s, a fragmentation of the union landscape took 
place. In 1994 and 1997, two groups split away from the union CCOO and founded 
independent union groups, which tended to increase labor demands in following 
collective bargaining rounds.  
At the end of the 1990s, labor unions’ and managements’ interpretation of 
Ford’s economic situation increasingly diverged. Management believed that the 
previous pattern of employment relations was no longer sustainable and felt compelled 
to stop rising labor costs and increase working time flexibility. When management 
was not willing to give in to union demands in the collective bargaining round of 
1998, a dramatic conflict erupted. Previously, collective bargaining had been 
negotiated between the local management and labor unions, but in the 1998 collective 
bargaining round managers from the world headquarters became directly involved. 
Management whipsawed the Valencia plant and threatened to transfer production to 
the Saarlouis plant in Germany. In addition, the president of the Ford Company talked 
to the unionists during a negotiation round via videoconference from Detroit. He 
called the unionists “pirates” and threatened to close down the Valencia plant.  
The intense collective bargaining round accentuated the ideological differences 
between the labor unions. UGT agreed to some extent with the interpretation of 
management. UGT accepted that it was necessary to improve Ford’s productivity and 
accepted that labor had to contribute to this. UGT was open to management initiatives 
such as working time flexibility. In contrast, the unions CCOO, PUT, CGT and SPV 
regarded the multinational company as an opponent. These unions did not accept a 
role in increasing productivity; they regarded this as the task of management. These 
unions believed that they could represent the interests of their members best by 
fighting for social improvements and resisting concessions.  
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Management sought to change labor relations more systematically in the 
following years. Management engaged in identity work and sought to influence the 
ideological orientation of the unions. As there were few opportunities to influence the 
more radical unions, management focused on nurturing the moderate union UGT. 
First, management released a greater number of UGT union representative from 
factory work than is required by Spanish labor law. Second, UGT members were more 
easily promoted within the company. Third, new applicants were more frequently 
hired if they were a UGT member. Besides favoring the more moderate UGT, 
management hardly fought the more radical unions, e.g. management dismissed CGT 
union members in 1999 and 2005. The identity work of management was only 
partially successful. UGT’s membership rose continuously in the following years, as 
the workers realized that it was in their own advantage to be a UGT member; however, 
the higher number of UGT union members did not result in a better result in the works 
council election in 1999. Many of the UGT members expressed a different ideological 
position to the one that their union membership put forward and vo ted for the more 
radical unions. The more radical unions won a majority. Another very contentious 
collective bargaining conflict ensued in 2001, the year of Ford Spain’s 25th 
anniversary. On the day of the anniversary, the unions were on strike and organized a 
protest march to downtown Valencia, which was followed by a large demonstration.  
Despite these ongoing conflicts between management and labor, the 
ideological composition of the workforce gradually changed. The focus of UGT on 
organizing new union members in addition to the support from management increased 
UGT’s union membership. In contrast, the membership of the second largest union 
CCOO decreased. CCOO was the largest union in the 1970s; however, an increasing 
number of their union members retired in the 2000s and they were not replaced by 
sufficient numbers of new members to keep union membership stable. Ultimately, the 
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altering union membership across the unions changed the balance in the works 
council. UGT won the absolute majority in the works council election in 2003. 
Henceforth, UGT and management negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
without the other unions.  
Ideological opposition decreased between management and the works council 
and cooperative – productivity and production assignment oriented – employment 
relations emerged. Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the number of strikes days lost 
significantly decreased after 2003. Both management and labor, shared an interest in 
keeping Ford Spain competitive. It is noteworthy that the ideological changes of UGT 
between the 1980s and 2000s took place under the same union leadership. The union 
leadership gradually changed the orientation of the union and adapted its position to 
the changing social and economic context, which included overcapacities and 
increased competition in the European auto market. In the 1980s, the UGT focused 
more narrowly on gaining higher wages and social benefits. In the 2000s, the key 
focus of UGT was on gaining new car production for Ford Spain. The UGT lobbied 
management at the European headquarters for new production and proactively linked 
collective bargaining agreements to the assignment of new production. The key union 
idea of UGT was that only if the plant had sufficient production, would all other union 
goals – secure jobs, wages and social benefits – be reached. Despite the institutional 
differences between Germany and Spain, employment relations looked increasingly 
similar at Ford Spain and Ford Germany in the 2000s. In both cases, large moderate 
union groups, UGT and IG Metall, which had a focus on gaining new production 
assignments from Ford’s European headquarters, dominated the respective works 
council.  
Employment relations practices at Ford Spain evolved within the Spanish 
employment relations institutions. The changing enactment and use of institutions and 
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development of different employment relations were underpinned by changing ideas 
and ideologies of both management and labor. In the 1970s and 1980s, the unionists’ 
ideology was crucially shaped by the ir illegal union work during the Franco 
dictatorship. Having had these experiences, these unionists tended to used the new 
employment relations institutions contentiously and fought for social and material 
improvements through collective bargaining. In the 1990s, management engaged in 
identity work and sought to change the ideological orientation of the workforce by 
nurturing UGT and helping to increase its membership; while at the same time 
repressing radical unions. Over time, the union membership changed and in the 2003 
works council election UGT won a majority. The use of the Spanish institutions at 
Ford Spain changed dramatically compared to previous decades and labor and 
management developed a cooperative relationship. A focus point for employment 
relations was the assignment of new car production to the Valencia plant, and 
management and labor sought to organize employment relations productively in order 
to be in a good position for upcoming sourcing decisions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT SEAT IN SPAIN 
 
SEAT was founded as a project of The Franco dictatorship in 1950 and built its first 
plant in the Zona Franca, Barcelona.193 The Italian company FIAT played a crucial 
role in setting up production by providing the technology and licensing its own cars to 
SEAT (Miguelez 2000). Due to restrictions on other car producers to enter the Spanish 
auto market, SEAT was the dominant car producer years until the end of the Franco 
dictatorship in 1973. SEAT expanded production in 1974, when the management 
bought a car plant in Pamplona. However, when FIAT left the joint-venture in 1981, 
SEAT did not seem to be viable on its own and the Spanish government looked for a 
new business partner. Choosing among different options, the Spanish government 
initiated a joint-venture with the VW. VW bought a majority of the shares in 1986 and 
fully owned SEAT in 1990. In 1993, VW built a new assembly plant in Martorell 
close to Barcelona, while the plant in the Zona Franca was turned into a parts and 
body stamping plant (Ortiz 1999).  
 
Labor at SEAT  
In the 1990s, a generation of labor representatives at SEAT was in power that had 
already been unionists during the Franco Dictatorship. Their repression by Franco’s 
secret police and their fight for democracy had played an important role in their 
formation as unionists. An important reference point in the collective memory of the 
unions was the shooting of a SEAT worker during a labor protest at the company in 
1971 (Vallejo 2006). Having made these experiences, it was just natural for these 
                                                 
193 SEAT stands for Sociedad Española de Automóviles de Turismo, which can be translated as Spanish 
Touring Car Corporation.  
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unions to conduct collective bargaining in a contentious manner during and after the 
transition to democracy.  
As in other large Spanish companies, UGT (Union General de Trabajadores) 
and CCOO (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras) were the dominant 
unions at SEAT. UGT and CCOO gained at least 75% of the votes in the union 
elections between 1990 and 2007. Since the 1980s, UGT received more votes than 
CCOO, and thus a representative of UGT was chair of the general works council. The 
strongest opposition was the labor union CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), 
which won a stable share – about 10% – of the votes in union elections. A smaller and 
less important union was the SPC (Sindicato de Cuadros y Professionales). UGT and 
CCOO at SEAT commonly took the lead in negotiating the majority of collective 
agreements with management (Ortiz 1999).  
The labor unions were represented at the plant level through a works council. 
In addition, labor representation body on the company level was the committee 
intercentro (henceforth general works council). The different works councils at 
SEAT’s different plants such as the Martorell plant (car assembly), the Zona Franca 
plant (parts production), Gearbox, ACR and the Centro Technico – all of them located 
near Barcelona – nominated representatives to the general works council. The general 
works council was the main labor representation body at the company level and its 
main task was to negotiate collective bargaining agreements. The Pamplona plant had 
also been part of the general works council. However, in 1995, VW transferred the 
Pamplona plant to the VW brands within the company, and henceforth the Pamplona 
plant negotiated a separate collective bargaining agreement.  
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Management strategies at SEAT  
VW’s oversight and control of labor relations became stronger during and after 
SEAT’s crisis in 1993. VW’s headquarters stepped in and negotiated a far-reaching 
restructuring program and bailout package in cooperation with the Catalonian state 
and Spanish central government. SEAT’s management had not informed about the 
crisis early on and the headquarters was shocked by the dramatic losses .  
In 1993, world headquarters began to implement a platform strategy. SEAT’s 
models shared a production platform with other small and medium cars of the VW 
brand and Skoda. The standardization of production across plants and the sharing of 
many parts and components across the production platform helped SEAT to reduce 
costs and to recover from its crisis in 1993. In addition, the common production 
platforms were a management tool in collective negotiations and made it possible to 
play different plants off each other. VW management increasingly made use of this 
strategy in the 2000s.  
In 2002, SEAT was transferred from the VW Group into the Audi Group. The 
Audi Group unified the sports car brands such Audi and Lamborghini. VW intended to 
position and brand SEAT as a small sports car model for dynamic people. This did not 
change the interaction with the management in Germany. When the management from 
Germany intervened, it was still the headquarters in Wolfsburg rather than the Audi 
management in Ingolstadt.  
 
The role of EWC and WWC  
SEAT’s unions became integrated into VW’s labor representation structure via the 
European Works Council (EWC) and the World Works Council (WWC). SEAT’s 
labor representatives became members of the EWC when it was founded in 1990. A 
crucial advantage for the Spanish unionists was the access to company information 
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and data, which was an extension of their information rights based on Spanish labor 
law. The contact and exchange with the German unionists in the EWC was an 
additional resource for the Spanish labor representatives. When they lacked 
information or had problems with the local management, they could get in touch with 
the German unionists at the company headquarters. Their direct access to the 
headquarters helped to sort out problems at times.  
After the VW management officially accepted the EWC in 1992, management 
used the EWC used to introduce labor relations practices from Germany at other plants 
in Europe. An important element was the extensive provision of company data and 
information on new investments to labor representatives. The management strategy 
behind this open access to company information was to nurture a greater responsibility 
by unionists for the productivity of the company. The importance that VW gave the 
transnational labor representation bodies was indicated through the participation of top 
management, which rarely happened at GM or Ford.194 
The participation in these transnational bodies contributed to ideological 
changes of the Spanish unions (at least UGT and CCOO) departing slowly from 
fighting for social change to taking on a greater responsibility for the competitiveness 
of the company. This was by no means a straightforward process and only took place 
over a long period. An opening for ideological change was the respect by the Spanish 
unionists for the labor union IG Metall. This type of unionism had accomplished a lot 
for its workers.195 On the other hand, Spanish unionists were aware of what kept them 
apart from the German unions in the EWC. Discussions on new investments and 
production assignments in the EWC were not crucial and decisions were ultimately 
negotiated by management and labor at the headquarters in Germany. Despite this 
                                                 
194 Management interview. VW. November 18, 2005.  
195 Union interview. UGT. March 17, 2003.  
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crucial difference, IG Metall remained a benchmark for the Spanish unionists in 
developing employment relations and institutional practices.196  
 
Collective negotiations at SEAT in the 1990s 
As a condition for acquiring SEAT, VW asked the Spanish government to take over 
SEAT’s substantial losses in 1985. In exchange, VW agreed to invest in the 
modernization of the company’s production facilities. The modernization of the plants 
and the recovering Spanish and European car markets helped SEAT to return to 
profitability. The economic context for the collective bargaining round in 1991 was 
positive, although the Iraq War added some uncertainties about future economic 
developments. Another context for the collective bargaining round was the building of 
the new SEAT plant in Martorell, close to Barcelona. Production was supposed to start 
in 1993 and the upcoming collective bargaining agreement would lay out the 
foundation for labor relations at the new greenfield site.  
Management saw the new plant as an opening to alter employment relations  
and tried to establish new work rules in the collective bargaining agreement. The two 
most important demands by management were to introduce teamwork and a 
permanent night shift in order to run the new production facility around the clock. In 
addition, management sought more working time flexibility, e.g. introducing 
obligatory Saturday shifts.197 On the other hand, the unions had a focus on reducing 
weekly and annual working time and increasing wages.198 Surprisingly, the 
introduction of teamwork was not a contentious issue. The largest unions, UGT and 
CCOO, agreed in principle to the introduction of teamwork.  
                                                 
196 Union interview. UGT. March 17, 2003. 
197 SEAT: Convenio Colectivo. Acta Tercera. Official transcript of collective bargaining round. 
December 19, 2000.  
198 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. Negociación. Union leaflet. December 20, 1990.  
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Collective bargaining made some progress in the following months and in the 
10th round of negotiations on March 27, management made its final and definitive 
offer.199 Management had made some concessions to labor with respect to annual 
working time and wage increases. The offer was accepted by UGT. The union had the 
largest number of seats in the general works council, but lacked the absolute majority 
needed to sign a collective bargaining agreement on its own. CCOO and CGT rejected 
the offer suggesting that the workforce should decide in a ballot vote about the 
management offer and alternative union proposals. As CGT and CCOO had the 
majority, they scheduled the vote for mid April. Management and UGT tried to 
convince the workforce to accept the last management offer, while CCOO and CGT 
campaigned for their proposals. More than 60% of the workers voted against the 
management offer.200  
As a consequence, UGT decided to step back from leading the negotiations 
with management.201 In the following weeks, CCOO, supported by CGT, led the 
negotiations for the general works council. These two unions started to mobilize 
through work assemblies and short work stoppages at the end of April and early May. 
In addition, CCOO and CGT organized a demonstration in front of the Automobile 
Show in Barcelona on May 8.202 In response, management did not attend one of the 
scheduled negotiations. After little progress had been made, the unions decided to 
increase the pressure and to conduct longer strikes, which would hurt the company 
economically since demand for SEAT cars was strong. In this context, the company 
provided another improved offer for the collective agreement, which was assessed 
                                                 
199 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. Union leaflet. April, 1991.  
200 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. Los trabajadores hemos decidido. April 17, 1991.  
201 General Works Council: Acta de Ejecutiva Intercentros. Official transcript of general works council 
meeting. April 19, 1991.  
202 CCOO. Assemblea Obrera. A todos los trabajadores. Union leaflet. May 3, 1991.  
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positively by CCOO. In the next negotiation round, the general works council and 
management agreed on the new collective bargaining agreement.  
The collective bargaining agreement had a duration of three years. The wage 
increase was 2% above the inflation rate for each of the three years. In addition, the 
unions were able to reduce the annual workdays from 221 in 1990 to 217 by 1993, as 
well as to prevent obligatory Saturday work; production could take place up to three 
Saturdays, but only on a voluntary basis. For management it was a success that the 
unions agreed to teamwork and three 8-hour shifts, which would allow running the 
new plant in Martorell around the clock.203 
In 1992, the paramount event in Spain was the Olympic Games in Barcelona. 
SEAT was directly connected to the Olympic Games by being one of the main 
sponsors. The transportation of the organizers and athletes took place in SEAT cars. 
After VW had taken over SEAT, there were concerns in Spain over weather SEAT 
would continue to exist as an independent brand or if its plants would ultimately used 
by VW for its own brands. The Olympic Games were a unique opportunity to present 
the independence of the SEAT brand to a worldwide audience. In addition, SEAT 
employees looked forward to the new plant in Martorell as the construction of the 
plant and the installation of machinery continued in 1992. The plant was supposed to 
be become one of the most modern plants in Europe.  
Parallel to these positive developments, the economic situation in the second of 
half of 1992 became more difficult.204 The demand in the Spanish and European auto 
market decreased considerably. In order to cope with the market pressure, 
management and labor engaged in collective negotiations. An agreement was reached 
to retire workers of age 59 and older. In addition, management and labor negotiated 
                                                 
203 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. Información Convenio. Union leaflet. May 31, 1991.  
204 El País: SEAT, Renault y Ford preparan regulaciones de empleo para reducir existencias por la caída 
del Mercado Europeo. Newspaper article. October 31, 1992.  
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short working time for December; production stopped for six days in December for 
about 11,000 workers.205 During this time, the affected workers were paid by the 
national unemployment insurance and received about 75% of their regular wage. The 
unions agreed to this measure because SEAT promised additional payments 
guaranteeing that the affected workers would get at least 95% of their regular wage. 
Like any other temporary or permanent discontinuation of the employment contract, 
this falls under the Spanish employment regulation and the regional Spanish labor 
ministry had to make the final decision.  
In 1993, as the market situation deteriorated further, management and labor 
agreed to a far more extensive employment regulation, which affected about 7,000 
workers until 1995.206 Each worker was not supposed to be suspended for more than 
ten months. Again, the national employment insurance picked up the tap for a large 
part of this measure and additional payments by SEAT guaranteed that workers would 
receive at least 95% of their previous wages.  
These were far-reaching measures to cope with the slump in the European and 
Spanish market, but they could not prevent that SEAT slid into the worst economic 
crisis of its history. In the summer of 1993, SEAT management informed VW 
headquarters in Germany about unprecedented losses. VW’s headquarters was 
shocked. It was clear to them that SEAT would incur losses, but the actual amount 
would force the whole company into the red, since the other company brands such as 
VW, Audi and Skoda could not compensate for these losses. Communication 
problems existed between SEAT and the world headquarters, since Wolfsburg had not 
seen the extent of this SEAT’s coming.  
                                                 
205 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. Union leaflet. November 18, 1992.  
206 SEAT: Acta Final Negociación ERE. Offical transcript of collective negotiation. April 2, 1993.  
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Different factors contributed to SEAT’s crisis. A crucial factor was certainly 
the dramatic slump in sales. Other important factors were the amortization of the 
Martorell plant and the devaluation of the Spanish pesetas, which made the purchasing 
of certain parts and resources more expensive. In addition, some of SEAT’s debts 
were valued in German marks and with the devaluation of the Spanish peseta, the 
debts increased in Spanish pesetas. SEAT’s losses in 1993 became higher than the 
actual value of the company, which meant that SEAT could not survive without 
outside financial support.  
In response to SEAT’s crisis, the world headquarters decided to step in and 
take charge. Shortly before, in January 1993, the leadership had changed at the world 
headquarters and Ferdinand Piëch  became the new president of the VW Company. 
Since the SEAT crisis became a crisis for the whole company, Piëch personally took 
charge of the crisis management. One of the first measures was to dismiss the 
president of SEAT who had lost the confidence of headquarters because he had not 
informed them early enough about SEAT’s crisis.207  
By October 1993, SEAT lost its financial liquidity and was in urgent need of 
financial resources to keep production going. In this context, the management from 
headquarters, the local management and the unions engaged in conversations about 
how to overcome the crisis. Due to the overwhelming economic pressure, local 
management and unions quickly agreed to “sell” SEAT’s Pamplona plant and SEAT’s 
credit branch to VW. In exchange, VW provided sufficient credit for the immediate 
running of SEAT. However, these measures would not secure the survival of SEAT in 
the medium term, and the headquarters’ management engaged in negotiations with the 
regional and central government about subsidies and in parallel negotiations with labor 
                                                 
207 El País: Volkswagen fuerza al presidente de SEAT a dimitir. Newspaper article. September 30, 1993.  
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about a far-reaching restructuring program in order to secure the survival of SEAT in 
the long run. 208  
VW was in a strong negotiating position with respect to the regional 
Catalonian and Spanish central government. The importance of SEAT in the Spanish 
economy made it politically unthinkable that either of these two governments could 
afford to let SEAT go bankrupt. SEAT, with its 24,000 employees, was the largest 
private company in Spain and the largest exporter of goods. SEAT was by far the 
largest company in Catalonia and large numbers of small and medium sized 
companies in the region were dependent on it. Furthermore, the socialist central 
government was caught in a weak moment. A key problem was the high 
unemployment rate. Bankruptcy of the largest private employer in Spain could have 
caused a substantial blow to the stability of the government. These political 
constellations made it possible for VW to receive substantial subsidies and support for 
the survival of the plant. In return, VW promised the long-term survival of SEAT and 
to agreed to new investments.  
Parallel to the negotiations with the central and regional government, 
management sought to negotiate a far-reaching restructuring program with the labor 
unions. In fact, both negotiations were on some levels intertwined, because some of 
the subsidies were aimed at supporting the restructuring program with labor. The 
extensive restructuring program suggested by management included the following 
points.209 First, management intended to reduce the workforce by 40%, or about 9,000 
workers, through different employment regulation (termination of temporary contracts, 
early retirement programs and temporary suspension of employment contracts). 
                                                 
208 El País: Volkswagen insinúa que el gobierno y la generalitat deben ayudar a SEAT. Newspaper 
article. October 10, 1993 
209 El País: VW propondrá hoy a los sindicatos cerrar la Zona Franca y reducir 9,000 empleos de SEAT. 
Newspaper article. October 22, 1993  
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Second, management suggested closing down car production in the Zona Franca and 
the entire car assembly production was supposed to take place in the new Martorell 
plant. The plant in the Zona Franca would be converted into a supplier park and only 
some of SEAT’s parts production and bodywork were supposed to remain in the Zona 
Franca. Third, management suggested reducing wages by 10% in order to finance the 
workforce reduction. A similar wage cut was negotiated at about the same time in 
Germany in the collective bargaining round on the 4-days-week in 1993 (cf. chapter 
on VW Germany). 
The Spanish unions were shocked by the boldness of the intended 
restructuring. They had expected to make concessions, but the points suggested by 
management went far beyond what they had imagined. Each of the points was rejected 
by the unions. A very sensitive issue for the unions was the closure of the assembly 
plant in the Zona Franca. In the memory of the workers and unions, the plant in the 
Zona Franca and the SEAT Company were identical. The plant had existed since 1953 
and most of the car production and unions’ historical struggles had taken place there. 
The unions expected that the closure of the plant was only a first step in closing down 
SEAT completely. They announced massive protests if management went ahead with 
its plan. 
During the first negotiation round, it became clear that management did not 
want to back down from any of its demands, arguing that all of the proposed measures 
were essential to secure the survival of SEAT. To put pressure on management, the 
labor unions started to mobilize not just the workforce but also the broader civil 
society in Catalonia. The unions started with 4-hour strikes in each shift on October 
27, followed by general workforce assemblies in each shift on October 29.210 In these 
                                                 
210 General works council: En defensa de SEAT, nuestra identidad y los puestos de trabajo. General 
works council leaflet. October 26. 1993 
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assemblies, the union leaders announced a 24-hour strike for November 9 with a 
demonstration in downtown Barcelona. Many social organizations in Catalonia 
supported this demonstration and more than 25,000 people took part.211 This display 
of labor’s strength led to the breakdown of negotiations between management and 
labor. Management decided to go unilaterally ahead with the reduction of the 
workforce and applied for three types of employment regulations at the regional Labor 
Ministry. Management intended to terminate 2,500 temporary contracts, to send 3,000 
workers into early retirement, and to suspend the contracts of 4,600 workers for two 
years. The conflict escalated and the unions began to mobilize for the next 24-hour 
strike with a demonstration in downtown Barcelona on November 17.212 For this 
demonstration, the turnout was even higher, with 30,000 people participating. Shortly 
after the demonstration, representatives from the regional government stated that the 
employment regulations would only be accepted if management and unions reached an 
agreement. Generally, a regional government is free to decide on an employment 
regulation, but a common practice had been to ask management and labor to find a 
compromise. At this point, it seemed that the labor unions were able to block the 
employment regulations.213 
Management had two options: it could either seek an agreement with the labor 
unions or try to get the regional government to agree to the employment regulation. At 
first, the VW management continued to seek approval by the labor unions, since it has 
been part of VW’s company culture to seek labor’s agreement in restructuring 
programs. Besides the local negotiations, management at headquarters tried to 
                                                 
211 El País: La movilización de SEAT reúne en Barcelona mas manifestantes que el Primero de Mayo. 
Newspaper article. November 10, 1993.  
212 CCOO: Assemblea Obrera. El 17 – por SEAT y su industria auxiliar. Union leaflet. November 15, 
1993.  
213 El País: La Generalitat no aprobara expedientes en SEAT si no se negocian con las centrales. 
Newspaper article. November 17, 1993.  
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convince the Spanish unionists in meetings of the EWC. In two meetings with the 
EWC, not only management but also the German unionists sought to convince the 
Spanish unionists that they had to make sacrifices and to contribute to the recovery of 
VW. The German unionists were doing this by themselves in parallel restructuring 
negotiations in Wolfsburg. The Spanish unionists agreed to make concessions, but 
they were not willing to sacrifice the plant in the Zona Franca, which remained a key 
point of management’s restructuring proposal. 
Despite the standstill, negotiations between management and labor continued. 
At the same time, management sought to convince the regional government to agree to 
the employment regulations, even if the unions did not approve them. A key moment 
was when VW announced a new estimate for the losses in 1993 at the end of 
November. The losses would not be 60,000 million Spanish pesetas, as had been 
announced in the summer, but rather 160.000 million Spanish pesetas.214 These figures 
included the costs for the restructuring program. These figures helped SEAT to make 
the case that the survival of company was seriously threatened. Shortly thereafter, the 
regional government changed its position, arguing in contrast to previous statements, 
that the employment regulations applied for by SEAT were necessary and signaled that 
it would agree to them even if management and labor unions could not reach a 
collective agreement. The unions had announced additional demonstrations for 
December to further press for their case. However, the announcement of the regional 
government sealed the loss of the unions in the contention. From then on, it was clear 
that management could unilaterally go ahead with the employment regulations. 
Nevertheless, management tried until the very last minute to get the approval of the 
labor unions. However, none of the labor unions was willing to approve the cessation 
                                                 
214 El País: Volkswagen anuncia que SEAT perderá 160,000 millones este ano al incluir también el 
coste de ajuste. Newspaper article. November 27, 1993. 
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of car production in the Zona Franca. On December 14, the regional government 
approved the employment regulations requested by SEAT, which terminated 3,000 
temporary contracts, retired 3,000 workers and suspended the contract of 4,600 
workers for two years.215 
The unions lost this conflict and were ultimately overwhelmed by the 
economic pressure and management strategies (which were backed by the political 
authorities), despite large-scale mobilization of the workforce and the broader public. 
Management accomplished most of its goals. However, the unions were able to block 
the 10% wage cut demanded by management. This change in the existing collective 
bargaining contract would have required the agreement by the labor unions.  
The conflict in 1993 had ended with a devastating loss for the unions. The 
restructuring had hit issues of fundamental importance to the unions such as 
discontinuation of car production in the Zona Franca. Labor relations remained on a 
bumpy track at SEAT. Management and labor disagreed about how to implement the 
employment regulations and the transfer of workers to the Martorell plant. 
Occasionally, protest flared and  the unions organized work stoppages. The labor 
relations department at headquarters felt some unease about the developments at 
SEAT and sought to improve the relationship with the unions. In the context of a 
EWC meeting in spring 2004, a meeting took place between SEAT’s unions, local 
management and the management of the headquarters’ labor relations department. Its 
head suggested establishing a co-management with the labor unions and a greater 
involvement by the unions in the decision-making processes at SEAT in order to avoid 
further conflicts.216 Specifically, the chair of the labor relations department suggested 
having plant symposia as at VW in Germany, in which management and labor 
                                                 
215 El País: La Generalitat aprobara mañana, sin acuerda syndical, la reducción de 7,600 empleos en 
SEAT. Newspaper article. December 14, 1993. 
216 CCOO: Notes from meeting with management (during EWC meeting). January 25-26, 1994.  
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commonly discussed the current situations and future plans. In addition, he suggested 
for each year planning rounds, an instrument also used at VW in Germany, in which 
unions and management discuss and plan production for the following years. Planning 
rounds were introduced at SEAT; however, they did not engender a more cooperative 
attitude by the unions in the short run.  
The next collective bargaining round started in June 1994. SEAT’s economic 
situation remained difficult. SEAT had lost 56,000 million Spanish pesetas in the first 
quarter of 1994, partly due to the costs of restructuring as well as to the continuing low 
demand for SEAT cars.217 For this reason, management suggested to cut wages by 
10%, a measure which management had already demanded during the 1993 crisis. 
Management pointed to the last collective bargaining agreement at VW in Germany in 
November 1993, in which IG Metall had agreed to similar concessions. In addition, 
management sought working time flexibility and suggested adding work shifts on 
Saturdays and during company holidays in the summer, if the demand required this. 
The unions rejected additional shifts on Saturdays and during holidays as well as the 
wage cuts proposed by management. In contrast, one of the key demands of the unions  
was a higher purchasing power for workers.218 
The negotiations quickly reached an impasse. It was too much for the unions 
that SEAT had just received 38,000 million Spanish pesetas in public subsidies and 
now asked on top of it for a 10% wage cut. After only one and half months of 
negotiations, the unions conducted a 24-hour strike on July 26.219 Management argued 
that the wage cuts and working time flexibility were necessary, pointing to SEAT’s 
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economic situation, which indeed remained critical. Management and labor did not 
reach an agreement before the several weeks long summer break and negotiations 
resumed in September 1994.  
After the break, the atmosphere between management and labor remained 
tense. The president of SEAT, who got directly involved in the negotiations, argued 
that the rejection of additional shifts on Saturdays  and during the summer holidays 
would “ruin” the company. 220 The unions were disappointed about this intervention, 
returned the favor and publicly called SEAT’s president a “troublemaker.”221 Besides 
this verbal exchange, the relocation of the cleaning persona l in the Martorell plant 
interfered with collective negotiations. Management had relocated 70 cleaning 
personal and sought to bring in an external service company. When the unions found 
about this, they immediately called for a strike, which was called off when 
management canceled the outsourcing.  
The collective bargaining round was charged. Management sought to avoid 
another serious conflict with the unions quickly gave in to some of the union demands. 
Management and labor agreed upon a new collective bargaining contract in early 
October.222 Management neither realized the 10% wage cut nor substantially increased 
working time flexibility. The wage increase was 2.9% in 1994, a cost-of- living 
adjustment in 1995 and one percent above the inflation rate in 1996. The unions did 
not agree to mandatory Saturday and holiday work, while management fended off a 
substantial working time reduction suggested by the unions. The new collective 
bargaining agreement had a three-year duration. The unions disagreed about whether 
to submit the collective bargaining agreement to a vote by the workforce. UGT 
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regarded it as sufficient that elected union representatives agreed to the collective 
bargaining agreement. However, CCOO and CGT insisted on a direct ballot vote by 
the workforce, which was conducted on October 14, 1994. Only 52% of the workforce 
agreed to the new collective bargaining contract.223 
Union elections took place at the end of November in the Zona Franca and 
three smaller company units, while the union election at the new Martorell plant 
followed at the end of January. Overall, CCOO was able to increase its share of the 
votes; however, UGT remained the strongest union. CGT received a similar share of 
the votes as in the 1990 union elections. In the general works council, UGT was 
represented with six representatives, CCOO with five and CGT with two. Since a 
cooperation between UGT and CGT was unlikely, CCOO was in the position to 
organize a majority with either of the unions.224 
In January 1995, shortly before the union election in Martorell, another conflict 
broke out between management and labor. Management intended to go ahead with one 
of the employment regulations approved by the regional government, which would 
allow suspending employment for up to 4,600 workers for up  to 10 months until 1996. 
Management had not exhausted this employment regulation and intended go ahead 
with additional temporary dismissals. The unions opposed this by arguing that the 
economic context had changed and temporary dismissals were no longer necessary. 
The unions conducted strikes on January 10 and 17 and boycotted overtime. In 
addition, the unions organized picket lines to stop maintenance work on weekends 
throughout January. Picket lines were rarely happened at auto companies in Spain and 
demonstrated how hostile the atmosphere between management and labor had 
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become. The president of SEAT called this “unionism like 30 years ago”. 225 
Throughout January, the work stoppages and protests by the unions continued and car 
production was lost, which hurt SEAT economically as demand in the auto market had 
picked up. The unions were able to stop the continuation of the temporary suspension 
of contracts and pushed management to agree instead to early retirement programs and 
voluntary buyouts. Saturday work remained an issue in 1995. Management tried to 
seek additional shifts to make up for lost production through the protests. UGT agreed, 
but CCOO and CGT stopped additional Saturday work. They generally rejected 
weekend work and tried to avoid an increasing number of exceptions for Saturday 
work.  
The headquarters in Germany was not content with the development of labor 
relations in Spain and began to reorganize them. As a measure to improve the 
relationship, management liberated 86 representatives of UGT and CCOO from 
factory work for their union work in the company. 226 Representatives of CGT did not 
enjoy this privilege, as management regarded it as too radical. In addition, VW 
reshuffled SEAT’s management shortly before the next collective bargaining round in 
1997. Among others, the president of SEAT, who was involved in several heated 
public discussion with the labor unions, and the head of the labor relations department 
were replaced with new managers.   
Between 1997 and 1999, labor relations and collective negotiations calmed 
down and were less contentious compared to previous episodes. The economic 
situation had improved and there was less pressure for change. Between 1993 and 
1997, the workforce shrunk from 22,403 to 12,811, while car production remained 
almost constant. This was a leap in productivity. In addition, the Martorell plant was 
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one the most modern plants in Europe and had a high productivity. In 1996, SEAT had 
broken even for the first time since the crisis in 1993. In the following two years, 
SEAT earned 66 million euros and 147 million euros respectively. 227   
Collective bargaining was not very contentious in 1997. Neither the new 
national SEAT leadership nor the labor unions complicated the collective negotiations 
with excessive demands. After only four months of negotiations and without any work 
stoppages, management and labor reached a new agreement. The unions gained a 
moderate wage increase and a slightly higher purchasing power for their members, 
while management gained some working time flexibility through additional Saturday 
shifts.228 Employment increased to 14,202 in 1998 and 14,317 in 1999.229 
Union elections took place in January 1999. UGT was once more able to win 
the elections and even gained an absolute majority of all works councilors across the 
different production sites. Thus, more than 50% of the workforce voted for the more 
moderate UGT. However, the absolute majority in terms of votes did not translate into 
an absolute majority in the general works council. The representation of the different 
production facilities favored CCOO and prevented an absolute majority. The 
composition of the general works council, which conducts collective bargaining for 
the whole company, did not change. UGT still had six, CCOO five and CGT two 
representatives in the general works council.230 
 
Generational conflict and leadership change, 2000 – 2003  
The struggle in the general works council over how to respond to management in 
collective negotiations became more pronounced in the early 2000s. One side in the 
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general works council (CGT and a part of CCOO) regarded management as an 
opponent and continued to resist changes in the company. The other side in the general 
works council (UGT and a part of CCOO) regarded it as essential to make SEAT more 
competitive by cooperating with management. Only if SEAT would run productively, 
so this union position went, VW would make new investments and assign new car 
production to SEAT. Only this would ensure employment for the workforce. UGT 
clearly tended towards the latter position while CGT clearly represented the former. 
UGT had responded positively to the initiatives by management such as the extensive 
provision of company information and common planning rounds on future production 
and investments. UGT appreciated a greater say in the decision-making process. CGT 
principally rejected initiatives by management and the unions believed that 
management only sought to exploit workers. The union did not sign any collective 
agreement with management, although it took part in the negotiations and resisted 
changes.231  
CCOO had an intermediate position and had tended to oppose management in 
key crucial collective negotiations in the 1990s, thus tilting labor’s responses in 
collective negotiations towards local resistance. However, this position became 
contested within the union and the question surfaced as to weather a more cooperative 
relationship with management would serve the union and the workers better. These 
debates within CCOO about union strategies were to some extent a generational 
conflict. The old generation of unionists continued to resist changes proposed by 
management, while the younger generation was more open to cooperating with 
management.  
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The inner conflict of CCOO came out first in the collective bargaining round in 
2000.232 At first, the three unions – UGT, CGT and CCOO – had reached a common 
position for the negotiations. In setting their demands, the previous collective 
bargaining round at VW in Germany was a benchmark. The unions asked for a 5% 
wage increase (with a forecasted inflation rate of 2%) and pointed to a similar outcome 
of the collective bargaining round in November in Germany. In addition, the unions 
sought to decrease the average weekly working time. The most important goal for the 
SEAT management was to increase working time flexibility; to support the position 
they pointed towards other plants within VW and other competitors in the Spanish 
market.  
Management made a first offer in February, which all unions rejected. When 
the company did not change its position in the next weeks, the unions put pressure on 
the company and organized a 4-hour strike in each shift on March 16. Management 
improved the suggested proposal and presented a final and ultimate offer on March 
21.233 This led to a division on the union side. UGT accepted the offer as sufficient and 
was willing to sign the collective bargaining agreement. Not surprisingly, the offer 
was rejected by CGT. Within CCOO, an open conflict broke out.234 One group wanted 
to accept the offer, while the other rejected it. CCOO union leaders from outside 
SEAT got involved in the conflict. The chair of CCOO’s metal section of the state of 
Catalonia urged the union group in SEAT to accept the offer.235 He was concerned that 
VW would transfer production to another country and would not invest in SEAT’s 
plants, which would have dire consequences for the suppliers located in Catalonia.  
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His statement related as well to changes in management strategy. VW’s 
headquarters began to play off different plants with each other and  used sourcing 
decisions as an instrument in collective negotiations. For example, VW’s management 
had played the German plants off against the Bratislava plant in 1999. Whipsawing 
practices by the headquarters spilled also over into SEAT. However, SEAT 
management did not use it very forcefully at this point and only pointed in a general 
way to production and investment decisions during the collective bargaining round in 
2000. 
CCOO decided to have an assembly with their members to discuss the union’s 
position on the management offer. Unions members disagreed about the topic working 
time flexibility. Some of the older worker representatives sought to prevent working 
on holidays and weekends, whereas some of the younger union members did not see 
this point as so the problematic regarding working time flexibility as legitimate and 
necessary in order to stay competitive. The conflict was decided by a vote: 65 % voted 
against and 35% voted in favor of the final and ultimate offer.  
Shortly afterwards, UGT alone signed the collective bargaining agreement, 
which was an unusual step by the union as it did not have the support of the majority 
in the general works council. UGT leadership praised the existing offer and said that 
the union was ready to take on new production assignments by VW.236 Management 
had suggested signing a limited collective bargaining agreement only for UGT 
members. It was unclear to what extent such an agreement was in accordance with 
Spanish labor law. 237 In any case, it was more of a strategy by management and UGT 
to put pressure on CCOO. Parallel negotiations continued with CCOO. The goal 
remained to convince CCOO, in order to get a collective contract that applied to the 
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whole workforce. Management made some minor concessions to CCOO and revised 
the final and ultimate offer. After these concessions, CCOO resubmitted this proposal 
to a union assembly and now 61% voted in favor of the offer. Despite reaching an 
agreement with management, CCOO remained torn part between different positions 
that reflected different ideologies – one side continued to resist changes and the other 
was open to cooperating with management. For the first time, the general works 
council did not submit the collective bargaining agreement to a vote by the workforce. 
UGT and management regarded such a vote as unnecessary, and CCOO and CGT 
could not agree on a common position to overturn UGT’s position.  
The collective agreement had a duration of four years. The wage increases 
were 0.5% plus the inflation rate in the first year and 0.4% in the following three 
years. The wage increases were moderate considering the improving economic 
situation of SEAT (Artiles 2000b). However, management at SEAT and the world 
headquarters was not content with the reached level of working time flexibility at 
SEAT, which remained in internal comparisons behind other plants within VW. From 
the management perspective, the unions had once more stalled important working time 
flexibility measures.  
In 2001, management and labor agreed on an early retirement scheme, which 
affected up to 7,000 workers (Artiles 2000a). Workers 60 years and older were entitled 
to the early retirement scheme. These workers were replaced with younger workers. 
These workers started at a lower wage-tier, which was 30% below the collective 
bargaining agreement at SEAT (Artiles 2000a). This was the first lower tier wages 
were introduced at SEAT. However, the lower tier wages would convergence to the 
wages of the collective bargaining agreement with increasing seniority. The collective 
negotiations on this measure took place parallel to the Auto 5000 negotiations, which 
introduced a second tier wage at VW in Germany. 
  
 
155 
The conflicts between management and labor about working time flexibility 
escalated in 2002. In February, management and labor negotiated the working time for 
the following months. Management asked for a working time corridor and additional 
Saturday shifts. When management scheduled a Saturday shift, UGT accepted this. 
However, CCOO and CGT blocked this measure in the general works council. They 
pointed to the existing collective bargaining agreement, which already included 13 
Saturdays for each of the three shifts (thus in total 39 Saturday shifts).238 In order to 
make sure that no work would be done by UGT members, CCOO and CGT organized 
picket lines. The police were present at the picket lines to ensure that workers would  
not clash with each other.239  
In September 2002, management asked for five additional Saturday shifts from 
October on. The demand for the car model Ibiza was strong and management intended 
to produce 5,000 more cars during these five Saturday shifts. CCOO and CGT blocked 
this initiative, while UGT was willing to negotiate the request by management. CCOO 
and UGT pointed to the existing collective bargaining agreement and collectively 
agreed upon working time. Labor did not want to adapt the collective agreements to 
the fluctuation of the market.  
The response by management was very forceful and came without warning. 
Management announced the transfer of 10% of the Ibiza production to the VW plant in 
Bratislava, Slovakia (Artiles 2004). In 2003, 20,000 of the total 200,000 annual Ibiza 
production units were supposed to take place in Bratislava. The Ibiza was SEAT’s 
most important product and had been produced exclusively at the Martorell plant. The 
unions were stunned by this decision. CGT suggested a vote by the workforce on the 
Saturday work, seeking a back up of the union position. CCOO and UGT wanted to 
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reengage in negotiations with management. However, SEAT’s president confirmed the 
decision at the Auto Show in Paris and said that it was irreversible.240 He justified the 
production transfer to Eastern Europe with the intransigence by the unions to work 
five additional Saturday shifts.  
The standardization of production and the introduction of common platforms  
in the 1990s made it possible to shift production across plants along one platform. This 
gave management a forceful instrument in collective negotiation, which they had so 
far not used beyond a verbal threat at SEAT. The unions suspected that the production 
move was motivated by the lower wages at the Bratislava plant, which were about 
one-fifth of the wages at SEAT. In the past few years, VW had made much headway 
in introducing working time flexibility at its European plants, however had faced 
fierce opposition at SEAT. Management tried to demonstrate that not accepting 
working time flexibility could have dire consequences. Politicians put some pressure 
on management by reminding VW of the many subsidies that SEAT had received. 
However, management did not change its mind and stuck with the production transfer 
of the Ibiza to Bratislava.  
Transnational worker representation bodies were involved in the conflict. On 
September 12, 2002, the steering committee of the WWC discussed the conflict at 
SEAT. The chair of the WWC sought to convince the Spanish representatives to agree 
to the additional Saturday shifts.241 However, his intervention did not have an impact. 
After the decision was taken against SEAT, the chair of the WWC wrote a letter to 
UGT, in which he made clear that they themselves had caused the production transfer.  
The relocation of Ibiza production became the most important topic in the 
campaign for the union election scheduled for January 2003. UGT blamed CCOO for 
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the transfer of production and argued that this would not have happened with UGT 
having a majority in the general works council. In contrast, CCOO presented itself as 
the union that protected the workers against management, making sure that 
management fulfilled the collectively agreed upon contract. As in previous union 
elections, CGT presented itself as a straightforward opposition union, which would not 
sell out workers and engage in any compromises with management.  
Before the election, a generational and leadership change took place. The older 
generation of union leaders stepped down before the union election and was replaced 
by a younger generation of unionists.242 The first candidate on UGT list had been for a 
long time Manuel Gallardo; he was replaced by Manuel Garcia Salgado (39 years), 
who had already been the general secretary of UGT since 1999.243 Another important 
new UGT union leader was Matias Carnero (43 years), who became the secretary 
general of UGT and later the chair of the general works council. The new candidate in 
the CCOO list was Manuel Galvez (35 years old) who replaced Alfonso Rodriguez, a 
union activist since 1967 at SEAT. Rodriguez took part in the occupation of the 
company in 1971 during which one SEAT worker was shot. In 1974, he was dismissed 
and imprisoned for supporting the democratic movement in Spain. During Spain’s 
transition to democracy, the amnesty laws supported his rehiring at SEAT. 244 The new 
and younger labor leaders at CCOO had a very different set of experiences. They 
became union activists when Spain was already a democracy. The older generation of 
union leaders at SEAT had a class-based perspective, meaning that for them labor 
relations was a conflict between capital and labor. The younger generation was more 
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open to a cooperating with management. Issues such as working time flexibility were 
not such much ideologically charged for the younger generation of unionists.245  
In the union election UGT became the strongest union again; however, their 
share of the votes decreased. The votes lost by UGT were picked up by CCOO. The 
share of the votes of CGT was constant; this union gained about 20% of the votes. 
Despite a slight change in the balance between UGT and CCOO, the composition in 
the general works council remained unchanged; UGT had six seats, CCOO five and 
CGT two in the new general works council (Miguelez 1993).  
 
Cooperative employment relations at SEAT, 2003 – 2007 
Working time flexibility remained an important topic in 2003. Finally, management 
was able to gain more working time flexibility. In 2003, the production for the station 
wagons Inca and Caddy ran out. Management argued that the workforce had an excess 
of 1,000 employees, and in order to secure new production for SEAT and to avoid an 
employment regulation (temporary dismissal), it would be necessary to increase 
working time flexibility. After difficult negotiations, UGT and CCOO agreed to a 
collective agreement on working time in May (Artiles 2003b). The unions agreed to 
increase the annual working days from 215 to 233 in case this was necessary. This was 
in affect a working time corridor, which allowed SEAT to better adapt production and  
working time to fluctuations of the market. In September, management and labor 
agreed on another collective agreement on working time and the unions agreed to 10 
additional Saturday shifts until the end of the year (Artiles 2003a). In 2003, the unions 
did not organize any work stoppages.  
The first collective bargaining round after the union election took place in 
2004. The unions were not able to agree on a common position for the negotiations 
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with management. Only UGT and CCOO agreed on common negotiation demands, 246 
while CGT pursued goals that were more ambitious.247 The two bigger unions 
demanded an increase in purchasing power for the workers and asked for labor-
management commissions, e.g. to discuss and develop training at SEAT. In addition, a 
goal of UGT and CCOO was to reverse the production transfer from Bratislava 
(Slovakia). Management continued its quest for working time flexibility and 
introduced the demand “more flexibility with zero costs.”248 Management sought to 
increase flexibility, but to avoid premiums for overtime, weekend or holiday work. 
The argument that the Ibiza could return if a good collective bargaining agreement 
could be reached, was present throughout the negotiations. However, the Ibiza 
production was not directly part of the negotiations – a decision on this production 
assignment by the headquarters was expected later in 2004.  
The negotiations ran into trouble at the end of March. Although UGT and 
CCOO did not generally oppose greater working time flexibility, the management 
proposal was too far-reaching. In this situation, management began to argue that the 
workforce had an excess of about 600 workers and threatened to suspend workers’ 
contracts temporarily through an employment regulation. The unions responded with 
short 20 minutes strikes in each shift on April 2.249 After management did not take 
back the threat to suspend 600 work contracts in the next negotiation round, the unions 
announced a 24-hour-strike.250 The chair of the EWC tried to mediate in the conflict 
and invited the leaders of UGT and CCOO to a meeting at the headquarters in 
Wolfsburg on April 15, 2004. In this meeting, the chair of the EWC supported the 
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demand by the unions to return the Ibiza production to SEAT. However, the unions 
did not renounce the strike scheduled for the following day. Parallel to the strike 
action, management announced the filing of an employment regulation seeking to 
suspend 415 employment contracts.  
After these “hot” two weeks in April, the negotiations between management 
and labor quickly calmed down and the positions of the two sides drew closer. 
Management took back the employment regulation and the unions agreed to some 
working time flexibility. In early May, management and labor reached an 
agreement.251 An important ingredient was the promise by SEAT’s president to ask the 
headquarters to return the Ibiza production to Barcelona. The collective bargaining 
agreement had an extraordinarily long duration of five years. The wage increases were 
0.5% plus the inflation rate for the first year and 0.3% plus the inflation rate for the 
following four years. Management gained working time flexibility. The annual 
number of working days was increased to 233 days; in years when a new car model 
was introduced it could even be 237 days. The greatest advancement for management 
was an individual working time account for each employee that could fluctuate 
between minus 240 hours and plus 200 hours within a year.252 Personalized working 
time accounts had already been introduced at VW Germany in the 1990s. This practice 
spread to other VW plants in Europe and was finally introduced at SEAT in 2004. 
Such individual working time accounts have the advantage for management to save 
premiums for overtime.   
Despite the short contention in April, the president of SEAT praised the new, 
constructive relationship between management and labor. SEAT’s president had 
started a campaign called the New SEAT framing the company as a modern and 
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competitive car company. He regarded the agreement reached and the improved 
relationship with the labor unions as an indicator for the “New SEAT.” In addition, the 
president of the VW Company congratulated SEAT on the new collective bargaining 
agreement. In September, the headquarters in Wolfsburg announced the return of the 
previously lost 10% production to SEAT. 253 Management made clear that the decision 
was related to the much- improved working time flexibility. UGT and CCOO regarded 
it as their accomplishment to regain the complete Ibiza production for SEAT.  
In the second half of 2005, the Spanish and European market shrunk. 
Management pushed hard for labor concessions in Germany in the second half of 
2005, and when the economic figures turned negative at SEAT, the headquarters asked 
the local management for a far-reaching restructuring program. In August 2005, the 
president of SEAT announced that the Martorell plant had a labor excess of 800 
workers – about 10% of the workforce. As an alternative to dismissals, he suggested 
cutting working time and reducing wages by 10%. The proposal was opposed by labor 
unions, who pointed to the existing collective bargaining agreement.254 
The conflict between management and labor began to escalate when 
management announced that the labor excess was higher than first stated. Management 
sought to dismiss 1,346 workers. If the unions would not agree to a common solution, 
management intended to seek the reduction of the workforce through an employment 
regulation filed with the regional government.  
The unions responded with a mobilization of the workforce. On October 21, 
the unions conducted 1-hour strikes in each shift, during which the unions informed 
the workers about the negotiations with management. During the next round of strikes 
on October 27, the union activists blocked highways close to the Martorell and Zona 
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Franca plants. The workers’ picket signs demanded the defense of their employment 
and the brand SEAT. Management did not flinch despite the protest and filed the 
dismissal of 1,346 workers at the regional Catalan government. A decision by the 
government was due in December.  
The unions intensified the protests and announced a 24-hour strike for 
November 10. On that day, the unions took their protests to downtown Barcelona and 
15,000 workers demonstrated against the planned dismissal. 255 More than 10,000 
workers took part in another demonstration in Barcelona on December 1. However, 
the November 10 strike did not economically hurt SEAT as management continued to 
seek to reduce production levels. Meanwhile the negotiations between management 
and labor continued. Both parties got closer after management proposed to use 
voluntary buy-outs and introduce an early retirement program for workers of age 58 
and older. SEAT offered up to 78,000 euros for workers with 25 years of seniority that 
would voluntarily leave the company. 256 After only one week, 300 workers expressed 
their interest in the voluntary buy-out package. In December, the regional government 
set an ultimatum for management and labor. If both sides would not settle on an 
agreement, the regional government would independently decide on the employment 
regulation. For management, it was important to have the unions on board, because 
this would provide legitimacy to the restructuring program and facilitate its 
implementation. Additionally, management had begun to consult the unions on 
important issues and the unions’ relationship with management had much improved in 
recent years despite the conflict.257  
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Ultimately, management and the unions found a compromise.258 For the unions 
it was crucial to reduce the job cuts. Management responded to this and limited the 
workforce downsizing from 1,347 to 660. In exchange, the unions agreed to an 
extension of the personal working time accounts. Management and labor agreed on a 
compensation package for the dismissed workers, and the collective agreement 
covered their return in case of an improved economic situation. A significant number 
of workers had voluntarily chosen to leave the company, but there remained 
permanent forced redundancies. It was a new development in Spanish industrial 
relations for unions to agree to permanent dismissals.259 
The implementation of the restructuring program and the processing of the 
dismissals remained difficult despite the support of the two largest unions. 
Management had made a list of workers to be dismissed. Management sought to use 
the job cuts to give a decisive blow to CGT and about 20% of the dismissed 
employees were CGT members. When the dismissal list became public, workers 
responded with a wildcat strike one day before Christmas.260 CGT continued its 
resistance against the dismissals in 2006. The unions organized demonstrations in 
Barcelona, in which several thousand protesters took part. In addition, CGT sued 
against the dismissals in court on an individual basis and won several reinstatements. 
In interviews, CGT representatives called the disproportionately high dismissals of 
CGT members a “cleansing” by management.261 
The relationship between the two largest unions, UGT and CCOO, and 
management quickly went back to normal. Despite the resistance, UGT and CCOO 
had accepted the reasoning by management. Management continued to praise the 
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relationship with the unions almost as if the 2005 conflict and labor protest did not 
happen. At a meeting of the WWC in May 2006, the president of VW, Pieschetsrieder, 
clashed with worker representatives from the VW plant in Pamplona, who were in the 
middle of an ultimately 18 months long collective bargaining conflict. He contrasted 
this contentious attitude at the Pamplona plant with the more cooperative unionists at 
SEAT, which had made the Martorell plant more competitive in recent years. In 
particular, Pischetsrieder praised the newly found working time flexibility at SEAT. 
Similarly, the larger unions, UGT and CCOO, appreciated the improved relationship 
with management. One union leader of UGT stated in an interview:   
I think there is a gain, the trade unions gained in this last phase something that 
we never had, which was the participation in the projects, in the processes, in 
teamwork, in co-management. We were demanding to be the same with IG 
Metall as in Germany and therefore, at the level of the European works council 
and at the World Council Councils, of which I am a member of the presidency, 
we managed to obtain one line of negotiations and dialogue with the 
multinational (…). Now, concerning SEAT, I think, we changed the culture. 
That is to say, the trade unionism of 10 years ago is not the same as the trade 
unionism today. If you ask me, would the agreement we signed 2 years ago 
[the 2004 collective contract] signed 10 years ago? – of course not. Why? First, 
because of the union’s ideology that was present at that time, second, because 
of the management we faced. The management made important changes. If we 
would have changed the unions, and if the company would have remained the 
same, that would not have worked at all. But the new president [Schleef], I 
think, he has been a fundamental part to promote a cooperation between the 
unions and management, which has become the model for all companies. If the 
company has problems, we participate in solving theses problems – it’s not just 
management, we solve it together. What is the difference with 10 years ago? 
Well that things are seen in another way. There was more social conflict, more 
oppression by the workers from management. These limitations have been 
removed, this does not exist any longer.262 
The next union elections took place in 2007. The workforce got to judge the collective 
negotiations in recent years. UGT and CGT won more union representatives across the 
different plants, while CCOO received fewer representatives. The overall balance of 
the general works council did not change. UGT retained seven works councilors but 
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stopped short of winning the absolute majority. CCOO lost one seat to CGT and 
received four seats. CGT received a record three seats in the new general works 
council and gained 20% of the votes.263 The result of the union election suggests that 
CCOO was squeezed between UGT and CGT. The electorate appreciated the 
conciliatory, cooperative relationship with management by UGT as well as the 
straightforward resistance of CGT. In the spring 2007, the new general works council 
and management engaged in collective negotiations. Management asked for a 
reduction of the workforce by 1,500 workers. Labor agreed to a reduction of the 
workforce through an early retirement program and voluntary buy-outs. In exchange, 
management agreed to assign the new car model Berlina to the Martorell plant.264 
 
Summary 
During Spain’s transition to democracy, the state, employer associations and labor 
unions agreed on a new employment relations framework. The institutional framework 
legalized labor unions, defined rules for collective bargaining and established a 
proportional labor representation structure, which guaranteed a role  for various labor 
unions. The use of employment relations institutions at SEAT was shaped by the labor 
unions’ ideology. Despite ideological differences between the labor unions, they 
shared a common past of illegal and dangerous union work during the Franco 
dictatorship. At a plant occupation in 1971, for example, Franco’s secret police shot 
and killed one worker. After the transition to democracy, it seemed to be natural for 
the unions, given their previous experiences, to continue fighting for social 
improvements and to use collective bargaining institutions contentiously. During 
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collective bargaining rounds in the 1980s, the unions were quick to threaten or take 
strike action. On the other side, Management had an adversarial ideology and taken a 
hierarchical approach to employment relations in previous decades. At best, 
management grudgingly accepted unions as actors in the workplace and resisted the 
unions’ demands as far as possible. The management of personnel was mostly a local 
matter even after Volkswagen took over SEAT in 1986. The local Spanish 
management, due to ideological and language barriers, was disconnected from 
management debates within the MNCs that envisaged a more constructive relationship 
with labor unions.   
 SEAT slid into the worst economic crisis of its history in 1993. This was a 
watershed moment for employment relations. During the very serious slump of the 
European auto market, SEAT accumulated unprecedented losses in 1993. 
Management at headquarters felt that the losses threatened the whole Volkswagen 
Company and stepped in decisively. Central management dismissed the SEAT 
president and also took charge of labor relations. Management asked for 
unprecedented concessions, including temporary dismissals for thousands of 
employees and the discontinuation of car production in the Zona Franca. The unions 
responded with large-scale strikes and demonstrations in downtown Barcelona. The 
severity of SEAT’s crisis; however, helped management to convince the Catalan labor 
authorities to approve the dismissals against the will of the labor unions. This was a 
devastating loss. Employment relations had reached a low-point.  
 VW’s headquarters continued to oversee labor relations more tightly. 
Management sought to mend the relationship with the unions and attempted to 
influence the ideological orientation of the unions. Management imported a number of 
HR practices from Germany. First, management introduced annual planning rounds in 
1994, in which management and labor commonly discussed and planned the 
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production for the following year. Labor received more company information than 
required by Spanish labor law and had more voice in management decision-making 
processes. The logic of management for such an “open-book” approach to labor 
relations was to educate labor leaders about the economic constraints management 
faced, with the aim of convincing labor leaders to make necessary changes. Second, 
VW management began to use the EWC as an HR instrument to influence unionists at 
VW’s European plant. Management provided the European Union leaders with all 
relevant company data, which included the benchmarking of plants. The data revealed, 
for example, which of the plants were behind in terms productivity. In addition, VW 
management sought to convince the union leaders of the need to stay competitive. The 
urgency of the task, and the importance of the labor leaders in it, was underlined by 
the presence of all top-managers at EWC meetings. Management used the WWC, 
founded in 1998, in a similar way. Third, management voluntarily released a much 
larger number of unionists from factory work than is required by Spanish labor law. 
Management intended to demonstrate its goodwill. Not having to juggle factory and 
union work made a big difference in the working- life of the unionists – and 
management hoped that this would engender a more cooperative attitude. Fourth, the 
Spanish unionists took part in the IG Metall trade union seminars in Germany. 
Management supported this union exchange, hoping that the exposure of the Spanish 
unionists to the more “mature” unionism in Germany would contribute to a 
“professionalization” of union work at SEAT. The above-described identity work by 
management only had a limited affect on employment relations in the 1990s. UGT 
became more open to cooperating with management compared to the 1980s; however, 
the majority of the unions were still in opposition to management initiatives. The 
decreasing number of severe labor-management conflicts in the second half of the 
1990s instead seemed to be related to the positive economic development of SEAT.  
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 Conflicts broke out during the next downturn of the market in the early 2000s. 
The ideological opposition of the majority of the general works councils to 
management initiatives surfaced again. A case in point is the topic working time 
flexibility. Management had implemented far-reaching working time flexibility since 
1993 in Germany. However, the Spanish unions had fiercely resisted certain working 
time flexibility measures such as weekend work and ind ividual working time accounts. 
When management pushed hard for more working time flexibility in the early 2000s, 
some unionists were open to it and regarded it as necessary; however, the majority of 
the general works council stood firm and rejected, once again, more working time 
flexibility. In particular, the older generation of unionists was opposed to these 
measures. They were not willing to give up historical trade union gains. Management 
strongly responded with whipsawing, which at that time was a new forcing strategy. 
VW management had mimicked this strategy from other auto producers in Germany 
and used this instrument for the first time in Spain in 2002. After the Spanish unions 
rejected increased working time flexibility in October 2002, management made good 
on its threat and transferred 10% of the Ibiza production to the VW plant in Bratislava.  
The Ibiza was the flagship car of SEAT and the transfer of production was a 
shock to the unions. This event facilitated ideational changes of the labor unions 
through generational and leadership change. After the production transfer, a conflict 
broke out among the unions and they blamed each other before the upcoming union 
election in 2003. This conflict resulted in the decision of long-term union leaders to 
step down and make way for a younger generation of unionists. For example, the long-
term leader of CCOO, Alfonso Rodriguez, decided not to stand again. He had become 
a union activist at SEAT in 1967; and in the early 1970s, he was imprisoned for illegal 
union work. The new head of CCOO became a unionist who was in his late 30s. At 
UGT, a unionist became the new union president who was in his early 40s. The 
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ideology of this new generation of union leaders was markedly different from the 
previous generation – as it was shaped by different experiences. Most importantly, the 
new generation of unionist did not experience union work during dictatorship. The 
different union mindset manifested itself through a greater openness to cooperate with 
management and with respect to working time flexibility. For the new generation of 
union leaders, this issue was not as ideologically charged as it was before, and so they 
were more pragmatic about it.  
In addition, important changes on the management side took place. Andreas 
Schleef became the new president of SEAT in 2002. He had been an expert in labor 
relations. Schleef had experienced the advantages of integrating labor in decision-
making processes during his tenure in Germany and sought a cooperative relationship 
with the labor unions. The parallel leadership change on the management and labor 
side improved the employment relationship at SEAT markedly. This was evident in 
the deal that management and labor struck during the collective bargaining round in 
2004. Labor agreed to more working flexibility and in turn, management transferred 
the Ibiza production back from Slovakia to Spain. Conflicts continued to exist between 
management and labor, but both sides kept an eye on the competitive position of the 
company while they worked out their differences. The ideological opposition had 
decreased and management and labor shared the causal belief that it was a common 
task to keep the company competitive.   
 Key elements of the Spanish institutional employment relations framework did 
not change since the settlement of the late 1970s. However, the unions and 
management developed different employment relations practices at SEAT as their 
ideas and ideologies changed over time. In the 1980s, it seemed to be natural for 
unionists, who had experienced repression during the dictatorship, to fight 
contentiously for social improvements from within the new institutions. Management 
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also had an adversarial ideology as they were used to govern employment relations 
hierarchically. The ideologies of the collective actors shaped a pattern of contentious, 
low trust employment relationship in the 1980s. In contrast, in the 2000s, union and 
management developed more cooperative employment relations. Management had 
already sought to influence labor’s ideology in the 1990s by giving access to all 
company information and integrating unionists in decision-making processes. 
However, only a generational change of workforce and union leaders and a leadership 
change led to changing union ideologies; a younger generation of unionists was more 
open to cooperating with management. A parallel development was a leadership 
change on the management side and the new president sought to extent the voice and 
influence of unions in management decision-making processes. SEAT’s management 
and labor constructed cooperative employment relations practices within the Spanish 
institutions, focusing jointly on securing jobs and production assignments from the 
headquarters by keeping the company competitive.  
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT GM IN SPAIN 
 
Billboards across Spain stated: “the giant is coming,” and announced boldly the arrival 
of GM in Spain long before the first car rolled off the assembly line in 1982.265 
Multinational companies like GM expected that the regime trans ition from dictatorship 
to democracy would spur economic catch-up effects.266 Less people owned a car in 
Spain compared to other Western European countries and the Spanish auto market had 
a significant growth potential. However, the only way for car producers to carve out a 
chunk of the Spanish auto market was to own production facilities in Spain. High trade 
tariffs impeded car imports from other countries.267 In this context, the largest 
automaker in the world decided to build its first Spanish plant in Figueruelas, a small 
farming town, located about 20 miles outside of Saragossa. Saragossa is conveniently 
located between Madrid and Barcelona, the two largest cities in Spain, both less than 
200 miles away from the GM factory. GM’s building of the Figueruelas plant was the 
largest foreign direct investment in Spain in the 1980s. (Ortiz 1999).  
 
The origins of labor relations at GM  
GM decided to keep some distance to the large industrial centers in Spain. These 
industrial centers had many-experienced unionists who had been shaped by their 
struggle for democracy during the Franco dictatorship. In choosing the sparsely 
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populated State of Aragon, primarily known for farming, GM hoped to avoid having a 
militant work force.268 
The plant in Saragossa was overseen by GM’s European headquarters, which 
was located until 1988 in Rüsselsheim (Germany). The connection with Germany was 
instrumental in building up a trained workforce.269 GM hired Spanish workers 
working in Germany who immigrated in the 1960s and 1970s and took this as an 
opportunity to return to their home country. In addition, due to the lack of a large 
industrial workforce in the State of Aragon, GM hired workers from different parts of 
Spain. The Saragossa plant started producing autos in its first year with 7,317 workers. 
The workforce increased throughout the decade to 9,447 in 1990, while the numbers 
of cars produced increased from 243,000 in 1983 to 395,000 in 1991 (Zubero 2003). 
The dominant unions at GM became UGT and CCOO. GM management was 
aware that it could not avoid a union presence. Before production started, management 
had reached out to the regional UGT giving this union a head start, attempting to 
establish a relationship to the more moderate union. This attempt backfired. CCOO 
won the absolute majority in the 1983/1984 election. The early contacts between 
management and UGT became known to the workforce and gave a boost to CCOO.270 
The third union that took part in the election was USO (Unión Sindical Obrera), a 
small local union, which usually voted together with UGT. The anarchist union CGT 
(then called CNT) had a presence in the company since 1986.271 The characteristic 
policy line of CGT was not to sign any collective agreements with management. The 
different unions were represented in the el comité de empresa (henceforth works 
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council). The main task of the works council was to represent the workforce and to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement.  
In the 1980s, labor unions and management negotiated four collective 
bargaining agreements (1983, 1984, 1985 and 1987). Collective bargaining was at first 
negotiated on an annual basis. The frequent  negotiations were related to the high 
inflation rate, which however, became less of a problem in the second half of the 
1980s and made it possible to sign collective bargaining agreements for longer 
periods. While in the first collective bargaining agreement management and labor 
quickly reached a compromise, the following negotiations were conducted in a much 
more contentious way. Compensation and wage levels at GM were behind the other 
large auto producers and the unions were determined to close this gap. The unions 
mobilized the workforce for each bargaining round and conducted strikes to support 
their demands. The collective bargaining round in 1987 resulted in an intense conflict 
with 14 strike days, several workforce assemblies and many demonstrations in 
Saragossa.272 The mobilizations reflected the fact that the different company unions 
were successful in organizing the workforce.273 The overarching goal to catch up in 
terms of wages with the workers at the other large auto producer’s plants was to some 
extent successful.274 On the other hand, labor relations were less settled than at the 
other car companies, which also provided some opportunities for management. 
Management was able to negotiate the introduction of night shifts in 1988. The GM 
Saragossa plant, therefore, was the first in Europe to introduce night work (Smith 
1990). The unions were persuaded by GM’s promise to create one thousand new jobs.  
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Overall, the economic development of the GM Spain went well. The wave that 
GM rode was the expansion of the Spanish auto market, which more than doubled 
from 522,228 cars sold in 1984 to 1,138,489 cars sold in 1989. GM was able to 
establish a presence in this growing Spanish auto market. In 1989, the market share of 
GM was 14% (Zubero 2003). 
 
Collective negotiations in the 1990s  
The 1992 collective bargaining round took place in the context of the forthcoming 
launch of the Corsa in 1993. Later during the negotiations, it became clear that a more 
severe recession of the auto market was pending. In this context, management aimed 
to limit the increase in labor costs, to introduce teamwork and to gain working time 
flexibility. The negotiation platform, composed of all major unions in the company 
(UGT, CCOO, CGT, USO, and Accumagne) started with high demands in various 
aspects including higher wages, longer vacations and longer work breaks.275 The 
unions had discussed the demands of the negotiation platform with the workforce in a 
general assembly, in which about 700 workers took part.  
Collective bargaining started in January 1992. In the first couple of negotiation 
rounds, it became clear that two issues would be difficult to resolve.276 First, GM 
intended to introduce teamwork at its Saragossa plant. GM had started to implement 
lean production at other plants in Europe. Second, management sought to increase 
working time flexibility. Management intended to extend the regular working week to 
Saturdays for the about 400 maintenance workers and to increase the number of 
annual shifts for stamping production. 
                                                 
275 Works council: Plataforma unitaria. VI Convenio Colectivo. Works council document. January 20, 
1992.  
276 CGT: 6. Convenio colectivo - Con las cosas claras. Union leaflet. No date.  
  
 
175 
The unions were not sure what to do with the issue of teamwork. The largest 
unions UGT and CCOO remained open to discuss teamwork with the company, while 
CGT rejected it outright. UGT and CCOO suggested a small pilot study in the 
company to explore the consequences for the workforce (Ortiz 1999). Management 
realized that having teamwork as part of the negotiations would complicate the 
negotiations and agreed to postpone further discussions until after the collective 
bargaining round.  
A central contention remained the proposed working time flexibility for 
maintenance workers and stamping production including Saturday work.277 The 
negotiation of this issue became more complicated through the grass-roots 
mobilization of the maintenance workers that took place to some extent without the 
approval of the unions.278 In leaflets, the maintenance workers made it clear that they 
were in favor of the existing working hours. In order to get a say in the negotiation 
process, the maintenance workers pushed for a workforce assembly and collected 
more than 800 signatures from workers who supported this proposal. The works 
council organized this meeting with about 500 of the affected workers. In the 
assembly, UGT representatives sought to mediate between the claims of management 
and protesting workers, by suggesting that interested workers could work voluntarily 
at the weekends. However, this was opposed by the majority of the assembly and the 
position was taken to keep the existing working schedule. All the unions felt obliged 
to adopt this as their position for the negotiations with management.  
In the following negotiations, management and labor made little progress. 
Management grew impatient and sought to convince the workforce of the significance 
of reaching an agreement. In the negotiation round on April 28, management pushed 
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for an agreement and presented its final offer. The offer included some improvements. 
Management offered to employ two hundred temporary workers permanently. 
However, management insisted on the working time changes for maintenance and 
stamping. The unions valued the offer to permanently employ the temporary workers, 
but rejected the package as a whole, as being insufficient. On May 12, the negotiation 
platform made a counter-offer, which was rejected by management. From this point 
on, the collective bargaining conflict escalated.279 
The labor unions rallied their members for support at the Labor Day parade on 
May 1, 1992. On May 27, the first strike action followed and the unions stopped 
production for four hours. Shortly afterwards, the works council called a workforce 
assembly and proposed to the workers to either conform strike action or to agree to the 
bargaining offer by management.280 Before the vote, management tried to influence 
the workforce by sending a personal letter to each GM worker. However, the workers 
rejected the company offer and 85% supported the proposed strike action. From mid-
June until July, the workforce stopped working each Wednesday for two hours in each 
of the three shifts. During the strike action, the workforce of each shift assembled and 
discussed the progress of the negotiations.281 
On the other hand, management used different forcing strategies. As one of the 
biggest companies, GM tried to use its political influence and sought to involve 
politicians of the State of Aragon, whose government is located in Saragossa. On June 
15, the minister of economics, trade and tourism called management and labor to 
separate meetings. Without clearly taking sides, the minister of economics expressed 
his concerns about the situation and urged both parties to find a compromise. In July, 
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management adopted measures that were more drastic and dismissed two workers 
involved in the protest against the company for sabotaging production. At this point, 
the relationship between management and labor was tense and the negotiations 
reached a complete impasse. The summer vacation began in early August. The 
negotiations had already taken more than six months. Never had it taken so long to 
reach an agreement at GM Spain.  
The three-week company summer break helped to calm down the situation. 
Both sides attempted to resume negotiations in good faith. Management announced 
that the re-admission of the two dismissed workers was possible, while the unions 
cancelled the scheduled strike action. 282 After the summer break, it became more 
apparent that the economic recession of the Spanish auto market (and the European 
auto market) would be more serious than they had previously assumed. The new 
strategic consideration by the works council was to reach an agreement as soon as 
possible before the negative impact of the coming recession would hit the company 
and weaken the negotiation position of the unions.283 
An outside mediator, the labor director of the State Aragon, to which labor and 
management voluntarily agreed, helped to find a solution. 284 Both sides agreed to the 
mediator’s proposal that linked the permanent employment of the 700 temporary 
workers to the Saturday shifts for stamping. The extension of the working week to 
Saturdays for a section of the production workers was a substantial gain for 
management. On the other hand, labor was able to limit the duration of the collective 
bargaining agreement to two years and win wage increases of 7.5% in 1992 and 6.5% 
in 1993. Shortly afterwards, on September 7, 1992, the collective bargaining 
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agreement was put to the vote by the workforce. 65.4% of workers accepted the 
collective bargaining agreement.285 
In 1993, the Spanish auto market shrunk by more than 23%, marking the worst 
recession in democratic Spain. Compared to the other car companies, the effect on GM 
was modest. GM was able to continue to make profits and did not have to shed 
workers, as SEAT did, in order to cope with the crisis. One reason was that at the 
beginning of the crisis in January 1993, the Saragossa plant started the production of a 
new car model, the Corsa, which was well received by consumers.286 
Until 1999, the economic development of GM was mostly positive. The plant 
was affected to some extent by the previous recession of the European and Spanish 
auto markets; however, at GM there was no major crisis. Car production rose from 
340,000 in 1993 to 458,000 in 1998 resulting in new record earnings of 41.6 million 
pesetas. The positive results made it possible for the unions to improve wages and 
social benefits for the workers, while the employment levels remained stable (above 
9,000 employees) throughout the 1990s.  
Labor relations steered into more troubled waters in 1999. Management 
anticipated a slump in the European market. In conversation with the works council, 
management sought to prepare the unions for declining production in the plant and the 
need for a common response.287 As a first step, management suggested converting 
individual vacation days into collective holidays, to which the unions agreed. Later in 
April 1999, when the market situation deteriorated further, management announced 
the filing of an employment regulation with the labor director of the state Aragon and 
the intention to suspend production for the whole workforce for 18 days in 1999. 
According to Spanish labor law, employers had to file an employment regulation, 
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when they wanted to dismiss workers permanently or suspend employment for a 
limited period. In both cases, the employer had to give a specific reason, e.g. serious 
economic problems, and then the labor director could either approve or reject the 
petition of the employer. 
The unions reacted with outrage against the management plan. The union had a 
number of reasons why they opposed the employment regulation. The economic 
scenario laid out by management did not make sense for the unions in the context of 
the record earnings and production of 1998.288 Even in the event of a small downturn, 
it seemed to be inappropriate that a big company such as GM would ask the state for 
wage subsidies. The unions were also concerned that this could tarnish the brand’s 
public image.  
The management sought to soften the union opposition to the employment 
regulation, by offering to pay the difference between regular wages and 
unemployment insurance benefits so that workers would not lose any money. In the 
negotiations, the unions won even more concessions by management and workers 
older than 55 were excluded from the employment regulation.289 For the unions, it was 
a concern that social security contribution for the pension would not be paid and could 
affect the pension level. For management, economic problems already loomed over 
the company. Their forecast proved to be right when the combination of decreasing 
demand and installed overcapacities of GM Europe began to cause economic 
problems. Moreover, it made sense to them to skim wage subsidies by the state as they 
had done in Germany and Portugal when GM applied for short working time and the 
respective national unemployment insurance payed for the workers’ wages.290 
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The unions responded by organizing two large demonstrations. On May 6, 
about 2,000 workers protested in front of the State Labor Office. It was one of the few 
annual rainy days in Saragossa and it was raining heavily during the demonstration. 291 
Furthermore, the unions protested on May 1, Labor Day, and organized some minor 
work stoppages in the company. However, the protests were in vain and the labor 
director of the State Aragon approved the employment regulation for 18 working days 
in 1999. 
The employment regulation of 1999 did cause some turmoil. However, the 
labor conflict was minor compared to the conflicts at Ford and SEAT during the 
1990s. Ultimately, management suspended production only for eight of the 18 days. 
During these eight days, workers could not pay their social security contribution, 
which would later result in a minor pension deduction. Apart from this, the 
employment regulation resulted in ‘a paid vacation for the workers’, as one manager 
put it in an interview. 292 
 
The emergence of a transnational dimension to collective negotiations 
In the 1990s, collective negotiations at GM in Spain barely had a transnational 
dimension. Local management and local unions largely determined the outcomes of 
collective negotiations. The European GM management had not included the 
Saragossa plant in the transnational whipsawing rounds in 1993/1994 and 1997/1998 
(cf. the chapter on Opel in Germany). However, the Spanish representatives had been 
participating in the meetings of the EWC after its foundation in 1996 and developed 
personal ties with other European colleagues.293 The transnational worker cooperation 
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and the transnational whipsawing by GM Europe had not significantly affected 
collective negotiations up to early 2000s. This changed in the following decade.  
A key step forward in the union cooperation in the EWC was the common 
solidarity action for the plant in Luton, United Kingdom, in 2001. GM Europe had 
announced its intention to close the Luton plant. The EWC got involved in the 
negotiations and organized a European Action Day, in which more than 40,000 
workers across Europe participated.294 The unions at the Saragossa plant took part in 
the action and organized short assemblies in every work shift.295 The European Action 
Day supported the collective negotiations between GM Europe and the EWC, which 
resulted in the first transnational collective agreement at GM. The EWC could not 
prevent the plant closure but avoided forced redundancies and the workers of the 
Luton plant were transferred to a close by truck plant (Greer & Hauptmeier 2008a).  
GM Europe slid into a severe economic crisis, which also put pressure on labor 
relations at the Saragossa plant.296 Between 1999 and 2004, GM made losses in every 
single year. One crucial reason were the overcapacities of the European auto market. 
The large multinational auto producer had installed more capacities to produce than 
they could sell. One hope of the large auto producers was to overcome the sluggish 
Western European auto markets through expanding into Eastern Europe. However, the 
demand in the Eastern Europe developed at a slower pace than anticipated. GM Spain 
contributed to the losses of GM Europe in 2000 and 2001. A problem for the 
Saragossa plant was that the Corsa, the main product of the plant, was not going 
well.297 The plant was only running at 80% of its capacity. As a result, the plant 
stopped the night shift.   
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In response to the crisis, GM Europe tightened its oversight and control of 
labor relations and collective negotiations in the different countries. On a number of 
occasions, European management got directly involved in local negotiations. Rick 
Wagoner, the president of GM, announced a worldwide restructuring of GM at a press 
conference in Detroit on December 12, 2000.298 He argued that it was necessary to 
reduce the workforce by 15,000 in the USA and by 5,000 in the European Union.  
This was the difficult economic context of the collective bargaining round that 
started in early 2001. UGT and CCOO were aware of the difficult economic situation 
and the main objective was to secure employment. The demands of the unions during 
this collective bargaining round were otherwise quite modest.299 Until March 2001, the 
negotiation took its usual course and the works council and management exchanged 
their positions.300 
The dynamic of the negotiations changed completely when it became public 
knowledge that the European headquarters was looking for subsidies for the 
production of the Meriva. Three plants were under discussion: Gliwice (Poland), 
Eisenach (Germany) and Saragossa. Parallel to the collective bargaining round, GM 
Europe had negotiated with the government of Aragon about subsidies for the new 
investment. Local management did not use the assignment of the Meriva as an 
argument in the collective negotiations. The unions criticized the fact that they were 
not better informed about the allocation process.  
A “ghost” was hovering over the collective bargaining negotiations as union 
leaflets put the appearance of the Meriva301. On the one hand, the unions criticized the 
poor information they had received about the Meriva. On the other, the possibility of 
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getting a second car model to Saragossa fired the imagination of the unions. Until 
March 2000, Saragossa had usually produced two cars. The plant had first produced 
the Corsa and the Kadett and later the Corsa and Tigra.302 When the Tigra was taken 
away from the plant in March 2000 and sales plummeted, the economic problems of 
the plant had begun, with all its implications for labor relations. “The Meriva is the 
way out,” summarized the union opinion in a leaflet.303 
It was obvious that the unions were inclined to make concessions in order to 
increase the chances that the Meriva was produced in Saragossa. However, a main 
objective remained to keep employment secure and avoid some of the most far-
reaching demands by management. Management and labor reached an agreement in 
May and the workforce confirmed the collective bargaining agreement by ballot vote 
on May 23. The gains of the unions were low compared to the collective bargaining 
outcomes of the 1990s and the wage increase was not secured through a revision 
clause.304 Previously, the state government in Aragon had reached an agreement about 
the subsidies for the new investment and production of the Meriva. It seemed that both 
the labor agreement and the subsidies, paved the way for the Meriva. GM Europe 
announced the location decision in favor of the Saragossa plant on June 7.  
Although the Meriva was a very important decision for the Saragossa plant, 
this was not going to calm the situation at GM. GM Europe was in the middle of a 
serious economic crisis and the Saragossa plant was part of it. In August 2001, it 
became public knowledge that GM was planning a major restructuring program. GM 
Europe had not made any official statements yet, however, the Financial Times 
reported that GM Europe was going to close down one of its plants and the Saragossa 
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and Antwerp plants were likely candidates. 305 The plant was closed and the workforce 
on summer vacation, however, the notification of a possible plant closure dropped like 
a bombshell on Saragossa. The media relentlessly called union leaders who stated that 
they had no such information and that they were certain that the Saragossa plant would 
not be affected.306 This did little to disperse the rumor. The workforce in Saragossa 
anxiously waited for a press conference by GM Europe scheduled for August 10. In 
the press conference, Förster, the new GM European Opel president, presented a 
planned restructuring program dubbed Olympia. GM intended to eliminate its 
overcapacities in Europe. The capacities of the ten European assembly plants were 
supposed be reduced by 15% corresponding to about 350,000 cars. Management 
considered closing either a plant or reducing capacities across Europe.307 
On August 15, the EWC met to discuss the situation and coordinate a strategy.  
In the discussion, it was agreed to pursue two goals. Under any circumstances, the 
EWC wanted to avoid a plant closure or forced redundancies. Some worker 
representatives demanded a common solution. Since the EWC did not question the 
need for a restructuring program, a common solution could only mean to distribute the 
concessions across the plants or “to share the pain” as one works council put it 
succinctly. At the end of the meeting, the representatives of the EWC promised each 
other to commonly resist a plant closure in Europe and coordinate a transnational 
response if necessary. 308  
The collective negotiations between the European management and the EWC 
quickly produced a result. Both sides signed the Olympia framework agreement, in 
which management agreed to exclude plant closure and forced redundancies as 
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options, and in turn, the union representatives accepted the goal of reducing 
overcapacities in Europe by 350,000.309 The following local negotiations were 
supposed to take place within the framework agreement.  
Negotiating a restructuring program with the EWC and seeking a consensus 
with labor representatives at European level was a new management strategy. 310 It 
went beyond the previous Luton and the Fiat joint-venture collective agreements, 
because it affected all European plants. If European Works Councillors were 
committed to the changes, so the consideration by management, this could help to 
avoid local labor protest. On the other hand, labor was interested – besides the 
aforementioned goals – in establishing the EWC as a worker representative body that 
would conduct collective bargaining, and thus enhance transnational options.  
Following the Olympia program, European and local management worked out 
a specific proposal for the Saragossa plant. Local management presented this proposal 
to the works council in early October, 2001.311 The key element was to increase 
working flexibility and to outsource 650 workers including 450 workers who produced 
axles.312 The unions were prepared to make concessions; however, they wanted to 
avoid the outsourcing and a division of the workforce, as they called it. The works 
council tried to broaden the range of possible ways to fulfill the Olympia program and 
suggested an early retirement program. Management and labor already had raised this 
possibility in the last collective bargaining round without reaching an agreement. Up 
to this point, early retirement had not been an issue for the Saragossa plant, because 
the plant and workforce was comparatively young. Management and labor agreed to a 
voluntary early retirement scheme for workers aged 60 or older. Later, about 400 
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workers opted voluntarily for this option, while at the same time a smaller number of 
apprentices entered the workforce, contributing to a renovation of the workforce.  
Finding a solution for the outsourcing of production proved more difficult, but 
a compromise was found that allowed both sides to save face. Production was 
supposed to be outsourced as suggested by management; however, the 650 workers 
remained covered by the GM collective bargaining agreement between 2002 and 2006. 
In this transition period, the workers could either choose to be transferred back to the 
main GM plant as positions opened up or opt to stay in the newly created company. 313 
To some extent, both sides accomplished their goals. While management could 
outsource production, the works council reached that the outsourced workers remained 
covered by GM’s collective bargaining agreement.  
The negotiations on the topic of working flexibility caused a row between the 
largest union UGT and CCOO. Management sought to extend Saturday work shifts if 
necessary and introduce a “working time corridor” of 15 working days.314 CCOO was 
not willing to sacrifice 15 days of vacation, and insisted that the workers would need 
their right to the full annual vacation. UGT regarded working time flexibility as 
necessary since GM Spain was in an economically difficult situation. UGT voted 
together with USO for the agreement in the works council, which represented the 
majority of votes because CCOO was absent from the meeting. The collective 
agreement reached in January 2002, was not put to a vote of the workforce.315 
Union elections were due to be held in October 2002. CGT and OSTA won the 
elections. CGT won one seat and now had seven votes in the thirty-eight union 
representatives strong works council. OSTA took part in company elections for the 
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first time and jumped to five seats. Both unions based their election campaign on the 
opposition to the Olympia restructuring agreement. UGT lost two seats in the elections 
and finished with 13 seats, while CCOO lost one seat and their faction in the works 
council was 12 representatives strong. 316 
GM Spain’s economic situation had slightly improved. While the company had 
made losses in three consecutive years between 2000 and 2002, the company returned 
to profits in 2003, earning 55 million euros. The Saragossa plant was running at full 
capacity and produced a record of 460,000 cars. In contrast to GM Spain, GM Europe 
continued to make losses in 2003 and 2004.317 
Encouraged by the improved economic situation in Spain, the unions aimed for 
wage gains in the collective bargaing round in 2004, which started in January 2004. 
UGT suggested the inflation rate plus a one percent wage increase for each year of the 
duration of the collective bargaining agreement.318 On the other side, management 
intended to limit the increase in labor costs and to continue to increase working time 
flexibility. During the negotiations, management argued that the plant in Spain was 
threatened by competition from Eastern Europe and implied that wage restraints were 
the only way to stay competitive. The unions hung on in the negotiations and hoped 
that the improved economic situation would help to support their demands. However, 
sales fell in the first quarter of 2004; it became likely that GM Spain would slip into 
the red again. Finally, unions and management agreed to extend the duration of the 
collective bargaining agreement from three to four years. The agreed wage increases 
were modest. Only in the first year, the wages increase would be by two percent, while 
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in the following three years the wages would only be adjusted to the cost-of- living.319 
Management and the works council signed the collective bargaining agreement on 
June 4. The unions did not put the collective bargaining agreement to a vote of the 
workforce.320 
After the collective bargaining agreement in 2004, GM Europe planned 
another restructuring program for Europe. The previous restructuring program, 
Olympia, was very substantial in terms of reducing employment and overcapacities, 
however, it did not result in improved economic performance. GM Europe was still 
losing money. Because of the poor economic performance, GM world headquarters in 
Detroit decided on a reshuffle of the top executive management in Europe in the 
summer of 2004. Fritz Henderson became the new president of the European branch 
and his task was to get GM’s ailing European division back to profitability. After five 
years of consecutive losses in Europe and parallel excessive losses in the United 
States, there was a sense of urgency. Under Henderson’s new leadership, European 
management planned reforms in different areas such as product development and 
marketing. Another target was to substantially bring down labor costs and reduce 
overcapacities; management began to work out a restructuring program, which proved 
to be more far-reaching than the Olympia program.  
GM Europe announced the restructuring program on October 14.321 GM 
planned to reduce the European workforce by 12,000. The brunt of the restructuring 
was supposed to take place in Germany, where GM intended to shed 10,000 jobs and 
reduce the German workforce by one-third. The other 2,000 job cuts were distributed 
across the other European plants. The Saragossa plant was supposed to be affected 
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with 600 job cuts.322 Notice of the restructuring program caused major labor protests 
in Germany; e.g. workers at the Bochum plant responded spontaneously with a wildcat 
strike (cf. chapter on Opel in Germany).  
Nevertheless, the message of 600 job losses at the biggest company in the State 
of Aragon was important news and dominated the public discourse immediately. This 
was the biggest job loss in the history of the plant.323 In a statement to the press, the 
union leadership sought to calm the situation and expressed the view that a solution 
could be found in negotiations with management. They demanded no forced 
redundancies or plant closure and instead suggested another European collective 
agreement negotiated by the EWC.324 
For October 19, the unions announced workforce assemblies for the various 
shifts.325 These workforce assemblies were part of another European Action Day, 
which was a protest against GM’s European restructuring program. In total, about 
40,000 workers took part in the labor protest at GM plants across Europe. The central 
demand of the European Action Day was the avoidance of plant closures and forced 
redundancies. The Spanish works council announced as well that it would consider 
strike action if management acted unilaterally and rejected the demands. 
Official negotiations between management and labor about a local 
restructuring agreement began in November. Although both sides preferred a 
negotiated solution, management filed for the planned dismissals with the state labor 
director.326 This employment regulation was a bold move by management. It was not 
clear if the labor director would approve it. This put pressure on labor representatives 
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to find a negotiated solution. Surprisingly, the response of the works council was 
modest. Union leaders stated that everybody should assume that a negotiated solution 
would be found, but they restrained form strike action.  
Meanwhile the anarchist union CGT, the third largest union in the company, 
reacted with outrage against the dismissals. They argued that it was unacceptable that 
the workers should be responsible for management failures. They organized one day 
work stoppages in the company, in which about 200 of their members participated. In 
addition, the CGT organized a small demonstration in Saragossa downtown. 327 
Parallel to the negotiations in Spain and other European countries, the EWC 
met with the management of GM Europe. The EWC sought to get management to 
agree to another European Framework Agreement but management was not very eager 
doing this. Finally, the European management agreed for two reasons. They saw that 
the local negotiations for the restructuring were already well underway in several 
countries such as Germany and Spain. In addition, the German labor representatives 
had announced that they would not sign a local agreement without a European 
Framework Agreement. EWC and European management reached a collective 
agreement on December 7, 2004.328 Management agreed to exclude forced 
redundancies and plant closures from the agenda of the European restructuring 
program, while the EWC agreed with the goal to reduce labor costs by 600 million 
Euros annually and to participate in the implementation of the restructuring program.  
In Spain, the local negotiations on the reduction of the workforce focused on 
three voluntary measures: voluntary buy-outs, early retirement and an invalidity 
program. The unions rejected the first proposal by management. They criticized that 
the level of the suggested compensation was too low. Management included some 
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improvements in their final proposal presented on December 9.329 The unions accepted 
this final proposal. According to the agreement, 451 of the 618 workers left the 
company based on the early retirement scheme and the voluntary buyout scheme. The 
compensation was between 12 and 32 months wages, depending on age and seniority. 
The remaining number of workers were supposed to leave based on the invalidity 
scheme. Management and labor reached a deal on December 13, only three days 
before the state labor director would have made a decision on the dismissals 
unilaterally.330 
GM had started formal bidding processes for the allocation of new car 
production in 2003.331 In 2005, the Saragossa plant became first involved in such a 
bidding contest. Only one day after the summer vacation at the end  of August, the 
European management announced a visit for the following day and requested a 
meeting with the works council. In this meeting, the GM managers announced a 
bidding process for the new Meriva between the Saragossa and the Gliwice plant, 
Poland.332 The bidding process was announced in Poland on the very same day. Both 
plants were supposed to submit a tender to the European headquarters for the 
production of the new Meriva. In practice, this meant that local management and labor 
unions were supposed to work out a collective agreement that lowered labor costs.  
The different unions’ responses varied. They felt threatened by the whipsawing 
processes. In an interview with a local newspaper, Fernando Bolea, the president of 
the works council, argued that the survival of the plant was threatened if the Meriva 
would not be produced in Saragossa.333 In meetings with their members, the various 
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unions discussed the situation. The consensus was that the bidding process was not 
just a bluff by management, and the union members regarded it as a real option that 
the product could be sourced to the Gliwice plant in Poland.334 That is why UGT, 
CCOO and OSTA decided to enter into negotiations with management, while CGT, as 
usual, opposed this.  
In the following weeks, unions and management met every two or three days. 
Participants described the atmosphere in the negotiations as tense and sometimes 
hostile.335 The most important issues for the unions were not to undercut the 2004 
collective bargaining agreement. Management was interested in more working time 
flexibility and the reduction of social benefits. On September 14, management made 
its first offer just as it would do at a regular collective bargaining meeting. The unions 
rejected the proposal unanimously. This was just three days before the deadline of the 
bidding process set up by the European headquarters. In order to avoid the failure of 
the negotiations, local management claimed “technical difficulties” and asked for a 
two weeks extension, which GM Europe granted.336 
The negotiations continued. UGT, the largest union, sought to find a 
compromise with management, while CCOO and OSTA were more reluctant, partly 
because of rank and file opposition. On September 28, management tabled its final 
proposal. The works council with the majority of CCOO, OSTA and CGT 
representatives rejected the management proposal. The negotiations had failed. Local 
management was scheduled to present the tender of the Saragossa plant in Zürich on 
October 3.  
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In this situation, the EWC got involved in the process and a EWC meeting took 
place.337 The meeting resulted in an argument between the Spanish and the Polish 
representatives. Fernando Bolea (UGT) argued that sourcing the Meriva to the Polish 
plant would result in about 3,000 dismissals in Saragossa, while the Polish 
representative argued that the Gliwice plant would also need the additional production 
since unemployment in the region was very high. The majority of the EWC members 
took sides with the Spanish representatives. The crucial argument  was that the 
retention of existing jobs was more important than the creation of new jobs.338 After 
the meeting, the EWC intervened in Zürich and made the case for reopening the 
bidding process again, to which the European management shortly afterwards agreed 
to do.  
Back in Saragossa, management and labor agreed to an outside mediator to 
overcome the impasse of the negotiations. The economic minister of the State of 
Aragon had offered to mediate. His participation reflected a broader concern of key 
political actors in Aragon. The regional media covered the competition between 
Gliwice and Saragossa closely. Local media engaged in the “benchmarking” of the 
two plants and compared in detail data on labor costs, production and necessary 
investments at the two plants for the new production. 339 It was likely that the data was 
provided by management. 
The economic minister of Aragon sought to find a compromise between 
management and labor. The economics minister presented his first proposal on 
October 9, which was close to the management proposals from the previous months. 
The unions discussed the proposal with their members, which all unions rejected 
except UGT. As a response to the continuing resistance of the majority of the unions, 
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management announced that they would stop production in December for three days. 
Management filed this employment regulation with the state labor director. The unions 
responded with large-scale demonstrations in Saragossa.340 
In this moment, when the conflict seemed to escalate, the economic minister of 
Aragon tabled his next compromise. Both sides agreed to his proposal. The unions 
achieved that the current collective bargaining agreement was not changed and that 
management had to withdraw the employment regulation. On the other hand, many of 
the initial demands of management were included in the proposal. Management was 
able to increase working time flexibility substantially. 341 
The local labor agreement was passed to GM’s European headquarters as part 
of the tender of the Saragossa plant for the new Meriva. The European management 
accepted the bid although several deadlines had been breached. In the end, European 
management waited for the concessions in Saragossa as long as it was necessary. On 
February 15 2006, the president of GM Europe announced that the Saragossa plant 
was going to produce the new Meriva in 2009.  
In April 2006, Spanish labor representatives met with the EWC. In the 
meeting, the worker representative expressed concerns that GM Europe extended its 
presence in eastern Europe at the expense of the Western European plants. GM had 
recently bought a production facility of Fiat342 close to Warsaw, Poland, a 40% stake 
of a plant in the Ukraine and a large property for the building of a new plant in an 
export-processing zone close to St. Petersburg, Russia. The worker representatives 
criticized the fact that GM Europe extended production in eastern Europe while using 
overcapacities as an argument to suspend production shifts in Ellesmere Port (Great 
Britain), Antwerp (Belgium) and Bochum (Germany). Moreover, the European 
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management considered the closure of the Azambuja plant in Portugal. 343 At the EWC 
meeting, the worker representatives agreed to resist the shift of production from 
Western to Eastern Europe and promised each other to take common action in the 
event of the threat of a plant closure.  
In the following weeks, the plans by the European management to close down 
the Azambuja plant became more specific. Management argued that the Portuguese 
plant was not productive enough, having a 500 euros cost disadvantage per vehicle 
compared to other GM locations in Europe. On June 1, the EWC discussed the 
situation. The cost argument did not seem valid to the worker representatives 
considering that the Portuguese plant had the lowest labor costs in Europe. For them 
the planned plant closure fitted into the pattern of shifting production from Western to 
Eastern Europe.344 The labor representatives agreed that this needed a forceful and 
common response by the EWC. The EWC announced work stoppages across Europe 
for mid-June 2006.  
Worker solidarity with the Azambuja plant was a real test case for the EWC. 
European management planned to transfer the production of the Combo from the 
Azambuja plant to Saragossa. Thus, the Saragossa plant was the direct beneficiary of 
the plant closure in Portugal. This was clearly in the economic interest of the workers 
in Saragossa. Nevertheless, the worker representatives and the workforce supported 
the work stoppages of the EWC in favor of Azambuja.345 Considering the continuous 
restructuring of the Saragossa plant in previous years, this was undoubtedly 
remarkable. A number of factors contributed to the solidarity action by the workers in 
the Saragossa plant. The low turnover of key personnel in the EWC such as Fernando 
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Bolea and Klaus Franz and the regular coordination of the EWC in times of crisis 
engendered trust between the worker’s representatives. In addition, the Spanish unions 
were grateful about the support by the EWC during the bidding process over the 
Meriva.346 
The protest action against the plant closure in Portugal began with a four-hour 
work stoppage in the late shift in Kaiserslautern (Germany) on June 19, 2006. The 
following day proved to be the main protest day with a two-hour work stoppage in 
each shift in Saragossa, a three-hour work stoppage in Rüsselsheim (Germany)347 and 
a six-hour work stoppage in Azambuja.348 According to statements by the EWC, the 
work stoppages resulted in the loss of 200 produced cars in Rüsselsheim, 550 cars in 
Saragossa and 100 cars in Azambuja. In the following days, other European plants 
joined the protest such as those in Aspern, Austria, Swentgotthard, Hungary, 
Strasbourg, France, and Bialsko-Biala, Poland. One of the most significant work 
stoppages took place in Ellesmere Port, United Kingdom.349 Work assemblies at all 
three shifts on June 28 and walkouts at the supplier parks in the previous days resulted 
in the loss of 1,800 cars. On June 29, the Azambuja workers struck for 24-hours and 
organized a “March to Lisbon” with their families to the Portuguese parliament. 
Meanwhile, the Portuguese government threatened to reclaim the subsidies paid for 
the GM investments.  
The protests had some effect. GM Europe suspended the plant closure during 
the summer and engaged in negotiations with the union in Azambuja. However, GM 
Europe only postponed the plant closure and finally shut it down in December 2006. 
GM Europe promised the Portuguese government that they would find a fair 
                                                 
346 Union interview. UGT. April 20, 2006.  
347 I took part in this protest as a participant observer.  
348 UGT: La línea de montaje de GM España parara hoy dos horas por turno. Union document. June 20, 
2006.  
349 EMF: EEF GM News Ticker. Webpage. June 29, 2006.  
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compromise regarding the subsidies. The production of the Combo started in 
Saragossa in 2007.  
 
Summary  
GM Spain started production at the end of Spain’s transition to democracy. Having 
entered Spain in the 1980s, GM had the advantage that the new plant in Saragossa 
lacked a history of intense and violent labor relations, which had happened at many 
other companies during the transition period and Franco dictatorship. At GM Spain, 
management and labor developed employment relations based on the new Spanish 
employment relations institutions, which had been negotiated between government, 
employer associations and labor unions at the end of the 1970s.  
 GM management sought to influence the ideology of the workforce before the 
start of production. Management reached out to UGT, the more moderate of the two 
largest Spanish unions, trying to give this union a head start. Management hoped that a 
strong UGT presence would diminish the role of CCOO and CGT. This attempt by 
management backfired. The cooperation between management and UGT became later 
known to the workforce and CCOO won the absolute majority in the first works 
council election. The anarchist union CGT also established a presence in the works 
councils. Contentious employment relations emerged at GM Spain in the 1980s and 
labor pushed for higher wages and social benefits; backing up the demands with strike 
action if necessary. However, as labor relations were not yet settled, this also gave 
management opportunities to explore new strategies. Management and labor agreed 
upon night shifts in 1988, which made Saragossa the first plant with round the clock 
production in Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s, a widespread belief of management and 
labor unions was that auto production was physically and technically too demanding 
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for continuous production. Following the Saragossa example, night shift production 
spread to other European plants during the late 1980s and 1990s.  
 The economic context began to change in the mid 1980s. Spain had joined the 
European Union in 1986, which opened up the Spanish auto market to foreign 
competitors. In the 1990s, the large auto companies built production capacities in 
Eastern Europe. The new plants in Europe had lower labor costs than those in Spain. 
However, the economic development of GM Spain continued to be positive until the 
late 1990s. Neither was the plant strongly affected by the slump of the European auto 
market in 1993. A key reason was that the Corsa, one of GM’s best selling cars in 
Europe, was produced in Saragossa. The positive economic results helped to settle 
employment relations in the 1990s. The collective bargaining round in 1992 was 
contentious, but there were no major strikes in the following collective bargaining 
rounds in the 1990s. GM Spain’s positive economic development allowed 
management to pay for social benefits and wages.  
 The labor representatives from UGT and CCOO took part in the founding of 
GM Europe’s EWC in 1996. The ensuing debates in the EWC were shaped by the 
experiences of the unionists in Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium. GM 
management had whipsawed various European plants and extracted concessions from 
labor in the context of new production assignment. The European works councilors 
began to formulate transnational strategies and ideas. A key argument was that labor 
could not counter transnational whipsawing through national strategies; to stop the 
downward pressure on wages and social benefits it would require transnational labor 
responses. In a number of discussions, formally and informally, the other European 
works councilors sought to convince the Spanish representatives of the benefits of 
transnational union strategies. The leadership of the EWC also integrated the Spanish 
representatives by giving them one seat on the EWC steering committee in 1999, 
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which coordinated the transnational work between the EWC meetings. The Spanish 
representatives built personal ties to other European works councilors, and based on 
this, they were open to the new transnational ideas. Transnational ideas turned into 
transnational practices in the early 2000s. The EWC negotiated with management a 
transnational collective agreement on the joint-venture with Fiat. Later that year, 
management announced the closure of the Luton plant in the UK. The EWC organized 
a European Action Day in support of the British workers, in which more than 40,000 
workers across Europe, including the Spanish workers, took part. This led to another 
European collective agreement, which avoided forced redundancies at the Luton plant. 
 The Spanish representatives took part in the first transnational action of the 
EWC in the early 2000s; however, the transnational ideas and strategies within the 
EWC did not fully overlap with the experiences of the Spanish unions. This changed 
in 2001. There was uncertainty during the collective bargaining round if the European 
headquarters would assign the urgently needed second car to the Saragossa plant, 
which put pressure on labor during the collective bargaining round. In addition, in 
August 2001, GM Europe planned another restructuring program and rumors appeared 
about another plant closure in Europe. Saragossa was a possible target.  
 Following the rumors of a possible plant closure, the EWC sought to find a 
solution and engaged in negotiations with management. The European works 
councilors did not question GM’s economic problems. In discussions in the EWC, 
they unionists developed the idea of “sharing the pain.” Labor representatives planned 
to contribute equally to labor concessions, in order to avoid another plant closure in 
Europe. Key HR managers also explored new transnational practices and believed that 
finding common ground with the European works councils could make it easier to 
implement a restructuring program and help avoiding labor conflicts at the local level. 
The European restructuring agreement negotiated between management and EWC was 
  
 
200 
called Olympia, which reduced labor costs and overcapacities of GM Europe. The 
Spanish representatives took part in the negotiations and labor at Saragossa bore their 
part of the “pain.” The main Spanish labor unions, UGT and CCOO, increasingly 
shared the ideology with the EWC that transnational strategies were helpful to avoid 
plant closures and forced redundancies at GM plants in Europe.  
 GM Spain’s economic situation improved in 2003, but GM Europe continued 
to make losses. In 2003, European management refined transnational whipsawing 
practices and announced that future production allocation in Europe would be based 
on a formal bidding process. Each plant was supposed to hand in a tender and the 
plants with the highest productivity or greatest labor concessions would win the tender 
and receive new production. The EWC sought to coordinate a common position 
between the plants during bidding processes; the goal was to negotiate a fair 
distribution of production across plants with European management, which would 
allow all plants to survive.  
In 2005, the Spanish plant was for the first time involved in a formal bidding 
process. Management offered the Meriva production to the Saragossa plant and to the 
Gliwice plant in Poland. A conflict of interest ensued between the Spanish and the 
Polish unionists and an argument erupted during a EWC meeting. The assignment of 
the Meriva would have created new jobs in Poland, while the assignment to the 
Spanish plants would have retained existing jobs. The EWC took sides with the 
Spanish representatives arguing that retaining existing jobs was more important than 
creating new jobs. The Saragossa plant won the bidding process. The Spanish 
representatives appreciated the support of the EWC, which further strengthened the 
personal ties to other European works councilors. 
 Although the EWC was not always able to organize cooperation between 
unions, the events in 2006 showed that the EWC and the Spanish unions shared a 
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transnational ideology around fighting plant closures and dismissals in Europe. 
Management announced the closure of the Azambuja plant in Portugal and the 
transferring of its production to the Saragossa plant. This was in the best economic 
interests of the Spanish unions, as the plant was not running at full capacity. However, 
the Spanish unions struck the Saragossa plant in protest against the plant closure in 
Portugal in the context of another European Action Day. More than 40,000 workers 
participated in work stoppages across Europe. The Spanish unions’ transnational 
ideology motivated the collective action – against their economic self- interest – and in 
favor of solidarity with the Portuguese workers. The protests, however, could not 
prevent the plant closure of the Portuguese plant. The limited success of the EWC 
included a social plan for the redundant Portuguese workers, which was not 
necessarily required by Portuguese labor law.  
 The GM Spain case is not only an example of how changing ideas and 
ideologies relate to the construction of different employment relations practices in the 
context of national institutions, but also how changing ideas and ideologies led to a 
different enactment of the institution EWC. The identity work of the European works 
councils gradually forged a transnational ideology around commonly fighting plant 
closures and redundancies in Europe. In addition, management explored the idea of 
using the EWC as a HR instrument, which included negotiating transnational 
collective agreements and whipsawing labor across Europe. The transnational idea and 
ideologies of management and labor underpinned the development of transnational 
employment relations practices within the institution EWC, which differed markedly 
from most other EWCs in Europe. Institutions are what actors make of them.  
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CHAPTER 6 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT FORD IN GERMANY 
 
Ford established a presence in Germany by building production facilities in Berlin in 
1926 and Cologne in 1931. After World War II, Ford added production facilities in 
Wülfrath (1956), Saarlouis (1966) and Düren (1968). In addition, Ford Germany built 
a plant in Genk (Belgium) in 1964. The two main assembly plants in Germany have 
been at Cologne and Saarlouis (with 25,000 and 6,000 employees respectively at the 
end of the 1980s), while the main parts producing plants were in Wülfrath, Berlin and 
Düren.  
 
Labor representation at Ford Germany  
The general works council at Ford was based in Cologne. The great majority of the 
workforce were members of IG Metall. Moreover, the great majority of the works 
councils at the individual plants was comprised of IG Metall members.  
At Ford four types of collective negotiations existed. First, following the 
collective bargaining on the sectoral level, management and labor at Ford negotiated 
on how to adapt the norms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, collective 
negotiations about investment and sourcing decisions for new production became 
increasingly important in the 1990s. Third, collective negotiations about employment 
protection emerged during the crisis of the automobile industry in 1993, which at Ford 
were closely intertwined with the aforementioned sourcing and investment decisions. 
Fourth, Ford’s European Works Council (EWC) negotiated a transnational collective 
agreement with European management about the Visteon spin-off. This was the first 
collective contract ever negotiated by a EWC.350 
                                                 
350 Works council interview. Visteon. May 31, 2005.  
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A crucial moment in the development of employment relations at Ford was the 
Turk strike in 1973 (Turner 1991). The Cologne plant had a large percentage of 
Turkish workers, who traveled by car to Turkey to visit their families during the 
summer vacation. As the trip by was arduous, Turkish workers regularly appeared late 
to work after their summer vacation, which was initially grudgingly excepted by 
management in a tight labor market. In 1973, management felt urged to stop this 
practice and dismissed the workers who showed up late to work. The Turkish workers, 
supported by many German colleagues responded with a wildcat strike. An important 
element of the pacification of labor relations was the integration of Turkish workers 
into the works councils. As in other large auto companies in Germany, a second round 
of collective bargaining at company level emerged in the 1970s. Following the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement, management and the general works council 
negotiated on how the collective bargaining agreement would be implemented at Ford. 
At an early stage, the general works council, gained additional wage increases and 
additional social benefits that were above the standards of the sectoral collective 
bargaining. From the 1980s onwards, the wage increases of the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement were usually applied at Ford. This resulted in a continuous 
upward wage drift, because of the already higher wage levels at Ford. In the early 
1990s, the wage levels at Ford were about 25% higher than those of the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement in North-Rhine Westphalia.  
Wilfried Kuckelkorn was for a long time the key labor representative at Ford. 
Between 1984 and 2001, he was the chairman of the general works council and the 
head of the works council at the Cologne plant. In 1988, he became the vice chairman 
of the supervisory board and in 1996 head of the new EWC until he left the company. 
Besides his work at Ford, he was active in the local and regional Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and became a member of the European parliament in 1994. Before he 
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became a full time labor representative, Kuckelkorn had worked on the shop floor 
himself.351 He could speak the language of a blue-collar worker, had a good sense of 
their preoccupations and knew how to mobilize them. Capable of communicating the 
problems and concerns of the workforce in a direct way, he could easily mobilize the 
workforce and potentially shut down production at short notice (despite institutional 
constraints in Germany).  
 
The politics and structure of negotiations at Ford  
Labor had to deal with three layers of management at Ford: the world headquarters in 
Detroit, the European headquarters in Warley, UK, established in 1967 and the 
national German management based in Cologne. The main oversight of the German 
plants was undertaken through the European headquarters, although all major business 
decisions were taken at the world headquarters in Detroit. Management governed 
hierachically. German management had to implement business decisions from higher 
management, which left little leeway for independent management strategies. The 
oversight and control at Ford by Detroit was tighter than at General Motors at least in 
the 1990s. One example was the collective bargaining negotiated at Ford in Europe. 
The world headquarters approved a framework and goals for the collective bargaining 
rounds. The national management was supposed to follow through on this in the 
negotiations with labor.352 
This transnational management structure created constraints for labor strategies 
but also some openings. Once a decision was taken in Detroit, e.g. about the reduction 
of employment or the allocation of production, it was very difficult to reverse it. 
However, openings for labor lay in the disagreements and latent tensions between 
                                                 
351 General works council interview. Ford. June 23, 2005.  
352 Management interview. Ford. November 16, 2005.  
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national management and the world headquarters. National Ford managers frequently 
disagreed with business decisions taken by world headquarters. Open criticism was 
barely possible without risking career prospects in the Ford Company. In this context, 
the German general works council and its powerful leader Kuckelkorn were an ally of 
national management. Kuckelkorn sometimes harshly criticized the business decisions 
of the European headquarters. In some cases, the national Ford management tacitly 
agreed with his arguments and provided the works council with information. The 
president of Ford Germany, Daniel Goeudevert, described in his autobiography the 
difficulties in pursuing his own business strategies and ideas against those of the 
European and worldwide headquarters (Goeudevert 1996). Goeudevert had two 
strategies to pursue his agenda. First, he fed his ideas to the media and tried to get 
public support for his projects. Second, he coordinated his ideas with the general 
works council beforehand and tacitly sought its agreement. Later in discussions with 
higher management levels, he could then point to support for his own ideas from the 
German public or consumers or to constraints through the German works council.  
This tacit support of national management by the general works council was 
not all one way and management had to take on board issues that were important to the 
general works council. Through cooperating with management, labor received 
important company information on strategic planning by headquarters. Of particular 
importance was the allocation of new car and engine production. Since it was difficult 
to influence location decision once headquarters took a decision, much of the politics 
and strategic focus of the general works council was aimed at getting the German 
plants in a favorable position for upcoming sourcing decisions. In the context of the 
supervisory board, Kuckelkorn lobbied international management for the German 
plants. In addition, Kuckelkorn traveled several times to Detroit and met with 
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management at headquarters.353 An important point in debates with management was 
that the German workers had not struck since 1973. However, this was only half the 
truth because Ford workers took part in “warning strikes” during the sectoral 
collective bargaining process and wildcat work stoppages took place infrequently. The  
lobbying by Kuckelkorn for new production often coincided with the interests of 
national managers. The resulting cooperation between national management and the 
general works council was agreed quietly and behind closed doors within the Ford 
organization. 354 Nevertheless, disagreements between national management and the 
general works council remained and were sometimes publicly fought out. This might 
sometimes have appeared rough on the surface; however, it was part of a routine and 
did not endanger the above described labor-management cooperation.  
Besides the structure of management, the competition between British and 
German plants was a crucial context for collective negotiations in Germany. Since the 
merger of the British and German Ford divisions into Ford Europe in 1967, the British 
and German production sites had been the largest in Europe. British and German 
worker representatives knew each other from infrequent meetings of the International 
Metal Workers’ Federation. Despite these contacts, both sides were eager to secure 
production for their respective plants. German worker representatives were afraid that 
British unionists could take advantage of their proximity to the European headquarters, 
while the British unionists were suspicious of German co-management and 
cooperation with management. Ford moved the European headquarters from Warley, 
UK, to Cologne in 1998, which made it easier for the German representatives to 
pursue production. 355 
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355 General works council interview. Ford. October 31, 2005.  
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Collective negotiations, 1990 – 1997 
In 1991, IG Metall and the employer association Gesamtmetall negotiated a sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement with a 6.7% rise for workers in the metal industries in 
the state North-Rhine Westphalia. In the following negotiations  at company level, 
management tried to limit the wage increase to 6%. It criticized the continuous  
upwards wage drift of the wages at Ford in comparison to the sectoral bargaining 
agreement. However, the general works council was once again able to win the full 
wage increases of the sectoral bargaining for the Ford employees. At Ford, blue collar 
workers in the wage categories six and seven earned 3674 German marks and 3892 
German marks per month respectively, while a blue-collar worker earned 2913 
German marks and 3035 German marks in the same wage categories based on the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement.356 
In 1992, Ford began to feel the first effects of the impending recession of the 
German and European automobile markets. The previous years had been economically 
successful for Ford Germany. Between 1986 and 1991, the company made stable 
profits, reaching a peak at 809.8 million German marks in 1987.357 This upswing was 
over in 1992 and the demand for Ford cars slumped. Ford management sought to 
decrease production capacities and production costs by two means. Management and 
the works council reduced the workforce through an early retirement program that 
allowed Ford workers at the age of 55 or older to leave the company. 358 About 1,300 
workers chose to accept the voluntary retirement package.  
Despite this cost saving measure, the pressure on the works councils increased 
in the second half of 1993. In trying to address this difficult situation, management 
                                                 
356 Works council: BR Information. Tarifrunde erfolgreich abgeschlossen. Works council leaflet. July, 
1991.  
357 Ford Germany: Annual company reports. Various years.  
358 Works council: BR Information. Hände Weg vom Sozialplan. Works council leaflet. February, 1993.  
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looked for successful coping strategies. Management and labor at VW and GM had 
already negotiated so-called Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness, which 
became popular in Germany during the 1993 recession (Rehder 2003). Management at 
Ford suggested to the general works council to negotiate such a Pact for Employment 
and Competitiveness. Management presented its demands and asked for wage and 
benefit cuts in a meeting on January 10, 1994. In the negotiations, management 
pointed to the cost savings made by its direct competitors in Germany. Furthermore, 
management argued that the German plants were no longer competitive in comparison 
with other foreign Ford plants. Management presented benchmarking data making the 
point that production costs for each car were $516 cheaper at the Valencia plant.359 
The general works council was aware that it could not prevent concessions in 
this difficult economic situation. However, the strategy of the general works council at 
Ford was different compared to that of GM and VW. At these companies, the key 
demand of labor was for an employment security clause. However, in practice, this 
only meant a ban on forced redundancies because management could still shed labor 
through early retirement programs.360 The head of the general works council believed 
that effective employment protection could only be reached through the allocation of 
sufficient production to the Ford plants. Because of this strategic focus, the general 
works council did not attempt to negotiate an employment security clause, but focused 
on the assignment of new production to the German plants.361 
In the final collective agreement, management promised production for each 
plant and laid out in detail when and where each product line would be produced. The 
investment security agreement guaranteed production for the different plants until the 
                                                 
359 Works council: BR Information. Geschäftsleitung kündigt drastische Sparprogramme an! Works 
council leaflet. January 11, 1994.  
360 General works council interview. Ford. June 23, 2005. 
361 Works council: BR Information. Gesamtbetriebsrat legt Verhandlungsposition fest. Works council 
leaflet. January 18, 1994.  
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2000s. In exchange, the new wage increases agreed would be limited to 3.5 % between 
1994 and 1997. This measure stopped a further positive wage drift at Ford in 
comparison with the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. The concessions added 
up to an annual labor cost reduction of 140 million German marks.362 
Before the general works council signed the collective agreement, it organized 
a workforce assembly, in order to seek the approval for the concessions by the 
workforce. 15,000 workers took part in this workforce assembly. 363 These massive 
workforce assemblies were part of the inner- life and politics at Ford. These workforce 
assemblies were to some extent a demonstration of labor’s strength. It showed that the 
general works council could easily mobilize the workforce, leaving little doubt that a 
mobilization for or against particular projects by management was easily possible.  
Following the collective negotiations, Ford’s world headquarters began to 
transform the worldwide company structure. This restructuring program was dubbed 
Ford 2000.364 The North American Operation and European Operation merged into 
one global structure that sought to avoid parallel and overlapping bueraucracies. Key 
elements of the program included the introduction of five transatlantic vehicles 
centers. Each of them had the responsibility for designing, developing and launching 
one type of car. Four of the five vehicle centers were located in the United States. The 
vehicle center for small and medium sized cars was jointly based in Britain and 
Germany. In addition, Ford intended to reduce the number of production platforms. 
Cars produced on one platform would share much of the technology, parts and chassis, 
but the “hat” or “dress” of the car could be adapted to the tastes of national or regional 
                                                 
362 Ford: Betriebsvereinbarung. Sicherung von Investitionen innerhalb der Ford -Werke AG. Collective 
agreement. Februar 25, 1994.  
363 Kölner Stadtanzeiger: Zusagen aus den USA für die deutschen Werke. Newspaper article. March 1, 
1994.  
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markets.365 The reduction of platforms and continuing standardization of car 
production increased the capacity to shift car production along platforms.  
In 1995, collective negotiations at Ford focused on working time. In this 
particular year, a debate on working time flexibility took place in the German 
automobile industry. One contribution to the debate was the book “The company that 
breathes” by VW’s head of labor relations Peter Hartz (Hartz 1996). The allegory of 
the title suggested that the working time of auto plants should flexibly adjust to the 
fluctuation of the auto market. An advantage for management was that it had to pay 
less overtime premiums and the utilization of the workforce was more efficient.  
As the other companies, Ford sought to increase working time flexibility. The 
leverage point for negotiations was the promise of the general works council in the 
1994 collective agreement to contribute 60 million German marks in labor concessions 
to the production of a new generation of engines. Ford’s chairman, Albert Caspers 
publicly demanded a 34-hour working week in the winter and a 42-hour working week 
in the spring.366 In addition, management demanded the Saturday as a regular working 
day. In the final compromise, the works council agreed to a 37.5-hour working week, 
which was two hours more than the sectoral collective bargaining agreement.367 In 
order to compensate for this, management and labor agreed to 15 free shifts for each 
year (which increased working time flexibility). Labor was able to fend off regular 
Saturday work. 
Economic development had been strong since 1993 and far-reaching changes 
in labor relations had taken place. After the losses in 1992 and 1993, the company had 
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made solid profits in 1994 and 1995.368 Even more important was the increased market 
share in Germany from 9.3% in 1993 to 11.3% in 1995. The more surprising it was for 
labor, when the local Ford management informed Kuckelkorn about plans to produce 
the next Fiesta generation in Valencia, Spain. During a visit of the chairman of the 
worldwide Ford Company, Alex Trotman, in Cologne, Kuckelkorn decided to 
confront him about the rumors.369 Trotman answered that there were no imminent 
plans, but made clear that the Cologne plant had a lower productivity. The head of the 
general works council was alarmed. The Fiesta had been the flagship of the Cologne 
plant since the 1970s. The general works council perceived the deliberation by Ford to 
relocate the Fiesta as a threat to the survival of the plant.  
In the aftermath of Trotman’s visit to Cologne, the general works council 
asked management for a new collective agreement in order to secure production for 
the German plants. There was no imminent investment decision to be made by 
management, but the general works council proactively sought to secure production 
assignments. Labor was willing to increase productivity at the German plants by 
agreeing to further concessions, but in return they argued that management would 
have to promise production for the German plants. Management initially showed little 
interest in negotiating such an agreement, but when Ford occurred losses in 1996, 
management engaged in negotiations and sought to reduce labor costs.  
Negotiations between management and labor lasted five months and finally 
reached an agreement in April 1997. The general works council was reasonably 
successful in securing long-term investments and product lines for all five German 
plants.370 In Cologne, the current  Fiesta Model was supposed to be continued until 
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2002/2003. The following new Fiesta model (B153) was also promised to the Cologne 
plants at least until 2011. In addition, management assigned two new engine models 
(OHV and SOHC) to the Cologne plant following the current generation of engines 
until 2007. The two Escort follow up models CW 170 and CW 214 were to be 
produced in 2003 in Saarlouis. In addition, the agreement secured follow up 
production for the German parts plant in Wülfrath, Düren and Berlin. The general 
works council argued that this detailed production assignment would give the German 
plants employment security until 2011.371 
In exchange, the general works council agreed to reduce wages and social 
benefits. The central point was a wage freeze of all wages in 1997 and 1998. This 
wage freeze reduced the wage differential with the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement. In addition, working time flexibility was further increased at Ford. The 
general works council agreed to a “working time corridor,” which made it possible to 
flexibly adapt working time – up to 70 hours below and above the average annual 
working time – to the demand of the car market. Furthermore, the collective 
agreement reduced the social benefits for overtime, night shifts and early retirement.372 
The deal between management and the general works council was 
controversial among the workers. Opposition groups at Ford such as the German 
Marxist-Leninist Party and a communist Turkish group mobilized the workforce 
against the concessions. To counter the mobilization against the collective agreement 
with management, the general works council called a workforce assembly. The head 
of the general works council used an unusual instrument for seeking support for the 
agreement. He asked for a vote of confidence.373 The complete general works council 
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resigned before the workforce assembly and said they would only continue their work 
if the agreement was backed by the workforce. About 15,000 workers convened for 
the assembly. In his speech, Kuckelkorn sought to convince the workforce: 
We have achieved employment security until 2010 (…). We have a lot of work 
to do in implementing the negotiated agreement, but to do this we need your 
trust and support. This is a historic contract and you made a contribution to it 
[meaning the concessions]. We ask for a vote of confidence, which is brave but 
should be a matter of course for each democratic actor. You can decide today 
in a vote of confidence if you accept the agreement reached with management. 
We have to accept your decision. I want to do everything for the future and for 
the security of your jobs, and for that I ask you to trust me and my team!374  
The workforce celebrated his speech. Once again, he was able to rally the workforce 
behind his course, despite unprecedented concessions.375 
Parallel to the collective negotiations in Germany, a labor dispute erupted in 
Halewood, United Kingdom. Management had decided to dismiss 1,300 workers, 
because of the cessation of the Escort production in Halewood.376 The new Escort 
model was promised to the Saarlouis plant in the 1997 collective agreement. The 
agreement stipulated: ”The West Europe production for the CW 170 and C 214 
[Escort] will be fairly shared between Saarlouis and Valencia.”377 The European Ford 
management denied such a relationship between the allocation of production to 
Saarlouis and Valencia, on the one hand, and the discontinuation of the Escort 
production in Valencia on the other, but the evidence points in a different direction.  
 
Transnational worker cooperation at Ford  
In the 1980s, infrequent meetings took place in the context of the International Metal 
Workers’ Federation. A loose exchange of information developed between British and 
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German unionists, however closer cooperation was impeded by the competition 
between British and German plants over the allocation of new production. In addition, 
the German worker representatives were suspicious that the British unionists took 
advantage of their proximity – in terms of geography and language – to the European 
headquarters, while the British unionists were suspicious of the German co-
management and cooperation with management. The idea to develop a EWC came up 
in the early 1990s after such a body had been founded at VW. However, the British 
unionists did not react very enthusiastically and the talks about a EWC fizzled out. 
New impetus came from discussions about a EWC directive in the bodies of 
the European Union. Kuckelkorn became a member of the European parliament for 
the SPD in 1994 and the EWC directive passed with the help of his vote in the 
European parliament in the same year.378 The directive led to the foundation of the 
EWC at Ford in 1996. Kuckelkorn became its new president. The annual meetings of 
the EWC made the exchange of information more regular between unionists from the 
different European Ford plants. Management representatives took part in sessions of 
the EWC and informed the EWC about key economic data of the company.  
The importance of the EWC increased when Ford management  decided to 
spin-off its parts production in the United States and Europe and created the new parts 
company Visteon. In the context of the Visteon spin-off, a close coordination between 
the EWC and the UAW took place. This was one of the very few occasions when the 
UAW took part in transnational worker cooperation. It is informative how the head of 
the EWC and German works council, Kuckelkorn, won the support of the UAW 
(Greer & Hauptmeier 2008b).  
On February 1999, a gas explosion at Ford’s River Rouge in Dearborn killed 
six workers and injured about 30 others. This was one of the worst accidents in the 
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history of the Ford Motor Company. The general works council in Germany organized 
a charity collection for the family of the victims, and set up a fund dedicated to the 
family of the victims.379 The UAW was moved by this act of solidarity. When 
Kuckelkorn later asked the UAW to support the Visteon restructuring, the UAW did 
not want to turn him down. The UAW sent their key representative for Ford, UAW 
vice president Ron Gettelfinger, to a meeting of the EWC in Cologne in July, 1999. 
 The situation was similar for the UAW and the EWC: Ford sought to spin-off 
its parts division Visteon in the United States as well as in Europe. This affected about 
19,000 workers in Europe and about 52,000 in the United States. In the discussion 
between the UAW and the EWC, both sides agreed to inform each other about the 
respective negotiations with management. Ford management was alarmed by the 
meeting between the UAW and the EWC, because they had never seen the UAW 
cooperating with European unionists in such a way. Managers were afraid that this 
transatlantic union cooperation could cause trouble for Ford.380 
The UAW reached an agreement with management on the Visteon spin-off in 
the context of the collective bargaining round in October 1999.381 The UAW 
prevented the complete separation between Ford and Visteon, and Visteon workers 
remained part of the Ford Company covered by the same collective bargaining 
agreement. In Europe, the negotiations between management and the EWC began on 
December 9, 1999. The strategic goal of the EWC was to copy the UAW Visteon 
agreement and implement it in Europe.382 The EWC got management to agree to the 
same wage and benefits for the Visteon plants; however, they could not prevent the 
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spin-off of Visteon. Visteon became an independent new company. In exchange, 
management agreed to the implementation of a new worker representation structure at 
Visteon, which also included a EWC. The agreement also included a clause that 
secured all existing national sourcing agreements for the new Visteon Company. The 
EWC wanted to make sure that the new Visteon management would honor the 
promises of the 1997 collective agreement.  
The Visteon agreement was signed on January 28, 1999. It defined wages, 
benefits and working conditions for the all Visteon plants in Europe, which were due 
to be implemented later at the national level. 383 In Germany, the plants in Düren, 
Wülfrath and Berlin became part of the new Visteon Company. There were various 
reasons why the Ford management agreed to transnational collective bargaining. 
Management did not want to test how far the transnational cooperation between the 
UAW and the EWC would actually go. In addition, agreeing with the EWC on the 
restructuring promised a smoother implementation at the local level and could help to 
avoid labor conflict in Europe 
Shortly afterwards, in September 2000, the EWC negotiated with the European 
management the next transnational collective agreement. Ford planned a joint-venture 
with the company Getrag merging the axle production of Ford and Getrag. 384 The 
joint-ventures affected the three production sites Cologne, Bordeaux (France) and 
Halewood (UK) and a total number of 3,850 employees. A rationale for the joint-
venture by management was to take advantage of the engineering know-how of the 
axle specialist Getrag. The collective negotiations followed a similar pattern to the 
Visteon negotiations. A difference to the Getrag agreement was that all Ford workers 
remained on the payroll of Ford and were only “rented” to the joint-venture. Thus, the 
                                                 
383 Ibid.  
384 EWC: Der Europäische Betriebsrat wird 4 Jahre jung. EWC leaflet. December 4, 2000.  
  
 
217 
general works council continued to represent the employees of the Ford-Getrag joint-
venture. Another element of the European collective agreement was a detailed 
sourcing agreement, in which Ford agreed to use axles from the new joint-venture for 
the next ten years.385 
The Visteon negotiations in 1999 and the Ford-Getrag agreements in 2000 
marked the most substantial period in terms of labor transnationalism at Ford. This is 
apparent from the large number of meetings that took place during that time. In 1999, 
there were four full meetings of the EWC and seven select committee meetings. In 
2000, four full committee meetings and ten select committee meetings took place.386 
In addition, the Visteon and Getrag European collective agreements were more 
substantial than subsequent agreements since they determined wage levels and benefits 
on a European scale.  
 
Ford’s European restructuring and labor responses  
In the late 1990s, the European car market grew more difficult and Ford’s European 
operation went into the red. In Germany alone, Ford lost 222 million euros in 1999. 
Various factors contributed to the deteriorating economic situation. First, the 
overcapacities reached a peak in Europe. Experts calculated that car manufacturers in 
Europe had production capacities for 20 million cars in Europe in 1999; however, only 
16 million cars were sold. Ford was capable of producing 2 million cars, but only sold 
1.6 million. 387 
The European and world headquarters felt the urgent need to launch a 
restructuring program for Europe, which was called the European Transformation 
Strategy. The restructuring program was introduced in May 2000 and was supposed to 
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reduce annual costs by $1 billion. The restructuring included a drastic reduction of 
Ford’s European production capacity and included the following elements: 
· selling the Azambuja plant in Portugal to General Motors,  
· closing the Plonsk plant in Poland, 
· selling the share of the AutoEurope joint-venture in Portugal,  
· stopping car production at the Ford’s Obchuk plant in Minsk, Belorussia,  
· discontinuing Fiesta production in Dagenham by offering a redundancy 
package to 1,900 employees and  
· cutting jobs at the Genk plant in Belgium.388 
The scale of the reduction of overcapacities can be appreciated by comparing 
production capacities, number of employees and number of assembly plants in 1997 
and 2003. In 1997, Ford had twelve assembly plants in Europe with 46,211 employees 
producing 1,914,740 cars and trucks. In 2003, Ford had seven assembly plants with 
26,300 employees producing 1,537,990 cars and trucks.389 
The British plants took the brunt of the restructuring. The most dramatic  
change was that Ford stopped producing Ford brand cars in the UK after more than 80 
years. The Fiesta production in Dagenham was transferred to Cologne; and the 
Halewood plant was transferred to Jaguar, which was part of Ford’s Premium 
Automotive Group (PAG)390. The only remaining Ford brand vehicle produced was 
the Ford Transit in Southampton; a plant with just 1,372 employees. To some extent, 
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the British workforce was compensated through new investments. In Dagenham, Ford 
invested in diesel engine production. 391 
Although some restructuring took place at the German plants, the overall 
importance of the German plants increased within Ford’s European operation. 
Employment levels only decreased slightly from 28,065 to 26,642 between 2001 and 
2003 (at Cologne and Saarlouis), while the share of employment in Europe of Ford 
Germany rose from around 33% in the early 1990s to 43% in 2003. The utilization of 
the German plants increased and it was easier to run the plants productively. 392 
Furthermore, the UK plants were not any longer competitors in car production. 
Competitors for car production in Western Europe only remained the Genk plant in 
Belgium and the Valencia plant in Spain.  
Another implication of Ford’s overhaul of its European operation was that the 
company did not intend to expand production significantly in Eastern Europe. Ford 
closed the plant in Plonsk, Poland, and stopped car production at the Obchuk plant in 
Minsk, Belorussia. On the other hand, Ford built two new plants in Eastern Europe in 
2002. Ford started producing the Ford Focus in the Leningrad Region, Russia, and 
built a van plant in Otosan, Turkey. However, these plants would only produce for the 
local markets and not compete with Ford’s Western European plants. This was 
different at VW and GM, where the Western European plants competed with plants in 
Eastern Europe.  
How did labor respond to the European restructuring program? The central 
strategy of the German general works council had already been established many years 
before. The 1997 collective agreement secured specific levels of car and motor 
production at the German plants. This was a safety net for the German plants during 
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the European restructuring program.393 Ford could not reduce capacities in Germany 
dramatically without breaching the 1997 collective agreement. There was resistance to 
the labor concessions in 1997 among the workforce and within the general works 
council but, in retrospect, the 1997 collective agreement was a key way for the general 
works council to keep production and employment levels stable in Germany. The 
effects of the European restructuring program were marginal, e.g. Ford opened a 
supplier park next to the Cologne plant with 1,300 employees for the new Fiesta 
production, which would gradually result in the outsourcing of production. The EWC 
did not play a major role in the European restructuring.394 
 
Collective Negotiations at Ford Germany, 2002 and 2007 
In August 2001, a leadership change took place. Wilfried Kuckelkorn stepped down as 
the head of the general works council, which was a post he had held since 1984. He 
also stepped down as the vice president of the supervisory board and head of the 
EWC. His successor in all these positions was Dieter Hinkelmann, who was like 
Kuckelkorn a member of the labor union IG Metall. He had already replaced 
Kuckelkorn as the head of the works counc il of the Niehl plant in Cologne in 1999. 
Hinkelmann followed the previous strategies of the general works council and there 
was more continuity than had been expected. Hinkelmann was confirmed as the head 
of the general works council in the 2002 works council elections. 395 
The restructuring in Europe reduced the capacities substantially and the plants 
were running close to full capacity. As one unionist put it: “Ford tried to shrink itself 
healthy.”396 However, the economic situation did not improve substantially and the 
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pressure on labor representatives remained high. The losses came to 314 million euros 
in 2002 and reached a record high of 1,069 million euros in 2003. The Detroit 
headquarters grew impatient with the performance of Ford Germany and pushed for 
further restructuring in Europe. In October 2003, management announced the 
dismissal of 3,000 employees at the Genk plant, Belgium. This reduced the Ford 
workforce in Belgium by about 50%. Workers in Belgium responded with production 
sabotage, strikes and demonstrations.397 
In Cologne, the management and general works council agreed to reduce the 
workforce by 1,700 employees through voluntary buyouts. By January 2004, about 
1,300 employees had already agreed to the compensation package offered by the 
company. Shortly afterwards, management and labor engaged in collective 
negotiations about the application of sectoral collective bargaining at Ford. 
Management and the general works council agreed that Ford was in deep trouble. In 
this situation, the key bargaining goal of the general works council was to avoid forced 
redundancies, which seemed to be a possibility for the first time in the history of Ford 
Germany. The general works council agreed to reduce labor costs by 200 million euros 
annually. This took place through the reduction of wage levels and social benefits. The 
main measure was a freeze on Ford wages until March 2005.398 Christmas pay, a 
commonly paid social benefit in Germany, was reduced to 55% of a monthly wage, 
and thus reached the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. 
In light of the serious economic situation, the general works council did not 
ask for new production assignments in return for the concessions. At least the union 
managed to insert a clause in the collective agreement that excluded forced 
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redundancies at Ford Germany until the end of 2005.399 At this point, collective 
negotiations were strongly driven by the company crisis and the competitive pressure 
of the European automotive market. It was perhaps surprising that Ford’s severe 
company crisis and the negotiations of far-reaching concessions hardly appeared in the 
newspapers and went largely unnoticed by the German public. Labor and management 
dealt quietly with the situation within the company and sought to resolve the crisis 
cooperatively, while at General Motors and VW open conflict erupted between 
management and labor in 2004 (cf. chapter on Opel and VW).  
The economic situation improved slightly in 2005, but the worldwide Ford 
Company remained in a state of crisis. When Ford headquarters announced a major 
restructuring program it also demanded the shedding of 1,300 jobs at Ford Germany, 
which then had to be implemented by the national Ford management.400 As in the 
United States, Ford offered compensation packages to workers who were willing to 
leave the company voluntarily. In order to motivate a sufficient number of employees 
to accept buy-outs, management threatened to dismiss workers if insufficient numbers 
of workers accepted the management offer.  
This more aggressive management style sparked opposition. The general works 
council organized a general workforce in assembly in December 2005, in which about 
12,000 workers took part.401 The chair of the general works council, Hinkelmann, 
criticized German management for not standing up to the world headquarters. He 
argued that workforce reductions in recent years had resulted in such work 
intensification that it was impossible to reduce the workforce further. In addition, 
Hinkelmann criticized the threats by management to dismiss workers as “collective 
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mobbing,” which he had never previously experienced at Ford.402 Consequently, he 
announced that the general works council stopped all overtime, until a solution with 
management was reached. He also warned management that threatening dismissals 
would sap the motivation of the workforce.  
The atmosphere of the workforce assembly was tense when the CEO of Ford 
Germany, Bernhard Mattes, began his speech. He had to start his speech over again 
several times, because workers heckled him continuously. His speech was very formal 
and he was not able to convince the workforce of the need for restructuring. Mattes 
defended the course of the American management and the need for a reduction in the 
workforce; however, he also made a slight concession to labor and showed some 
goodwill by minimizing the workforce reduction to 1,200 employees. The workforce 
reduction target of 1,200 was easily met and by January 2006, 1,350 workers had 
already accepted the buy-out offer by management. The financial offer seemed to be 
more attractive for older workers.403 
The mobilization by the general works council cannot only be seen in the 
context of workforce reduction. The general works council also sought to negotiate 
production assignments for the German plants. The general works council considered 
that labor remained vulnerable to employment reductions without production 
assignments. The negotiations were difficult and management asked for substantial 
concessions in exchange for new production. Management knew that labor was under 
some time pressure, because of the works council elections were scheduled in March 
1996. The approach of the general works council had been to negotiate concessions 
before elections – as in 1997 – and then let the constituency judge the course of the 
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works council. As one works councilor put it: ”We only negotiate concessions before 
elections and not after them.”404 
Shortly before the election, management and labor reached an agreement.405 
Labor was able to secure long-term production guarantees and investments until 2011. 
The Cologne plant remained the main plant for the B-platform producing Fiesta and 
Fusion, with at least 350,000 annual units to be produced in three work shifts a day. 
The Valencia plant had demanded a larger part of the Fiesta production; however, the 
new agreement secured the larger part of the production volume for Cologne. The 
Saarlouis plant remained the main plant for the C-platform. The production of the 
Focus (3 and 5 doors), Focus Turnier and the Focus-C Max were all assigned to the 
Saarlouis plant. The collective agreement secured the production of 350,000 annual 
units in three working shifts a day. In exchange for new car production and 
investments, the general works council had to agree to substantial concessions. 
Between 2006 and 2010, the difference between the Ford wages and the wages of the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement would be decreased by 6.5% bringing the 
level of the Ford wages close to those of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. 
In addition, all new employees at Ford would be employed on the basis of the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement.406 This measure created lower tier wages at Ford. 
The wages and social benefits of Ford workers converged with the level of the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement.  
In the works council election in March 2006, workers had to make a decision 
about the concessions and the new production assignments. In Cologne, voter 
participation was 75% and IG Metall list won 95% of the total number of the works 
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council seats (39 of 41 seats) making it the best result ever for IG Metall at Ford’s 
Cologne plant. In Saarlouis, voter participation was 95% and the IG Metall list won 
85% of the votes, also making it the best result of IG Metall at the Saarlouis plants. 
The result of the elections showed that the workforce fully backed the course of their 
labor representatives. Although considerable concessions had taken place in previous 
years, employment levels remained comparatively stable at the plants in Germany, 
while other Ford plants in Europe had been substantially downscaled or closed down.  
 
Summary  
The last major labor conflict at Ford Germany took place in 1973. In the following 
years, a stable pattern of employment relations developed in the context of the German 
institutions. The ideas and ideologies of labor and management at Ford changed only 
gradually and were often in line with previous institutional practices, which 
contributed to the stability of employment relations at Ford. 
The 1973 strike at Ford in Cologne came to be known as the Turk strike. 
Ford’s Cologne plant had a large number of Turkish workers. During the summer 
vacation, these workers went back to Turkey and often stayed a couple of days longer 
than the duration of the company holiday. When workers showed up late after their 
summer vacation, management accepted this grudgingly in a tight labor market. In 
1973, management felt urged to stop this practice and dismissed workers that showed 
up late after their summer vacation. Turkish workers and many of their German 
colleagues responded with a contentious wildcat strike. An important element of the 
acquiescence of labor relations was the integration of Turkish labor activists into the 
labor representation structure and a number of them became works councilors. 
Another element of the settlement of labor relations at Ford was the 
development of a second collective bargaining round. The wage settlements of the 
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sectoral collective bargaining agreement stayed behind the productivity growth of 
Ford. Like labor at other large auto producers, the general works council at Ford used 
the co-determination rights on overtime to pressure management into company level 
negotiation. Management accepted this, partly because they sometimes urgently 
needed labor’s permission for overtime, but also because some labor representatives 
suggested launching an independent auto union, like that of the UAW in the United 
States. Limited collective bargaining at the company level seemed to be the more 
attractive option for management. Both management and labor, avoided calling these 
negotiations over benefits and wages collective bargaining, as the labor law in 
Germany did not define a role for works councilors and management for collective 
bargaining at the company level. Works councilors used these negotiations to push for 
higher social benefits and wages in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, wage 
levels at Ford were about 25% higher than those of the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement.  
 Both labor and management contributed to the stability of employment 
relations from the 1980s onwards. On the one side, there was great continuity with 
respect to labor representation. Wilfried Kuckelkorn took over the labor leadership at 
Ford in 1984 and led with a firm hand until 2001. He had the skills and power to unify 
other labor representatives and the workforce behind his course. He represented the 
interests of the workforce robustly; however, he was also respected by management as 
he would help implement collective agreements once a compromise had been found. 
Despite the sometime contentious negotiations between the labor leadership and 
management, there were barely any labor conflicts on the shop floor. On the other 
side, Ford management had a conservative approach to employment relations in the 
sense that management appreciated the stability of labor relations over radical change. 
When new management ideas and ideologies such as lean production or transnational 
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whipsawing came up, management’s practices only gradually changed and this took 
place without pushing labor to an extreme.  
 A central element of labor’s ideology was the idea that only sufficient levels of 
production would secure employment levels, wages and social benefits. Labor pursued 
this economic idea systematically from the 1980s onwards. The assignment of 
production for the European plants was decided at the world headquarters at Detroit. 
Labor representatives said that it was difficult to reverse a production assignment once 
a decision was taken in Detroit. This is why labor sought to influence production 
decisions at an early stage. Kuckelkorn lobbied higher management levels for new 
production in the context of supervisory boards meetings. He also traveled to Detroit 
to make a case to world headquarters for the German production sites. The local Ford 
management shared labor’s interest and provided labor representatives with internal 
information about upcoming production decisions in Detroit.  
The negotiations for production became more formalized in the 1990s in a 
more difficult economic context. Ford Germany made losses and management pushed 
for concessions. Labor was aware that it could not avoid concessions. However, labor 
made sure to exchange concessions for production assignments in 1993 and 1997. The 
orientation of labor representatives was different at VW and GM. There labor 
representatives focused on employment protection clauses, which meant no forced 
redundancies. The economic idea of Ford’s general works council to focus on 
production assignments proved to be right, when management at VW and GM reduced 
employment levels substantially through early retirement. The strategy by labor at 
Ford to negotiate collective agreements on specific production assignment was copied 
by labor representatives at GM in 1998, at VW in 2001 and by the UAW in the United 
States during the collective bargaining round in 2007.  
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 Labor experimented with transnational strategies in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. When Ford spun-off its European parts production into the independent 
company Visteon in 1999, Ford’s EWC negotiated a transnational collective 
agreement, which regulated employment relations at Visteon. This was the first 
collective agreement ever negotiated by a EWC. Despite negotiating this landmark 
agreement, labor mainly focused on previous national employment relations practices, 
which produced positive results in comparison with other Ford plants in Europe. The 
1997 collective agreement at Ford included labor concessions, but also production 
assignments for the German plants, which protected the German plants when 
management pursued a far-reaching restructuring program in the early 2000s, cutting 
jobs and closing down plants elsewhere in Europe. The production share of the 
German plants increased within Ford Europe. The greater importance of the German 
production sites was also indicated through the move of Ford’s European headquarters 
from the UK to Germany in 1998.  
 The labor leadership change in 2001 meant continuity. The successor had been 
a member of the works council since the 1980s and a close confidant of Kuckelkorn. 
The successors pursued the previous practices and economic ideas of the general 
works council. In 2003, Ford Germany slid into a severe economic crisis and made 
record losses. Despite the magnitude of the economic problems, labor and 
management shared the same interpretation of the crisis and quietly negotiated, mostly 
without the knowledge of the German media, unprecedented concessions. The 
economic situation remained difficult and management and labor were forced to 
negotiate another collective agreement in 2006. Labor agreed to significant 
concessions and in exchange secured production assignments for the German plants 
until 2011.  
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 Ford Germany is an example of institutional stability. Management and labor’s 
economic ideas and ideologies, which underpinned the working of the institutions, did 
not change along important lines. Ford management had a conservative approach to 
labor relations, in the sense that Ford favored stability of labor relations over radical 
change. Ford’s management employment relations practices only changed gradually, 
stretching labor at times, but without pushing labor to the extreme. Ford’s general 
works council developed early on the economic idea of negotiating production 
assignments with management and set production levels in collective agreements. In 
addition, Ford works council negotiated wages and social benefits at the company 
level. In the 1970s and 1980s, wage levels rose to about 25% above the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement. In the more difficult economic context in the 1990s 
and 2000s, wage levels at Ford converged towards the level of the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement.  
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CHAPTER 7 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT VW IN GERMANY  
 
Volkswagen (VW) was founded in 1937. The direct translation of VW is “people’s 
car,” which summarizes an early philosophy of the company. VW wanted to realize 
Henry Ford’s vision to produce cars for the masses in Germany. The first plants were 
built in Braunschweig and Wolfsburg. After World War II, VW built assembly plants 
in Hannover (1956) and Emden (1964) and parts plants Kassel (1958) and Salzgitter 
(1969) (Koch 1987). After German unification, VW extended production to eastern 
Germany building assembly plants in Mosel (Zwickau) and Dresden. Wolfsburg was 
the largest production site and seat of the world headquarters. VW has been a distinct 
company, because of its government ownership. VW began as a project of the fascist 
Hitler regime. After World War II, the federal government and the state Lower-
Saxony became 20% shareholders of VW respectively. The federal government sold 
its share in 1988, but the state Lower Saxony has remained a shareholder (Jürgens 
1998). 
 
Labor and the politics of collective negotiations 
In contrast to most other large companies, VW was not covered by a sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement and management and labor negotiated an independent 
company-level collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining was conducted 
by a commission of the regional branch of IG Metall, which was mostly comprised of 
works councilors from the VW plants. The seat of the general works council was 
Wolfsburg at the world headquarters. The general works council and the works 
council at the individual plants were almost exclusively members of the labor union 
IG Metall (Haipeter 2000). 
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Labor at VW had more power than at other large companies in Germany. 
Union density at VW was extraordinarily high; for most of the time more than 98% of 
the workforce were union members. Company level bargaining was based on the 
collective bargaining law and therefore, labor had the right to strike. Labor at VW 
barely used this forcing strategy and the strike rate was close to zero. However, the 
availability of this instrument in collective negotiations resulted in having greater 
bargaining power in comparison to other works councilors (Turner 1991).  
Furthermore, labor was represented on the supervisory board and was 
potentially able to organize a majority on key questions. Labor-side supervisory 
members and the state Lower Saxony shared a common interest with regard to 
dismissals and plant closure – and together they had the majority of votes on the 
supervisory board. Traditionally Lower Saxony was a state with a largely rural 
economy based on farming and only had a small industrial workforce. The major 
concentrations of labor in state Lower Saxony were at the VW production sites in 
Emden, Hannover, Salzgitter, Wolfsburg and Braunschweig. Shedding labor at VW 
meant higher unemployment in Lower Saxony, which was a considerable liability for 
the government in state elections.407 Related to this, there was a common interest 
between labor representatives and the state Lower Saxony with respect to investment. 
All major investment decisions went through the supervisory board and required 
confirmation by either the state or labor. In practice, the supervisory board 
unanimously decided most investment decisions. However, given the overall influence 
                                                 
407 A watershed experience was the politics of the supervisory board during the oil crisis in 1973/1974. 
The VW Company was hit hard by the recession and a slump in demand. VW management worked out 
a restructuring plan that included plant closures (e.g. at Emden). In the negotiations and in background 
talks, labor and state representatives made clear that this was not an option and threatened to dismiss 
and replace managers through a vote on the supervisory board. Management was persuaded to avoid 
plant closures and negotiate an alternative with labor. Finally, a comparatively small reduction in the 
workforce took place through socially acceptable means (e.g. early retirement). The episode was a 
learning experience in the developing relationship between management and labor. It demonstrated that 
key labor relations issues could only be worked out with labor representatives and not against them.  
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of labor and the state, the burden fell on management to demonstrate that new 
investments abroad were in the wider interests of the VW plants at home. In addition, 
the Volkswagen Law limited the voting rights of any shareholder to 20% (Koch 1987).  
Labor representatives on the supervisory board also took part in the 
appointment of top management as do labor representatives on other supervisory 
boards in Germany. A difference at VW was that the Director of Labor Relations (who 
is the head of the company’s labor relations department) was also a member of the 
labor union IG Metall. Despite differences in style to other companies, labor relations 
directors at VW represented the interests of management and sought to convince labor 
representatives of measures for staying competitive, but due to their union 
background, they had a deep understanding of the working, positions and concerns of 
labor, which facilitated an accommodation between management and labor.  
Management nutured a cooperative relationship with the union. The general 
works council at Wolfsburg had a staff team and financial resources that allowed them 
to develop informed positions on important issues for the company. They also had 
resources for traveling and contracting in external professional expertise. Peter Hartz, 
Director of Labor Relations between 1993 and 2005, argued that the labor 
representatives’ visits to foreign plants demonstrated to them first hand that those 
foreign competitors were catching up (Hartz & Kloepfer 2007). This contributed to a 
better understanding by labor for the need to stay productive and ensure labor’s 
participation in the continuous improvement of the home plants. Until 1993, 
management and labor made productivity improvements through a more efficient 
organization of production. When the competitive pressure of the auto market 
increased in 1993 during the recession of the German and European auto market, 
management and labor began to work out labor concessions.  
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Changes of the production structure and collective negotiations  
Changes in the manufacturing footprint tend to have implications for collective 
bargaining, in particular if parallel production emerges in one region of the world. The 
first wave of VW’s international expansion began shortly after World War II408 and 
did not have a significant impact on collective negotiations (Haipeter 2000). The 
second wave of VW’s expansion included the buildup of production capacities in 
South and Eastern Europe. Specifically, VW took over the Spanish auto brand SEAT 
with plants in Barcelona and Pamplona in 1986, bought the Slovak auto company 
Skoda in 1991, built a new production facility in Bratislava (Slovakia), built a van 
plant in Poznan (Poland) in 1994 and started a joint-venture with Ford for van 
production in Setubal (Portugal) in 1995.409 Parallel production was built up and 
original VW models were produced abroad. The Polo was first produced in Wolfsburg 
and later in Pamplona (Spain). The Passat was first produced in Emden and later in 
Bratislava.410 The expansion of production in eastern Germany and South and Eastern 
Europe took place with the support of the labor representatives on the supervisory 
board 1990s. There was a sense on the labor side that these investments and VW’s 
expansion was necessary for coping with the competition in the European auto market.  
From 1995 onwards, management developed a platform strategy. Previously, 
VW had produced 16 different car models. VW introduced four platforms, whereby 
the VW branch was responsible for the small car platform (e.g. Polo) and the compact 
                                                 
408 VW was one of the first German multinational companies. VW expanded production to Brazil 
(1953), South Africa (1956), Mexico (1964), Yugoslavia (1972), USA (1976) and China (1984). 
Building up production facilities in other countries was aimed at obtaining access to new markets that 
were protected by trade restrictions. In the postwar decades, production for the Western European car 
market mainly took place in the German plants with the exception of the plant in Brussels (Belgium). 
409 VW: Volkswagen Chronic. Company document. 2005.  
410 In addition, VW expanded production to Eastern Germany in 1991 and built a new assembly plant 
and an engine plant in Zwickau. The Eastern German plants were not fully integrated in VW’s labor 
representation system. Their works councilors belonged to the general works council; however,  the VW 
collective bargaining agreement only covered VW’s western German plants. The Eastern VW plants 
were covered by a Eastern sectoral collective bargaining agreement with wage levels that were 20-30% 
below Volkswagen’s collective bargaining agreement. 
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car platform (e.g. Golf), while Audi was responsible for the mid-range cars (e.g. 
Passat) and the upper range cars (Audi models). By 1998, VW planned to produce 25 
different models on the four production platforms. Cars produced on the same 
platforms would share most of the parts (Jürgens 1998). 
As is shown below the changing production structure, including the expansion 
to South and Eastern Europe and the introduction of production platforms increased 
the competition for the German plants in Europe and put pressure on labor in 
collective bargaining. From 1999 onwards, management began to use whipsawing 
practices in collective negotiations. Collective bargaining and negotiations about the 
distribution of production became more intertwined.  
 
Collective negotiations at VW in the 1990s 
VW was in good shape in the early 1990s and profited from the unification boom. The 
economic context was positive for the collective bargaining round in 1991. The union 
was able to reduce working time to a 35-hour working week. The employer 
association had agreed to this in principal after a 6-week strike in the metal sector in 
1984; however, the 35-hour week had not been fully implemented. Because of the 
model character of labor relations at VW, the reduction of the weekly working time to 
35 hours was an important signal for other collective bargaining rounds in the metal 
sector.411 
In 1993, Ferdinand Piëch became the new CEO, which brought changes for 
labor relations. Piëch succeeded Hahn who had been in charge since 1982. During his 
first year, Piëch reshuffled key management positions. He poached Ignacio Lopez 
from General Motors for VW’s reorganization of production and sourcing. The hiring 
of Lopez was a signal that VW would get tough on suppliers (Jürgens 1998).The new 
                                                 
411 IG Metall: Geschäftsbericht 1990-1992, Bezirk Hannover. Union document. 1992.  
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head of the labor relations department (henceforth labor director) became Peter Hartz, 
who was previously a labor relations manager in the steel industry. As previous labor 
directors at VW, Hartz was a member of the union IG Metall.  
In 1993, VW was severely hit by the recession in the European car market and 
car sales dropped dramatically. Confronted with the slump, management reevaluated 
the production plans for 1994 and 1995 and announced that VW had 30,000 
employees too many. Even though the results for 1993 had included one-off effects 
such as the large foreign investments (e.g. for the new SEAT plant in Martorell) that 
had taken place in previous years. Labor representatives did not doubt that the 
company was in serious economic trouble.412 The company crisis put a lot of pressure 
on the upcoming collective bargaining round in November 1993.  
IG Metall and the general works council were willing to accept changes in 
labor relations, but also made it clear that forced redundancies were not an option. 
They demanded from management a socially acceptable plan to cope with the crisis.413 
The agenda setter for collective bargaining began to change. In previous rounds, labor 
had set central issues for negotiations such as working time reduction. From the 1993 
collective bargaining round on, management increasingly set the agenda for collective 
bargaining at VW.  
Hartz, developed a strategy to reduce overcapacities. He suggested a radical 
working time reduction to a 28.8-hour or 4-day working week. This working time 
reduction was roughly the equivalent to a reduction in the workforce by 30,000. 
Hartz’s proposals went against the general run of debate in Germany, which had begun 
                                                 
412 General works council: BR kontakt. Krise überwinden – Arbeitsplätze sichern! General works 
council leaflet. March, 1993.  
413 General works council: BR kontakt. 1993 im Rückblick. General works council leaflet. February 
1994.  
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to move against further working time reductions during the post-unification economic 
crisis.  
Labor positively assessed Hartz’s proposal as it confirmed its position that a 
working time reduction was a feasible way of dealing with unemployment.414 Even 
though management and labor quickly agreed in principal on working time reduction, 
the specifics of the proposal had to be negotiated in the forthcoming collective 
bargaining round. The main contention was about how to reduce the wages in relation 
to the working time reduction. IG Metall was aware that the proposal for a far-
reaching reduction in working time could not be achieved without wage concessions, 
but the union did not want to lower existing wage levels. Finally, a compromise was 
reached and the working time reduction was financed by cut ting the wage increases in 
1994 and 1995, the annual vacation benefits and an annual bonus. Labor agreed to 
unprecedented wage concessions, but secured existing wage levels. The new collective 
bargaining agreement included a job protection clause and excluded forced 
redundancies until the end of 1995.415 In the context of the negotiations, management 
agreed to reduce their own salaries by 20% signaling to the workers and labor 
representatives that management was also willing to make sacrifices for the recovery 
of the company.  
The core of the collective agreement was the reduction of working time, which 
was reached through three specific measures. First, working time was reduced from 36 
to 28.8 hours a week on average. Second, labor and management agreed to a so-called 
Staffettenmodell. Younger workers would start with less working hours and their 
working time would increase gradually, while the working time for older workers 
would decrease over time. Third, alternate groups of workers were released from 
                                                 
414 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Sichere Jobs für zwei Jahre. Union leaflet. November 1993.  
415 IG Metall: Modellwechsel – Die IG Metall und die Viertagewoche bei VW. Union publication. 
1994.  
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factory work for training at a newly founded VW training center. In parallel to the 
implementation of the working time reduction in 1994, VW reduced the size of the 
workforce through an early retirement program, which was subsidized through the 
national unemployment insurance.416 
The economic performance of VW improved in 1994 and 1995, but the 
pressure on labor in collective negotiations remained high. Labor became particularly 
concerned about production levels at the Wolfsburg plant, as it had more than 50,000 
employees. It was not easy to restructure and modernize the Wolfsburg plant and it 
remained of vital importance to run it close to full capacity. VW management had 
transferred part of the Polo production to the former SEAT plant in Pamplona 
(Haipeter 2000). As a result, it was especially important to labor that management 
assigned the new small car model Chico to the Wolfsburg plant. However, 
management had previously announced that the Chico project would only be 
implemented in Wolfsburg if productivity levels were comparable to foreign VW 
plants. Even though neither management nor labor made the connection between 
production and collective bargaining explicit, there was pressure on labor in the 
collective bargaining round in 1995 to lower labor costs and increase productivity.  
In the 1995 collective bargaining round, Management focused on increasing 
working time flexibility further. The labor director, Peter Hartz, summarized his ideas 
with the allegory of “the breathing company” (Hartz 1996). Production was supposed 
to adapt flexibly to the fluctuation of the market. He suggested that production should 
increase up to 48 hours per week (from 28.8 hours) in times of peak demand. Saturday 
was intended to become a regular working day without additional weekend benefits.417 
Labor focused on three goals: IG Metall wanted higher wages for its members, 
                                                 
416 Ibid.  
417 Handelsblatt: Arbeitszeitmodelle sind weiterhin umstritten. Newspaper article. September 4, 1994.  
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because wage levels had stagnated after the last collective bargaining round; labor 
sought to avoid some of the working time flexibility measures such as Saturday work; 
and labor intended to focus on employment security by excluding forced redundancies 
for the term of the collective bargaining contract.418 
Collective negotiations quickly reached an impasse. Saturday work became a 
major point of disagreement. In this context, labor decided to mobilize the workforce. 
During the fourth negotiations round on August 29 1995, 15,000 workers 
demonstrated in front of the building where the negotiations were taking place.419 
Labor continued its protest during the following negotiations round and more than 
60,000 workers across the VW plants participated in short “warning strikes”. VW lost 
the production of about 7,000 cars. Shortly afterwards, management and labor reached 
a compromise in the negotiations.420 Wages increased and the collective bargaining 
agreement included again an employment protection clause. In addition, labor was 
able to avoid Saturday as a regular working day. On the other hand, working time 
flexibility increased considerably with the possibility of fluctuations between 28.8 and 
40 hours. Another aspect of the working time flexibility agreement was to increase 
working time for younger employees in parallel with a decrease in working time of the 
older employees.421 Management regarded the 1995 collective bargaining agreement 
as an important step forward towards more working time flexibility.  
In the second half of the 1990s, the economic situation of the VW Company 
improved considerably. In the wake of the improving auto markets in Germany and 
Europe, the profits of VW increased from 678 million German marks in 1996 to 1,361 
million German marks in 1997. In 1998, the company made the biggest profit in its 
                                                 
418 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Start frei fü r die Tarifrunde 95. Union leaflet. April/Mai,1995.  
419 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Noch kein Durchbruch erzielt. Union leaflet. August 31, 1995. 
420 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Tarifkommission hat zugestimmt. Union leaflet. September, 1995. 
421 IG Metall: Die Zeit müssen wir uns nehmen. Union publication. October 1995.  
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history and earned 2,243 million German marks. Productivity increased by 30% 
between 1993 and 1997.422 Important elements of this leapfrog in productivity 
included the reorganization of production (e.g. the introduction of production 
platforms and thus the sharing of the same parts across different models), cheaper 
sourcing of parts and the above described changes in labor relations. 
A focus of the collective bargaining round in 1997 was the introduction of an 
early retirement plan. 423 The compromise was based on the individual “time account” 
of VW employees, which had been introduced in 1993 as part of the changes in 
working time. These working time accounts allowed individual employees to save 
working time and to use it for earlier retirement. The combination of VW’s social 
benefits and the benefits provided by the national social insurance made it possible for 
employees aged 55 and older to retire.424 For the company, early retirement was a way 
to modernize the workforce, while the unions valued the fact that their members could 
stop working earlier.425 
In the 1999 collective bargaining round, the annual bonus for the VW 
employees was a point of contention. Management and labor had first introduced such 
a bonus in the 1997 collective bargaining round. The bonus linked the compensation 
of workers to the company’s performance. Following record profits in 1998, the union 
described the offer by the company to pay a bonus of 1,000 German marks as 
“ridiculous.” The final compromise of the collective bargaining agreement was a 
bonus of 1,600 German marks for each employee.  
 
 
                                                 
422 VW: Volkswagen Chronic. Company document. 2005. 
423 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Altersteilzeit hat Priorität. Union leaflet. March 17, 1997. 
424 IG Metall: Altersteilzeit. Das Modell der IG Metall bei Volkswagen. Union publication. November 
1997.  
425 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Ein Zeichen gesetzt. Union leaflet. July 10, 1997. 
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A new context of collective negotiations: labor transnationalism  
The idea of developing transnational labor representation structures emerged in the 
1980s when VW began to expand production in Europe after the acquisition of SEAT. 
The general works council was aware that this could lead to increasing competition 
between VW plants in Europe. In this sense, the foundation of the European Works 
Council (EWC) in 1990 was a precautionary measure, which seemed justified when 
VW further expanded production by buying the Slovakian car company Skoda and 
built up new production capacities in Eastern Europe (Haipeter 2000). In addition, 
parallel production emerged when the Polo production no longer exclusively took 
place in Wolfsburg but also started at the Pamplona plant in Spain.  
At first management rejected the EWC. Management only recognized the 
EWC in 1992 as an official labor representation body of VW. From then on, 
management took a more pro-active role and learnt to use the EWC. In the EWC 
meetings, management provided the representatives with all the important economic 
data of the company, which meant an extension of information rights for unionists 
from outside Germany (e.g. Spain). The provision of key economic figures to 
unionists was an important element of co-management in Germany. Unionists who 
could independently assess the economic situation of a company were often more 
inclined to take on responsibility for the competitiveness of the company. The 
importance of the EWC for management was apparent through the participation of 
top-management – including the chairman – in the meetings.426 VW’s management 
used the biannual meetings with the EWC to highlight problems in the car markets and 
to convince labor to improve the competitive position of the VW Company. In 
addition, management provided internal comparisons of the different European plants. 
These comparisons illustrated which plants lagged behind in terms of productivity. In 
                                                 
426 Management interview. VW. November 18, 2005.  
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1998, management and labor founded a WWC,427 which was used by management in a 
similar way. 
The general works council at the world headquarters in Wolfsburg was at the 
center of the transnational labor relations structure. The chairman of the general works 
council, Klaus Volkert, was also the chairman of EWC and WWC.428 Thus, the labor-
side strategies depended to a large extent on the German general works council. 
Despite the initial intention of the German works councilors to develop the 
transnational labor representation structures for coping with international competition,  
the actual working of EWC and WWC was different. In contrast to GM and Ford 
representatives, labor at VW sought neither to negotiate transnational collective 
agreement in the EWC nor to negotiate restructuring or the distribution of production 
in the EWC. The German works councilors decided to deal with the more substantial 
issues (collective bargaining and production assignments) in their home institutions, 
which provided greater leverage for labor than the transnational labor representation 
structures (Greer & Hauptmeier 2008b). There were discussions in EWC and WWC 
about the distribution of production, however the actual decisions were made at the 
world headquarters in Wolfsburg and the German labor representatives had a say in 
them, in particular through labor representation on the supervisory board.  
 
Collective bargaining and competition over production, 1999 – 2007  
From 1999 onwards, the connection between collective bargaining and the 
competition over production assignments within VW became much stronger. Two 
factors contributed to the increasing competition. First, in previous years, negotiations 
                                                 
427 General works council: BR Kontakt. Welt-Konzernbetriebsrat. Fuer die Solidarität aller 
Konzernstandorte. General works council leaflet. July, 1999.  
428 General works council: BR Kontakt. Welkonzernbetriebsrat gegruendet. General works council 
leaflet. July, 1998. 
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about production had mostly been about how to distribute the increasing production. 
Production of cars had increased between 1994 and 1999, but began to stagnate from 
then on and it became obvious that VW had overcapacities.429 The German plants 
were increasingly underutilized, which made it difficult to run the plants productively 
in comparison with foreign VW plants. Second, the standardization of production and 
the introduction of production platforms made it possible for management to assign 
productions to different plants or shift production volumes between plants. VW began 
to play plants off each other and used this as an instrument in collective negotiations 
with labor.  
An important change took place in 1999. Management decided that the new car 
model Touareg, a small Sports Utility Vehicle, would not be produced in the 
Hannover plant but in Bratislava, Slovakia.430 Management argued that the production 
costs were too high in Germany, and in order to keep the German production sites 
productive, it was crucial to find a healthy mix between foreign low cost production 
and high cost production in Germany. This was a shock for the labor 
representatives.431 The clear message was that car manufacturing was too expensive in 
German plants. This had always been an argument in public debates, but labor at VW 
believed that higher labor costs were compensated for by effective organization and 
the high quality of production at the German plants. Giving the Touareg, which was 
seen as a high-end product, to a production location in Eastern Europe was a big blow 
for the labor representatives at VW.  
Shortly afterwards, in November 1999, management made the link between 
collective bargaining and the distribution of production even more explicit. The labor 
director, Hartz, publicly offered the production of a new car model and the creation of 
                                                 
429 VW. Annual company report. Various years. 
430 Union interview. IG Metall. June 12, 2006. 
431 Industry expert interview. May 19, 2005. 
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5,000 new jobs to the labor representatives.432 However, the production of this car 
model and the creation of new jobs could not take place under the VW collective 
bargaining agreement that was in place at the time; it could only be realized under a 
new collective bargaining regime. Hartz suggested paying a production worker about 
5,000 German marks, which was at least 20% below VW’s collective bargaining 
agreement. In short, Hartz suggested 5,000 new jobs each for a monthly wage of 5,000 
German marks. 433 This is why the model came to be known as the 5000 x 5000 
project – later it was just called. IG Metall rejected lower-tier wages but showed some 
willingness to engage in negotiations. 
Before the negotiation over the Auto 5000 project began, a regular collective 
bargaining round took place in the fall of 2000. Management and labor quickly 
negotiated a new labor contract. Shortly before the negotiations, the chair of VW, 
Piëch, had stated in an interview that VW would make a record profit (in 2000 the VW 
Company earned 2,061 million euros and the VW brand’s contribution was 918 
million euros). The statement by Piëch was a good starting point for the union in the 
collective bargaining round and made it to difficult for management to push for 
concessions.434 Finally, management and unions agreed to take the percentage 
increases of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement and apply them to VW.435 
The collective negotiations on the Auto 5000 project started in March 2001.436 
Management made it very clear that the production of the car model Touran would 
only take place in Germany if the IG Metall agreed to a new and additional collective 
bargaining agreement with lower social benefits and wages. Otherwise, the production 
                                                 
432 IG Metall. Geschäftsbericht, 2000-2003. Union document. May, 2004.  
433 IG Metall: 5000 x 5000. Neue Wege wagen. Das IG Metall-Tarifsystem für das VW Project 
5000x5000. Union document. November 2001.  
434 IG Metall. Geschäftsbericht, 2000-2003. Union document. May, 2004.  
435 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. Eine runde Sache. Union leaflet. September 26, 2000. 
436 IG Metall: 5000 x 5000. Neue Wege wagen. Das IG Metall-Tarifsystem fuer das VW Project 
5000x5000. Union document. November, 2001. 
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of the Touran would be given to a foreign plant as had happened before with the 
Touareg. The negotiations over Auto 5000 drew a lot of attention beyond the VW 
Company. Auto 5000 became a focus point of the public debate in Germany. 
Unemployment remained high in Germany. A major public cause was the transfer of 
industrial jobs to Eastern Europe. In this context, Hartz offered the creation of 5,000 
new industrial jobs in Germany. This was big news. IG Metall was already on the 
defensive and was seen by neoliberal commentators as part of the problem of the 
German economy. If the IG Metall rejected the proposal, the public would blame the 
union for the relocation of industrial jobs to other countries. This public discourse put 
pressure on the union. 437 
At times, it seemed that the labor director, Hartz, asked for too much.438 
Previously, the VW employees in the six plants in western Germany had been covered 
by the same collective bargaining agreement for decades. Hartz asked for a new and 
different collective bargaining agreement for the Auto 5000 production. First, wages 
were suggested to be on the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement, 
which was at least 20% below the wage levels at VW. Second, Hartz asked for far-
reaching working flexibility, with workers having to work up to 48 hours a week in 
times of peak demand. Third, workers were supposed to have greater responsibility for 
each produced car. In case workers did not produce a car properly, e.g if they damaged 
a car accidentally, workers were supposed to fix these problems in their private time 
after work.439 
Hartz was aware that some of the elements of Auto 5000 were barely 
acceptable to the unions, but he had also included aspects that were positively assessed 
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438 Management interview. VW. November 18, 2005.  
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by the unions. He suggested introducing a new type of group work with flat 
hierarchies in the new plant, which connected to a previous debate within IG Metall on 
the humanization of work. In addition, it was suggested that the newly employed 
workers were to drawn from the unemployed. Extensive training was supposed to be a 
part of the Auto 5000 project. Despite these positive aspects, some norms of the Auto 
5000 agreement conflicted with very important elements of IG Metall’s ideology. A 
key social norm of the unions had been “same pay for the same work” (in German: 
“gleicher Lohn fuer gleiche Arbeit”). However, the implementation of Auto 5000 in 
Wolfsburg would result in lower wages for the same type of work at one production 
site. In addition, the suggested working time of 48 hours heavily conflicted with the 
union’s idea to reduce working time for countering unemployment.440 
In the negotiations, IG Metall tried very hard to make Auto 5000 possible. 
However, management and labor could not agree on the working time issue. 
Management had stepped down from the 48-hour week and instead suggested a 
working time corridor (on average a 42.5-hour week) flexibly organized between 
Monday and Saturday. IG Metall was willing to agree to greater working time 
flexibility but wanted to defend the 35-hour working week in principal. This 
disagreement resulted in the breakdown of the negotiations in June 2001.441 
The breakdown of the negotiation resulted in extensive media coverage. As the 
labor representatives had anticipated, much of the media blamed IG Metall for the 
failure of the negotiations. The largest German newspaper, the boulevard newspaper 
Bild, called IG Metall a “job killer” in large capital letters on its front page.442 Even 
the German parliament discussed the topic in an extraordinary session. The neoliberal 
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441 IG Metall: Metall Nachrichten. VW hat Bogen ueberspannt. Union leaflet. Juni 27, 2001. 
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party FDP demanded new opening clauses for collective bargaining agreements. In 
addition, the chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, became involved.443 He had 
connections to VW stemming from the time when he was a member of VW’s 
supervisory board during the 1990s representing the state Lower Saxony,  whose 
president he had been. Schröder sought a meeting with a few key actors from both 
sides and forcefully demanded the implementation of the Auto 5000 project.  
Shortly afterwards, management and labor, driven by political and public 
pressure, took up negotiations again and reached an agreement on August 28, 2001. A 
compromise was reached with respect to working time. Management agreed to a 35-
hour week on average and labor agreed to at least 10 additional shifts at the weekend. 
As demanded by management, the wage levels of the newly employed workers were 
on the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, labor 
had secured production for the Wolfsburg plant, where work started in 2003 with 
3,500 new employees.444 
The Auto 5000 contract was the last major change in labor relations during the 
term of Piëch, who was VW’s chairman between 1993 and 2002. The new chairman 
became Wolfgang Pischetsrieder, while Piëch became the new chair of the supervisory 
board. After the leadership change, in the fall of 2002, a regular collective bargaining 
round was due. Management tried to seek additional concessions. However, labor was 
not willing to accept the demands given the positive economic situation of the 
company and previous concessions. The negotiations did not touch on sensitive issues 
and were not very contentious. After only three rounds of negotiations, management 
and labor reached a compromise. The benchmark for the agreement was once more the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement. The percentage wage increases mirrored 
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those of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. In addition, IG Metall was able 
to gain and additional merit-based lump sum for VW employees.445 
In the following two years, the socio-economic context became more difficult 
for labor at VW. IG Metall lost the strike in the East German metal industry in 2003, 
which was one of the worst union losses in the postwar period. VW was the model 
company of IG Metall and many new labor innovations had spread from VW to 
sectoral collective bargaining agreements in the postwar decades. There also existed 
close ties between the national union and labor representation at VW, e.g. the head of 
IG Metall was traditionally a member of the supervisory board. It had been an 
advantage of labor at VW to be backed up by the national union, but on the other 
hand, it also meant that if IG Metall suffered a major loss then it had greater 
repercussions on labor at VW as compared to other companies. In addition, the 
economic context deteriorated. The German auto market shrunk in 2002 and 2003 and 
the German economy slid into recession in 2003.  
This was the context for the collective bargaining round at VW in the fall of 
2004. It became clear that VW management would push very hard for concessions. 
Management demanded a labor cost reduction of 30% by 2011,446 which was 
equivalent to an annual labor cost reduction of two million euros. Among other 
measures, management suggested a substantial increase in working time flexibility, the 
freezing of the current wage level and the introduction of lower wage levels for new 
employees. Management linked its demands to the incentives of new production and 
employment security. In contrast, labor focused on a 4% wage increase and 
employment security. Parallel to the collective bargaining round, labor and 
management negotiated new production assignments for the German plants. As at 
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Ford, labor wanted management to agree to production assignments in a collective 
contract. The chair of the general works council summarized the strategic option of the 
union before the collective bargaining round as “jobs or money” indicating that the 
union could either aim for employment security or wage increases. Compared to 
previous collective bargaining rounds, this was a very defensive starting point.  
The negotiations reached an impasse and IG Metall started to mobilize the 
workforce in October, when protests took place parallel to the negotiation rounds with 
management. Between October 5 and October 13, about 51,000 workers took part in 
demonstrations at various plants. During the next protest wave, between October 22 
and October 28, again more than 50,000 workers participated.447 IG Metall started 
warning strikes on October 29 with work stoppages at Kassel, Braunschweig and 
Hannover. This was one the biggest worker protests in the history of VW.  
Parallel developments at another carmaker, Opel, dampened expectations at 
VW. GM had announced on October 14 the shedding of 10,000 employees or one 
third of the VW German workforce (cf. chapter on Opel). The development at Opel 
boosted the arguments of the management at VW, e.g. that the German production 
sites had a productivity problem and too high labor costs. Even though the 
negotiations at Opel were still underway, the Opel case signaled to worker 
representatives and workers at VW that the alternative to concessions could be a 
massive reduction in the workforce.  
In this situation, labor made substantive concessions and achieved job security 
and production for the German plant in exchange.448 First, labor agreed to freeze 
wages for 24 months. Labor got a one-off signing bonus, but at the same time, the 
merit-based bonus was cut. Second, labor agreed to another different collective 
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bargaining agreement for VW, the so-called collective barga ining agreement II. 
Collective bargaining agreement II was at the level of the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement, and thus was at least 20% below the wages and benefits at VW. 
All new employees joining VW would be compensated based on this new collective 
bargaining agreement. Third, the working time flexibility increased considerably and 
the individual working hours account could fluctuate by 400 hours above and below 
the annual average working time. Through the different working time flexibility 
measures VW had to pay less overtime benefits. Fourth, workers were obliged to put 
66 hours overtime towards their working time accounts. This saved working time was 
used to retire workers early.449 The labor side concessions added up to labor costs 
savings of one billion euros. 
In exchange for the concessions, labor gained employment security for the 
workforce. The collective bargaining agreement included an employment protection 
clause until 2011. The second and new element to secure employment, were specific 
production assignments for the different plants. The Wolfsburg plant was promised the 
new Golf Variant and a compact SUV; while the Emden plant was promised the new 
Passat production. In addition, the engine and parts plants got specific product 
assignments for the subsequent years. Another concession to labor was the freezing of 
management wages and benefits, which helped to legitimize labor concessions.  
The 2004 collective bargaining round at VW meant the continuation of a trend: 
the introduction of second tier wages or collective bargaining agreements with lower 
standards. In 2004, labor and management introduced the collective bargaining 
agreement II for all new employees. Previous collective bargaining agreements with 
lower standards were the AutoVision collective bargaining agreements in 2000, the 
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Sitech collective bargaining agreement for upholstery supplies and the aforementioned 
Auto 5000. All these different collective bargaining agreements took the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement as the benchmark and were thus at least 20% below 
VW levels. It was easier to introduce these new collective bargaining agreements for 
newly employed employees. By 2007, the share of the employees covered by these 
second tier collective bargaining agreement had increased. Over time, this would 
hallow out VW’s main collective bargaining agreement.  
In June 2005, a corruption scandal was uncovered (Hartz & Kloepfer 2007). It 
was uncovered that he labor department had sought to influence the orientation of 
labor leaders between 1995 and 2005 by paying them extraordinary benefits. This is 
another example of identity work, an illegal one though. The head of the general 
works council, Klaus Volkert, had received annual salary of 300,000 euros a year and 
1.95 million merit-based benefits (Hartz & Kloepfer 2007). In addition, the labor 
department paid for prostitutes and brothel visits for some German labor 
representatives during meetings of the EWC and the WWC. As a consequence, the 
head of the general works council, Klaus Volkert, and the head of the labor 
department, Peter Hartz, had to step down. Both were later prosecuted for the 
embezzlement of company money by a German court. The general works council 
sought to put the scandal quickly behind them and Bernd Osterloh became the new 
chair.450 However, despite the quick leadership change, labor representation at VW 
seemed to be weakened through the corruption scandal.  
In this situation, management launched an unusual attack on labor. 
Management tried to take advantage of the situation. Wolfgang Bernhard had joined 
VW as the head of the VW brand in February 2005. He had been a key figure in the 
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restructuring of Chrysler in the United States after the merger with Daimler. Bernhard 
launched much of the attack in the wake of the corruption scandal.451 Bernhard argued 
that either the costs at the German plants would have to decrease by 30% or the 
workforce had to be shed by 30%. In addition, he argued that the productivity of the 
Emden plant was too low and its survival was at stake. These statements were very 
unusual for labor relations at VW; it had hardly ever happened that management 
openly threatened dismissals or plant closures. Labor regarded this as an attack on the 
2004 collective bargaining agreement and its employment security clause.452 
In this period, management sought to gain further concessions from labor. 
First, it introduced a bidding process between the Emden and the Mosel plant for the 
production of the new car model C-Coupe. This was very similar to the formal bidding 
process for production at GM Europe, in which individual plants had to provide a 
tender for the production of new car models. Second, Bernhard announced that the 
SUV Tiguan (in the planning stage known as Marrakesch) would not be produced in 
Wolfsburg, if the costs did not fall considerably. He threatened to assign this car 
model to the VW plant in Portugal. 453 
The 2004 collective agreement on the distribution of production, which was 
negotiated in parallel with the collective bargaining agreement, had stated that the 
Tiguan would be produced in Wolfsburg. A works councilor described his reaction in 
an interview: “Now they don’t respect any longer our collective agreements. We can’t 
trust them [management] any longer.”454 Under pressure the general works councilors 
engaged in negotiations with management and the compromise was that the Tiguan 
would not be produced under the main collective bargaining agreement but under the 
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Auto 5000 collective bargaining agreement.455 Management had pushed successfully 
for concessions. In addition, labor was not able to stop the competitive bidding 
between the Emden and Mosel plants. The C-Coupe was finally given to Emden after 
they agreed to concessions.456 
Management also sought to stop the appointment of the new labor director 
suggested by IG Metall.457 It was part of the tradition at VW that IG Metall’s nominee 
was appointed. IG Metall suggested Horst Neumann who was the former head of the 
labor department at the VW brand Audi. The chair of VW tried to break with this 
tradition and criticized Neumann as not being sufficiently qualified for the position. 
Like all new managers, Neumann’s appointment had to be confirmed by the 
supervisory board and it came to a rare showdown. Following serious disagreements 
over the new candidate, a representative of the capital side suggested a postponement 
of the vote in order to have further discussions. This was rejected by labor and a vote 
on Neumann took place. His post was confirmed with votes from labor, two 
representatives of the capital side and the chair of the supervisory board. IG Metall 
had pushed through its candidate for the Labor Director.  
The vote can only be understood in the context of a power struggle on the 
supervisory board in 2005 and 2006, in which labor took sides with its chairman 
Ferdinand Piëch. Piëch wanted to bring in the Porsche Company, which was owned by 
the Piëch family, as a major shareholder of the VW Company. The prime minister of 
Lower Saxony and some representatives from the capital side harshly criticized this 
and asked Piëch to step down. They pointed to the conflict of interest his private 
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interest (as an owner of Porsche) and being the main supervisor of VW. The power 
struggle did not become dangerous for Piëch because he was supported by labor (who 
had half the votes on the supervisory board) as well as some capital representatives. In 
2006, the supervisory board dismissed Pischetsrieder as the president of VW.458 
Bernhard left the company as well because he lost with Pischetsrieder his most 
important supporter.   
Before the turnaround on the supervisory board another collective bargaining 
round had taken place in 2006, while Pischetsrieder and Bernhard were still in charge, 
the new Labor Director Horst Neumann negotiated a new collective bargaining 
agreement. In the spring of 2006, management began to talk about a potentially life-
threatening crisis in the VW Company and a labor excess of 20,000 employees. 
However, it is not clear that there actually was an economic crisis at VW. The whole 
VW Company made profits and the gross income in 2005 was 2,792 million euros.459 
However, the contribution of the VW brands in recent years had decreased. The VW 
brands were competing in the low and medium segments of the auto market. In these 
segments, competition remained stiff and overcapacities were a problem.460 
The new labor director tried to talk IG Metall into negotiations for a new 
collective bargaining agreement. A new agreement was not due before 2007, but 
management argued that new negotiations were necessary because of the difficult 
economic situation. In preliminary talks during the summer, IG Metall made it clear 
that it would not rush into collective bargaining. The only reason to engage in 
collective bargaining would be additiona l production for the German plants. However, 
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the underutilization of the German plants was a concern to IG Metall. After 
management indicated an interest in negotiating additional production for the German 
plants, IG Metall agreed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. 
The major concession that labor made was to increase the working week from 
28 to 33 hours without a respective wage increase. In addition, management and labor 
agreed that up to 30% of the wages would be merit-based. There was no wage increase 
for 2007, but only a one-off 1,000 euros lump sum.461 The difference between VW’s 
collective bargaining agreement and the sectoral collective bargaining substantially 
decreased. In exchange for the concessions, management promised additional 
production for the plants in the collective bargaining agreement. In contrast to the 
2006 collective bargaining round, management and labor not only agreed on specific 
products but also on specific production levels.  
A key point of the 2006 collective bargaining agreement was the increase in 
Golf production in Wolfsburg. Additional volume was supposed to be transferred from 
the Brussels plant, where the Golf was the most important product. This shift of 
production threatened the survival of the Brussels plant. The unions at the Brussels 
plant went on strike and open conflict broke out in the EWC. The Belgium unions 
openly said that they felt betrayed by the German worker representatives.462 
Meanwhile, unions and management at the Brussels plant engaged in collective 
negotiations. After the Belgian unions agreed to substantial concessions, VW assigned 
the production of the Audi A3 to the Brussels plant, which secured the survival of the 
plant. 
VW management had claimed before the collective bargaining round in 2006 
that the survival of the company was threatened. This did not seem credible after the 
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results for 2006 were announced in 2007. VW had earned 2.9 billion euros and the 
VW brands had contributed 1.4 billion euros to the company result.463 In the first half 
of 2007, VW reached a new sales record and sold for the first time more than 3 million 
cars in six months. 
 
Summary 
The institutional basis of labor relations at VW was unique in Germany and grew out 
of particular historical circumstances. VW was a state-owned company. After the 
partial privatization of the company, the federal government and the state Lower 
Saxony became 20% shareholders respectively. This compromise, codified in the 
Volkswagen Law, also limited the votes of any shareholder to 20%. This strengthened 
labor’s position on the supervisory board, as half of the supervisory members were 
labor representatives. Labor had an influential say in investment decisions and 
appointments by management. In addition, labor shared crucial interests with the state 
Lower Saxony, which remained a shareholder after the federal governments sold its 
share in 1988. Labor and the state government were interested in employment and 
investments at the plants in Lower Saxony where the majority of the German VW 
plants were located. Another particularity of the institutional structure at VW was 
company level collective bargaining, which gave labor the right to strike in collective 
bargaining in contrast to the works councilors at GM and Ford.  
 An employment relations pattern emerged at VW, which has often been 
described as co-management. One side of co-management is the institutional 
framework, which gave labor a far-reaching say in decision-making processes in the 
management of the company. The other side is co-management as an ideology. The 
institutional integration in key decision-making processes brought out a labor 
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orientation that accepted early on a responsibility for the productivity of the company. 
In companies where such an integration of labor in decision-making is missing, it is 
much easier to develop opposition to management initiatives. Management at VW had 
a paternalistic approach to labor relations during the postwar decades. Its co-
management orientation was shaped by the institutional constraints and specific 
historical experiences. When management considered closing down a plant during the 
first oil crisis in the 1970s, which would have been a more conventional management 
approach, labor showed management its limit and stopped the plans decisively. 
Management learnt that it could not manage unilaterally, and so developing a co-
management orientation was a necessity.  
 VW was one of the first multinational companies in Germany and built plants 
in foreign countries early on in the postwar decades. Labor supported this international 
expansion on the supervisory board. Until the mid 1980s, foreign production facilities 
were aimed at gaining access to new markets that were protected by trade barriers. In 
the following years, labor’s choices became more difficult as VW’s expansion in 
Europe in the second half of the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s meant direct 
competition for the German plants in the context of the liberalization of the European 
auto market. However, labor continued to support VW’s expansion as labor believed 
that this was necessary to keep the company competitive, which would also secure 
jobs at home.  
 During the recession of the European auto market in 1993, VW made record 
losses and experienced a severe company crisis. In line with previous employment 
relations practices, labor and management cooperatively worked out a reduction of 
labor costs. In order to avoid redundancies, labor and management focused on 
reducing working time to 28.8 hours a week. In addition, both sides agreed to far-
reaching working time flexibility measures. In a following collective agreement in 
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1995, working time flexibility was further extended. The agreement by the German 
labor representatives to working time flexibility stands in stark contrast to other VW 
plants in Europe such as the Spanish plants, which only implemented similar measures 
in the 2000s. Agreeing to far-reaching working time flexibility was an attempt by 
labor to increase productivity of the German plants, while at the same defending 
higher social benefits and wage standards compared to other VW plants in Europe.  
 In the 1990s, a transnational labor representation structure developed at VW. 
Labor founded a EWC as a precautionary measure in 1990, because labor expected 
more competition within Europe. After initially being skeptical about the EWC, 
management officially accepted the EWC in 1992 and embraced it quickly as a HR 
instrument. Management used the EWC to extend some of the German employment 
relations practices to other European plants. Management gave labor representatives 
from other European plants access to company information and discussed investment 
plans with them. The management idea behind such an “open book” approach was to 
influence labor’s orientation and engender cooperation. Labor representatives tended 
to become more inclined to share an agenda with management and to take on 
responsibility for the productivity of the company, when they got access to key 
company information and had a voice in company planning. The WWC, founded in 
1998, was used by management in a similar way. Labor used the EWC and the WWC 
for an information exchange with labor representatives; however, labor representatives 
preferred to negotiate the crucial elements of the employment relations with 
management within the German institutions, as they provided more leverage with 
respect to investment decisions.  
 Between 1995 and 2005, the HR department sought to influence the orientation 
of key labor leaders by using money, which is another example of identity work, albeit 
an illegal one. In 2005, it was revealed that the HR department paid the head of the 
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general works council, who was at same time head of the EWC and WWC, a salary of 
about 300,000 euros a year and more than two million euros merit-based bonuses 
between 1995 and 2005 (Hartz & Kloepfer 2007). The highest labor representative of 
the VW Company was treated like a top manager. In addition, the labor department 
paid for prostitutes and brothel visits for key labor representatives during meetings of 
the EWC and the WWC. The head of the HR department and the head of the general 
works council were prosecuted for embezzlement of company money by a German 
court. The evidence suggests that the HR Department sought to influence key labor 
leaders with respect to changes in labor relations; however, the evidence is not 
sufficient to argue that the HR department bribed labor representatives, as it is not 
possible to establish a clear link between the above described illegal payments and 
benefits and specific changes in labor relations.  
 In 1999, management began to engage in whipsawing practices and coercive 
comparisons. Management mimicked these strategies from other producers such as 
GM. This was a departure from the more cooperative employment relations at VW. 
When labor did not agree to a new collective bargaining agreement with lower 
standards and second-tier wages, management sourced a new VW car to the Bratislava 
plant in Slovakia. This was the first time the production of a new VW model did not 
start in Germany; previously, only older car models had been sourced to foreign 
plants. The decision to source the new car model to Slovakia was part of the 
investment plan 1999, which was accepted by the supervisory board with the votes of 
the labor representatives. Another collective agreement from the same year is helpful 
in understanding labor’s ideology.  
Shortly later, management announced the launch of another new VW car 
model for 2001. Management argued again that the production would only take place 
in Germany, if labor representatives agreed to a collective bargaining agreement with 
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lower standards. An intense debate broke out among labor representatives and within 
IG Metall. Initially, labor rejected the demands by management. Only under strong 
public pressure and after an intervention by the chancellor of Germany, Gerhard 
Schröder, management and labor found a compromise. Despite some management 
concessions, the bottom line was the introduction of a lower tier collective bargaining 
agreement. This was a renegotiation of the institutional rule and norm “same pay for 
same jobs.” In 2005, management pitted – for the first time – two German plants 
against each other in a competitive bidding process for the allocation of new car 
production. This was similar to the bidding process between plants introduced by GM 
in 2003.  
 The 2004 collective bargaining round was contentious and labor decided to 
hold one of the few postwar strikes at VW. In a difficult economic context labor 
sought to limit the concessions. In addition, labor representatives mimicked a strategy 
of the Ford works council and negotiated specific production assignment for the 
German plants. In exchange, labor agreed to another lower tier collective bargaining 
agreement. A similar exchange took place in 2006. The extension of lower tier 
collective bargaining agreements meant a hollowing out of the main collective 
bargaining agreement as newly employed workers would only be employed based on 
the collective bargaining agreements, with lower standards.  
Labor at VW had more institutional rights and resources than at any other 
German company; however, the meaning and functioning of the institutions changed 
at VW. In the postwar decades, labor used its exceptional influence to push for social 
and material improvements. Labor was a trendsetter and new collective bargaining 
innovations, developed at VW, spread to other German companies. In the 1990s and 
2000s, in a more difficult economic context, management became the agenda setter in 
collective bargaining attempting to stop rising labor costs and increase productivity. 
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Management sought to influence labor through illegal payments and benefits to some 
key labor representatives between 1995 and 2005. In addition, management began to 
whipsaw the German VW plants in the la te 1990s. Labor did not use its strong 
institutional position to counter whipsawing; labor shared the interpretation of 
management that the German VW plants lagged behind in terms of productivity. 
Labor accepted whipsawing as a “tough medicine,” but as a legitimate management 
approach in order to stay competitive and secure jobs, wages and benefits. Despite the 
co-management institutions at VW, employment relations at VW looked increasingly 
similar to other car producers – management’s whipsawing, lower tier collective 
bargaining agreements and labor’s focus on the assignment of production to the 
German plants were symptomatic elements.  
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CHAPTER 8 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT GM IN GERMANY 
 
GM bought the German carmaker Opel in 1929 (Schneider 1987). This was one of 
GM’s first moves on the European continent. In addition to its Rüsselsheim plant, 
Opel had production sites in Bochum (1962), a component plant in Kaiserslautern 
(1966) and an assembly plant in Eisenach (1992). Employment reached its peak in 
1979. The economic record during the 1980s was mixed, but profits skyrocketed at the 
end of the decade, reaching a new company record in 1990. Opel was in good shape at 
the brink of German unification, while GM had economic problems in the United 
States.  
 
Labor representation at Opel 
As in other large companies in the German auto industry, the labor union IG Metall 
was the predominant union at Opel and it represented the great majority of the 
workforce. The general works council, the main collective representation body for all 
the plants is mainly composed of IG Metall members (Turner 1991). It has its seat at 
the Rüsselsheim plant. There were only a few large strikes at Opel in the post-war 
decades. One example was IG Metall’s national campaign for a 35 hour-week in 
1984.464 The Rüsselsheim plant was one of the strike targets and production was 
halted for six weeks.465 Such strikes took place in the context of sectoral collective 
bargaining between the national union IG Metall and the company, since works 
councils do not have the right to strike. Work stoppages, however, sometimes 
happened, especially at the Bochum plant, which had a workforce largely composed of 
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former mineworkers. In the context of low unemployment in the 1970s, the general 
works council at Opel pushed for a higher wage than the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement permitted. A second collective bargaining round after the sectoral collective 
bargaining round became at Opel, as at other auto companies, a common practice. The 
workers called the subsequently negotiated higher wages on the company level: the 
Opel wage. In the 1970s and 1980s, the wages increases of the collective bargaining 
agreement were added to the already higher Opel wage. This led to an upward wage 
drift in contrast to the wage levels of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement.466 
In the early 1990s, the Opel wages were about 25% above the sectoral collective 
bargaining level.467 
German co-determination laws gave labor representative two instruments to 
advance the interests of workers, namely participation on the supervisory board and 
taking part in the decision-making process on the shop floor (Turner 1991). First, half 
of the members of the supervisory board were labor representatives. The other half of 
the seats on the supervisory board belonged to Opel or GM management, including the 
head of the supervisory board, which had the decisive vote in case of a draw. In 
contrast to other companies, Opel management did not actively sought to integrate 
labor in decision-making processes. The main advantage of the supervisory board for 
labor was to receive information on company performance and investment decisions. 
Second, works councilors have different means to influence management. According 
to the works council constitution act, the general works council has to agree to 
changes in working time and work organization. There are numerous examples in the 
1970s and 1980s, when the general works council leveraged the approval for overtime 
in order to gain concessions from management. Thus, although the general works 
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council and the works councils at the individual plants lacked a right to strike, they 
had alternative forcing strategies in collective negotiations with management.  
 
Management and the structure of production  
GM expanded production in Europe in the 1980s. Up to then, GM served the 
European market exclusively through the brands Vauxhall in Great Britain and Opel in 
Germany (which also included a subsidiary of Opel in Antwerp, Belgium). In the early 
1980s, GM moved beyond these countries and built the Saragossa assembly plant in 
Spain in 1982 as well as a motor plant in Aspen, Austria. In addition, GM moved its 
European headquarters from Rüsselsheim to Zürich in Switzerland. The intention was 
to separate the European headquarters from the comparatively strong labor 
representation at Opel in Germany. At the end of the 1980s, GM bought the Swedish 
premium car SAAB in 1989. After the collapse of communism, GM expanded beyond 
the iron curtain and built a new production facility in Eisenach in East Germany and a 
motor plant in Hungary. This expansion was supported by the high profits of Opel 
between 1989 and 1992. This boom period of the auto market came to a sharp end in 
1993, when one of the worst postwar recessions hit the German economy. However, 
this more difficult economic environment opened the way for management to push for 
changes in employment relations. Management became the agenda setter. 
 
Collective negotiations at Opel, 1990 – 1999  
The boom of the German economy in the wake of German unification supported the 
wage demands of the works council in their collective negotiations. In 1990468 and 
1992469, the wage increases won by the sectoral collective bargaining round were fully 
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added to the Opel wage, further increasing the wage differential between sector and 
Opel wages. Following these positive results for labor, the social and economic 
context began to change decisively.  
The recession of the German economy in 1993 coincided with an economic 
crisis caused by German unification. Thousands of companies in East Germany did 
not survive the exposure to western capitalist markets and went bankrupt, resulting in 
skyrocketing unemployment. During the crisis, employer associations pushed for 
changes in employment relations and gained opening and hardship clauses in the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement s in Eastern Germany. Along with other 
employers, the Opel management sought to alter previous employment relations 
practices. During the presentation of the company report, the president of Opel 
announced the benefits for 1992 in the amount of 202 million German marks.470 He 
judged them as a poor performance and blamed the high wages and short working time 
in Germany. Along the same line, the company newspaper Opel Post showed in table 
and graphs that Opel Germany had the highest wages and lowest annual working time 
at GM worldwide.471 The management position was summarized by citing a 
newspaper article: “The German workers have become the most expensive and laziest 
in the world.”472 At the height of the campaign, management cancelled three collective 
agreements on social benefits – an unprecedented incident in labor relations at Opel. 473 
The first agreement cancelled was the one in which the full wage increases won in 
sectoral collective bargaining would be added to the Opel wages. The second 
concerned remedies for varnishers, and the third concerned additional payments 
during short working time. In addition, management closed down the company library 
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for workers.474 In order to cope with the slump in demand, Opel management 
suggested negotiating a Pact for Employment and Competitiveness (Rehder 2003). 
Similar pacts had already been drawn-up at other large German companies. Such 
company level pacts had become popular during the slump of the German economy 
since they addressed the competitiveness of companies as well as employment security 
for workers.  
After the cancellation of the three collective agreements, workers reacted with 
a wildcat work stoppage in Rüsselsheim.475 The works councilors helped to put an end 
to this work stoppage, but also sought to counter the management campaign. The 
works council mobilized the workforce and organized workforce assemblies in July 
and September 1993. The general works council called the management statements an 
insult and the cancellation of the collective agreements an unprecedented attack on 
labor. Labor representatives pointed to the high productivity of the German plants and 
high earnings of Opel in recent years. Despite the mobilization against the 
management plans, the works council agreed that they had to make some concessions 
in order to cope with the effects of the recession. 476 In addition, competitors of Opel 
such as Ford and VW, negotiated concessions from the workforce and thus there was 
some pressure on Opel to follow suit.  
After the partly heated exchange in July 1993 both sides restrained themselves 
from extreme statements in the collective negotiations, and a compromise was reached 
in November.477 Management was able to gain two important concessions. In the 
following four years, the wage increases of the sectoral collective bargaining would 
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not be fully added to the higher Opel wages. Compared to later collective negotiations 
the labor cost reduction was not very significant, but from a management perspective, 
it was important to stop the continuous positive wage drift between sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement and Opel wages. In addition, the collective agreement linked the 
full payment of a 13th monthly wage (the so-called Christmas wage)478 to absenteeism 
within the company. The most important gain for labor was an employment security 
clause. Employment security became the major focus of worker representatives 
because of rising unemployment in Germany. 479 
The market pressure caused by the recession within the German and European 
auto market opened up some space for management to pursue the above-mentioned 
changes. An additional lever for changes was the new Eisenach plant in East 
Germany, which started production in August 1992. The Eisenach plant was supposed 
to be GM’s most modern plant – a worldwide benchmark for lean production and 
teamwork. The labels attached to the Eisenach plant like “NUMMI of the east” or 
“shrine in the east” reflected the extraordinary status of the plant within GM (Turner 
1991). Here GM sought to imitate the competitive production of the Japanese car 
producers, which came to be known as lean production. Based on the experiences at 
Saturn, as well as the NUMMI joint-venture with Toyota and in the United States, GM 
developed its own production system called the General Motors – Global 
Manufacturing System (GM-GMS) at the Eisenach plant further. GM intended to 
implement this manufacturing system at all its plants worldwide and thereby 
standardized production. Complementary to this production system, GM developed a 
platform strategy. This standardization of the common production platform was the 
basis for later coercive comparisons in collective negotiations.  
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The Eisenach plant was kept at first out of the labor representation structurep 
of Opel and as the Eisenach plant was set up as an independent subsidiary. 480 This 
meant that Eisenach had a separate labor relations structure – disconnected from the 
general works council and the supervisory board in the west. The wages in the plant 
were on the level of the East German sectoral metal collective bargaining agreement, 
which were 20% below the ones in the west. However, management did not use the 
Eisenach plant so much to push for lower wages – but rather as an example to induce 
more lean production and teamwork at the western plants. Management used internal 
comparisons to demonstrate to the western plants that the Eisenach plant had a higher 
productivity. 481  
The next round of collective negotiations at Opel took place in 1995. The 1993 
Pact for Employment and Competitiveness had a run-time until the end of 1997; 
however, management took new investment and production decisions at its European 
plants and used these as leverage to renegotiate labor relations. Management offered 
the production of the new Vectra, as well as new investments of six billion German 
marks to its western German plants.482 In turn, management demanded greater 
working time flexibility. GM’s European management initiated similar negotiations in 
Antwerp (Belgium) and Luton (UK), offering these plants the production of the Vectra 
as well. In the negotiations, management presented the production costs to the general 
works council, which indicated that the productivity at Rüsselsheim was below that of 
the other two plants, mostly due to the higher wage costs in Germany. Management 
demanded a higher productivity in order to secure production volumes for 
Rüsselsheim. Finally, both sides agreed on a working time corridor from 31 to 38.75 
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weekly working hours, the weekly hours would adapt to the fluctuation of the 
market.483 The average weekly working time was supposed to be 35 hours. This 
working time agreement followed in the footsteps of 1993 and 1994 agreements at 
VW, in which VW had considerably increased working time flexibility at its plant. 
Besides increasing working time flexibility, the general works council agreed to a 
lower wage increase compared to the 1995 sectoral collective bargaining agreement.  
In exchange for the concession management assigned an additional 15% 
Vectra production. The European management did not stop here. It took the German 
agreements to the other Vectra plants in Antwerp, Belgium, and Luton, UK, to extract 
concessions at these plants. After some concessions at the Luton plant, worker 
representatives got a supposedly higher share of the Vectra production (for export to 
Japan). There was, however, no transnational information exchange between tlabor in 
Europe that would have verified or falsified the claims made by management.  
Besides the collective agreements in 1993 and 1995, management and labor 
also used early retirement schemes to reduce the workforce. Early retirement was an 
instrument favored by the German government to fight unemployment. Workers 
would get up to 70% of their former wage through the national social security system. 
At Opel, management paid for the difference between social benefits and previous  
wages, so that workers in early retirement received the equivalent of a full wage. Early 
retirement was popular with both management and unions. Management appreciated 
being able to rejuvenate the workforce by having the national social insurance pay the 
largest amount of the costs, while the works council appreciated the social advantages 
for older workers, who also continued to be union members as retirees. However, a 
strategic dilemma for the works council was that management used early retirement to 
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shrink the workforce, since the retired workers were not equally replaced with new 
entrants.484 The workforce decreased throughout the 1990s from 57, 489 in 1990 to 
44,695 in 1996.485 GM’s European management began to shift employment to Eastern 
Europe, as is indicated by the opening of a GM motor plant in Hungary and a new 
assembly-plant in Gliwice (Poland), built in 1996.  
Negotiations for the next Pact for Employment and Competitiveness had 
originally started in 1997. At this time, unemployment had reached a new high in 
Germany. In surveys, the German people named unemployment as the most important 
political issue. In this context, management threatened to cut jobs, which caused major 
concerns among the Opel workforce. The employment security clause of the 1993 
contract expired at the end of 1997, and so did the general works council seek an 
extension of employment security. 486 Negotiations on these issues did not go smoothly 
and were interrupted several times. A conflict in the management emerged between 
the Opel CEO, David Herman, and the GM headquarters. In October 1997, rumors 
appeared that Herman would be transferred to GM’s Russian operation. Although GM 
did not confirm the transfer of Herman to Russia before the summer of 1998, the early 
rumors undercut Hermann’s authority in the negotiations. Finally, the headquarters 
directly intervened in the collective negotiations when it announced that it would cut 
the European workforce by 10,000 workers by 2001. During this period, GM’s 
headquarters took a hard line towards labor, which was also demonstrated by the 
conflict with the UAW in the Flint strike in 1998 (cf. US chapter).  
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Despite these interferences by the headquarters, the negotiations continued.487 
As in the 1995 negotiation, management whipsawed the German plants by comparing 
them with plants in the UK and Belgium, and by promising them new investments and 
production assignments in Europe. Management and labor reached an agreement in 
January 1998.488 For the duration of the agreement, the wage increases of the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement would not be fully added to the Opel wages, thus 
diminishing further the difference between the Opel wages and those of the sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement. The pay of the Christmas benefit was again coupled 
to absenteeism and the full Christmas benefit (the 13th wage) would only be fully paid 
if the rate of absenteeism was below 6%.489 The working time flexibility measures of 
the last collective agreement were extended. In addition, the agreement opened up the 
possibility to reduce the workforce through early retirement by up to 4,000 workers. In 
exchange, management agreed to exclude forced redundancies until the end of 2002 
(one year longer than the collective agreement). Management also agreed to new 
investments and production assignments to the German plants, which were in detail 
listed in the new collective agreement. The general works council at Opel imitated this 
strategy from the Ford works councils, which had started to negotiate specific 
production volumes with management and to define them in collective agreements 
(Schulten, Seifert, & Zagelmeyer 2002).  
As after the last collective negotiations, management took the German 
agreement and whipsawed the Belgium and British production sites, pointing to the 
productivity improvements at the German plants. GM had a greater capacity to 
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whipsaw plants than Ford since GM had more parallel production (Greer & 
Hauptmeier 2008a). The GM management used this technique to extract aggressively 
concession across Europe. This new round of European whipsawing showed the limits 
of national labor strategies.490 The result was a downward spiral of working conditions 
and standards across countries. The whipsawing by European management became 
much more pronounced as the European car market entered the next recession – and 
overcapacity became the main problem (Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie, & 
Winchester 2006). In this context, plant representatives from the different European 
plants began to cooperate across countries. 
 
Collective negotiations and transnational worker cooperation, 2000-2006 
The development of transnational labor strategy goes back to the late 1980s. After the 
European headquarters moved from Rüsselsheim to Zürich, the head of the general 
works council suggested establishing a EWC.491 He pointed to the foundation of a 
EWC at VW, but the GM management rejected this idea. The chairman of the general 
works council was only able to get Opel to agree to pay for an international worker 
conference in exchange for the general works council’s agreement to the introduction 
of teamwork. This conference took place in Rüsselsheim in 1992, and worker 
representatives from all the major European plants participated.492 The conference, did 
not move beyond an information exchange between worker representatives. A major 
impediment was the underlying, but deep-seated suspicion of the British worker 
representatives for the German unionists.493 For the British, the participation of 
German workers representatives on the supervisory board was equivalent to a cozy 
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relationship with management, which did not square well with their more class based 
unionism.  
An important impetus for a transnational union strategy was the Directive on 
EWCs issued by the European parliament in 1994, which required the introduction of 
a EWC in multinational companies operating in Europe by September 1996 (Schulten 
1996). This new institution provided a structure for working beyond borders. The 
meetings of the EWC helped to learn more about worker representation in other 
countries, and to get to know each other on a personal basis.  
An important motivation for the EWC members to discuss and to develop a 
transnational strategy was the common experience of being whipsawed by 
management.494 The labor unions realized that negotiating separate national 
agreements, while management forcefully whipsawed the plants across borders in the 
context of new production assignments resulted in a downward spiral of working 
conditions and wages for all European plants. The unions increasingly realized that 
this could only be countered by a transnational strategy and coordination across 
borders.  
The EWC played, for the first time, a substantial role in 2000, when GM 
announced a joint-venture with Fiat for power train and gearbox production. This 
affected about 15,000 GM workers in Europe and in Brazil respectively – and they 
were then supposed be transferred to the new joint-venture. After the news came out in 
March 2000, newspapers speculated that this would possibly make thousands of jobs 
redundant.495 The workforce at the affected German plants in Bochum and 
Kaiserslautern responded with spontaneous wildcat strikes. Management had not 
informed the EWC about the planned restructuring. This was a breach of the EWC 
                                                 
494 General works council interview 2. Opel. April 18, 2005. 
495 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Opelaner in grosser Sorge. Newspaper article. May 30, 2000 
  
 
273 
statute, which required that worker representatives would be informed and consulted 
in case of restructuring. The German works councilors in their role as EWC 
representatives protested against this violation of the EWC statute and demanded a 
European collective agreement that would protect workers. Management agreed to 
such negotiations.  
The rationale for management was that mergers and joint-ventures are often 
difficult business undertakings that require the active participation of employees. A 
negotiated agreement with the EWC could facilitate the transfer of workers as well as 
secure worker participation in setting up the new joint-venture.496 GM’s European 
management and the EWC negotiated a European collective agreement, which would 
later be implemented by local agreements.497 The worker representatives took the 
Visteon agreement as an orientation mark (cf. chapter on Ford Germany). The core 
points of the agreement were that wages and working standards at the new joint-
venture would mirror those at the respective GM plants and excluded forced 
redundancies. The Fiat joint-venture agreement was an important learning experience 
for the European works councilors. It demonstrated that a transnational strategy helped 
them to cope with the transnational challenges they faced.  
In the summer of 2000, a leadership change took place.498 Klaus Franz became 
the chairman of the German general works council and of the EWC, in which he had 
already participated as a regular member since its foundation in 1996. This leadership 
change led to a greater emphasis on transnational strategies. Franz was convinced that 
only a transnational strategy could counter the transnational whipsawing by the 
European management, and he sought to convince other unionists in Germany and 
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Europe of the necessity of closer transnational cooperation. 499 Another indication of 
the greater emphasis on a transnational strategy was the employment of a full- time aid 
for the international work by the German general works council. His main task was to 
coordinate the work of the EWC.500 
A next step in the development of transnational worker cooperation was the 
conflict over the closure of the Luton plant in Great Britain. In December 2000, GM 
management announced to close the Luton plant, which sparked an immediate local 
labor protest in Britain. This time management had followed the EWC statute and 
informed the EWC about the plant closure. However, it was not clear how the 
leadership of the German works council would react. Luton was one of three plants 
that produced the Vectra, along with Antwerp (Belgium) and Rüsselsheim. The 
Rüsselsheim plant was not running at full capacity and the closure of the Luton plant 
would directly benefit the Rüsselsheim plant. One option for the leadership of the 
German work council and EWC was to stand aside and to let the Luton plant closure 
be a local problem – and this certainly would have been the strategic approach in the 
1990s. However, the leadership of the EWC (and German works council) decided to 
take on this issue and the EWC tried to become a voice in the ensuing contention. The 
EWC had a two-pronged strategy. First, they engaged in negotiations with 
management, trying to find what options might solve the Luton conflict. Second, the 
EWC started to mobilize for a European work stoppage, which they called European 
Action Day. 501 Management agreed to negotiations with the EWC, partly because the 
local negotiations in Luton had reached a deadlock.502 After the announcement of the 
plant closure, a bitter conflict between the local management and labor had broken 
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out. Meaningful negotiations were not possible in this hostile atmosphere. The 
inclusion of European management and European works councilors that were not 
directly involved facilitated a negotiated solution.  
On 25 January 2001, 40,000 GM workers across Europe demonstrated against 
the closure of the Luton plant through work stoppages and protests at all major GM 
plants in Western Europe. Parallel to this protest, negotiations between management 
and EWC were taking place and did reach a solution. Klaus Franz, head of the EWC, 
was able to announce via a conference phone to the protesting workers in Germany 
that a compromise with management had been reached.503 Although the main union 
demand – that of preventing the closure of the Luton plant – was not accomplished, 
the EWC and GM Europe signed a contract that excluded forced redundancies, and 
most of the workers were transferred to the nearby Isuzu plant.504 The Luton conflict 
consolidated the EWC as a negotiating body (Herber & Schäfer-Klug 2002). 
Moreover, the common transnational action and practiced solidarity of workers across 
Europe was an important experience for the European works councilors and helped to 
develop a common transnational ideology. The initiative taken by the German works 
council in favor of their British colleagues helped to build stronger ties between 
British and German EWC representatives and improved this historically difficult 
relationship (Fetzer 2007). 
Despite the continuing restructuring over the last years, the economic situation 
of GM Europe had scarcely improved. GM Europe had incurred losses since 1999, and 
the first quarter result in 2001 made it likely that GM Europe would not turn to profits 
in 2001 either. The continuing overcapacity of the European auto market and GM’s 
European plants were the key reasons. On average, GM’s plants were only running at 
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80% of their full capacity, while Ford, one of GM’s main competitors, was producing 
at 95% of its full capacity. 505 Another problem that GM faced – was the loss of market 
share. Opel’s share of the market in Germany slumped from 17% in 1995 to 12% in 
2000.506  
The GM headquarters in Detroit was dissatisfied with the situation in Europe 
and changed the leadership. The new management had the task to work out a new 
restructuring program for GM Europe. It created a “turn-around board” with 18 
working groups and 170 members. This working group was charged with reviewing 
all major European operations – including development, marketing, purchasing, 
manufacturing, sales and labor relations. A main problem with direct implications for 
labor relations remained the continuing productive overcapacity at GM. Management 
considered different ways of dealing with this problem – among which was a plant 
closure. This was an attempt to better match productive capacity to the demand within 
the European car market.  
The German works council heard early on about the plans by management and 
called for an emergency meeting of the EWC in August 2001. The discussion within 
the EWC and the development of a response were shaped by the recent Luton 
events.507 The European works councilors felt encouraged by their own transnational 
solidarity action in the Luton conflict, but an important goal of labor had still not been 
accomplished. They had not prevented the closure of the Luton plant. Against this 
background, the main goal of the EWC became to avoid any further plant closures in 
future negotiations over restructuring. Other goals of the EWCs remained what they 
were before: the avoidance of forced redundancies. Since labor did not doubt the need 
for a restructuring program in the context of the difficult economic situation, the EWC 
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explored alternatives to the plant closures. In the ensuing discussion among the 
European works councilors, a consensus emerged to share the necessary concessions 
equally, but to avoid by any means a plant closure. They called this to “share the 
pain.”508 The EWC representatives tried to persuade the GM management of European 
negotiation by not participating in local restructuring negotiations. 
Management’s approach had changed since the previous rounds of whipsawing 
in 1995 and 1998, in which management sought concessions at one plant and then 
used them to whipsaw other European plants and extract further concessions. 
Management had the idea this times that a European solution could facilitate 
cooperation by labor.509 A major restructuring program such as the one that was 
underway could easily spark local labor protest. Having the European works 
councilors on board, who were at the same time labor leaders at the local plants, would 
ensure a smoother implementation of the restructuring program.  
In August 2001, European management and the EWC began negotiation on a 
restructuring program, which was called Olympia.510 The European headquarters 
provided the EWC with all major company data. Informing worker representatives 
about the economic situation was a common practice at Opel Germany, but it meant an 
extension of labor rights for unionists from other countries such as the UK. 
Management and labor gradually reached a common perception of the crisis, and labor 
agreed to concessions in the European negotiations. The Olympia restructuring 
agreement was signed in September 2001. The EWC reached its main goals, which 
were the exclusion of plant closures and of forced redundancies.511 The agreement 
reflected the idea “to share the pain.”512 Management had obtained significant 
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concessions from labor. The agreement stipulated the reduction of 350,000 units (car 
and parts).513 The specific implementation and measures for each plant were supposed 
to be determined in local-national negotiations and thus could vary. 
The implementation of the Olympia restructuring program at the German 
plants was not straightforward and was delayed. The main reason was the up-coming 
works council election. Olympia meant concessions from the workforce, which were 
difficult to sell in elections. IG Metall works councilors decided to postpone the 
implementation of Olympia until after the elections. In the election campaign, IG 
Metall works councilors presented the maximum demands of management, which they 
termed “horror demands.”514 In the elections, IG Metall defended its predominant 
position and did obtain at least 80% of the votes in the three western plants. The votes 
at the individual plants also decided about the composition of the general works 
council. Klaus Franz was confirmed as the head of the general works council.   
After the works council election, management and general works council 
decided to negotiate the specific implementation of the Olympia program in Germany. 
They also took decisions about the company level bargaining that was due to follow 
the recent sectoral collective bargaining round. The most important measure to match 
the requirements of the Olympia program was to bring down production capacity. A 
workforce reduction of about 2,500 workers was reached through an early retirement 
program. Beyond this workforce reduction, the works council accomplished that the 
wage increases of the sectoral collective bargaining should be fully added to the higher 
Opel wages.515  
The crisis of GM Europe continued in the years 2002 and 2003. Management 
sought to cope with the crisis by refining its transnational strategies. GM Europe 
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introduced bidding processes for the allocation of new car production for its European 
plants in October 2003.516 Management announced that the allocation of new 
production would take place solely based on productivity comparisons between plants. 
Management created an internal market within the company and the plant with the 
best offer was supposed to get the tender. This represented a departure from the 
whipsawing practices of the 1990s, which were more informal. The first test case was 
a bidding process between the Polish plant Gliwice and the Rüsselsheim plant on the 
new Zafira car model. The Polish plant won the productivity competition. 
Management argued that each Zafira would be 350 euros cheaper in Poland. This was 
the result of the huge wage differential between the German and Polish plants. 517 This 
was a major blow for the German worker representatives since the Rüsselsheim plant 
urgently needed the new Zafira, as production was down to 70% of full capacity. 518 
By 2004, GM Europe was in its fifth year of consecutive losses. Previous 
restructuring efforts had not been sufficient to return GM Europe to profitability. The 
headquarters in Detroit intended to improve the situation by another management 
reshuffle, installing Fritz Henderson as the chairman of GM Europe.519 Henderson had 
the task to organize a major restructuring program that would include all major 
business areas of GM Europe. In September 2004, management informed the EWC of 
a major restructuring that would include all plants in Europe. Management did not 
reveal any specific details, but declared that the restructuring could include a plant 
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closure. Labor representatives were alarmed. The German works council and the EWC 
decided to extend transnational coordination by cooperating with the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF).520 A new coordination group was established at the 
EMF. The new group included the representatives of national unions as well as core 
members of the EWC. This coordination group started to work out a strategy and a 
mobilization plan in case GM Europe acted unilaterally and attempted any plant 
closure in the upcoming European restructuring.  
In October, GM Europe announced that it intended to axe 10,000 jobs in 
Germany and 2,000 additional jobs in Europe.521 The announced job cuts would 
reduce the German work force by one-third, making it the largest labor shedding in the 
history of Opel Germany. After the meeting with the plant managers, the news spread 
quickly and reached the Bochum plant. Workers reacted with an immediate wildcat 
strike. This took place while management was still informing the works councilors 
about the restructuring plan. The workers, who spontaneously struck, thought that the 
management plan would result in the closure of the Bochum plant.   
The German works councilors agreed to mobilize against the jobs cuts, but to 
keep communication with management open. The strategy of the works councilors had 
two main facets. First, they intended to mobilize protest across GM’s European plant 
by cooperating with the EWC and the coordination group at the EMF.522 Second, the 
German works councilors engaged in a public debate in Germany and sought to 
mobilize public opinion against GM. This Europe-wide strategy had been prepared in 
advance at meetings in September and October,523 which made it possible to call for a 
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October 2004.  
523 General works council interview. Opel. May 3, 2005. 
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European Action Day only five days after the management plan came out. The 
members of EWC and EMF coordination group agreed that each GM plant would stop 
work for at least one hour.524 A total of more than 40,000 GM workers took part in the 
protest across Europe. Even the plant in Gliwice, Poland, that had previously not 
participated in transnational mobilization took part this time. The largest 
demonstration happened in Rüsselsheim with 20,000 people. GM workers were joined 
by people living in and around Rüsselsheim. The demonstration was officially 
declared a workforce assembly because German works councilors were not allowed to 
strike according to German labor law. The central demand of the European Action 
Day was to avoid plant closures and forced redundancies by negotiating a European 
Framework Agreement.  
The planned massive job cut at Opel was immediately the dominant news-story 
in the German media. In the public debate, many politicians sided with the protesting 
workers. Many local, regional and federal politicians expressed their concern and 
support but without making any financial promises.525 For example, the governor of 
the state North-Rhine Westphalia, where the Bochum plant was located, met with Opel 
management. Although there was serious criticism of the GM plans, the legitimacy 
and economic reasoning of the management plan was not contested. A key difference 
in contrast to previous public debates was that politicians did not try to intervene with 
a business decision, something, which had taken place regularly in the past. In 
previous prominent company crises, politicians had intervened and subsidized or 
bailed out companies (e.g. the Holzmann crisis in 1998).  
                                                 
524 EMF: The EMF European Company Policy – The EMF/GM experiences in cross-border 
consolidation 2004. February 23, 2005. 
525 Frankfurter Rundschau: Landesregierung besorgt über Werk in Rüsselsheim. Newspaper article. 
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Meanwhile, the wildcat strike in Bochum continued.526 Radical groups 
including Marxist and anarchist groups, from across Germany quickly supported the 
striking workers. These groups regarded the dispute at Opel as an opportunity to take 
on a capitalist multinational company and they camped-out in front of the plant.527 The 
protesters and media crowd blocked the plant’s main entrance. From a strategic point 
of view, the strike at the Bochum plant made sense. The strike in Rüsselsheim barely 
affected GM since the plant was not running at full capacity anyway. The situation 
was different in Bochum. Most of the assembly plants in Europe were dependent upon 
axle production in Bochum, and because of just- in-time production inventory was low. 
By the fourth day of the strike, the plants in Antwerp had to stop production because 
of the lack of axles from the Bochum plant. To shut down axle production in Bochum, 
which was a small department with only 150 employees, had the potential to cripple 
GM’s production in Europe.528 
This was a real concern by management. One plan considered by management 
was that of getting access to the plant through the police529 and to keep axle 
production going – such an intervention would have been unprecedented in German 
industrial relations. In addition, management approached the works councilors and 
asked them to intervene and convince the workers to return to work. The works 
councilors thought that an escalation of the conflict would not be helpful for the 
negotiations with management. On the seventh day of the strike, the works council had 
set up a workforce assembly. Workers and works councilors engaged in a heated 
discussion about the continuation or termination of the strike.530 At the end of the 
                                                 
526 Frankfurter Rundschau: Wir legen Europa lahm. Newspaper article. October 15, 2004.  
527 Works council interview. Opel Bochum. June 21, 2005 
528 Management interview. GM Europe. November 29, 2005. 
529 Management interview. GM Europe. November 29, 2005. 
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assembly, a majority of the workers voted in favor of ending the strike. The next day 
production resumed at Bochum.  
After the strike in Bochum was over, the struggle between management and 
labor cooled somewhat and renewed negotiations resumed in November. Parallel to 
the negotiations in Germany and Spain, meetings between the EWC and GM Europe 
took place. The central demand by the EWC was a European Framework Agreement  
for the restructuring that would once again exclude forced redundancies and plant 
closures.531 In these negotiations labor threatened that it would not sign any local or 
national agreements without a comprehensive European Framework Agreement. 
Finally, in December, management agreed to a European Framework Agreement  
because the national negotiations in Germany and Spain were already well underway 
and blocking a European agreement would have complicated these national 
negotiations. A new European Framework Agreement was signed on December 8, 
2004.532 This agreement excluded forced redundancies and plant closures.  
Shortly afterwards management and labor signed the restructuring agreement 
in Germany and Spain. The German works council agreed to reduce the workforce by 
9,500 employees. The works council agreed to the workforce reduction because it was 
aware of the serious economic problems of the company and of its overcapacity. The 
focus of the works council became to make sure that the workforce reduction would 
take place in a socially acceptable manner. 
With the restructuring agreement in place, management reached its goal of 
saving about 500 million euros in annual labor costs. This 2004 agreement took place 
in the context of substantial cost-saving agreements at other big auto companies in 
Germany such as VW, Ford and DaimlerChrysler. The workforce reduction at GM 
                                                 
531 EMF: The EMF European Company Policy – The EMF/GM experiences in cross-border 
consolidation 2004. February 23, 2005. 
532 GM: Restructuring Framework GM Europe/ EWC. Collective agreement. December 8, 2004.  
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took place in three ways: 2,000 workers were supposed to leave the company through 
outsourcing, 1,000 workers took early retirement and 6,500 employees were offered 
voluntary buy-outs.533 The severance pay was based on seniority and could amount to 
as much as 200,000 euros for a worker with 30 years seniority. Speaking to a 
workforce assembly, the head of the general works council, Klaus Franz explained the 
agreement to the workforce calling it the “most severe cut in the history of Opel since 
World War II,” but he argued that the survival of Opel was at stake.   
In January 2005, collective negotiations started related to a new bidding 
process on new Vectra production between Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan, Sweden. 
Both plants were supposed to hand in their proposals by March 2005. Since the Vectra 
was one of the main products, the production assignment was eagerly sought by the 
Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan plants. During the European-wide mobilization in 
October, this issue had already been brought up by the protesting workers, who had 
demanded the survival of both plants on their posters and leaflets. Worker 
representatives in Germany and Sweden wanted to avoid management’s whipsawing 
by keeping each other informed about the negotiations with management. Local 
politicians in Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan – both fairly small cities which were 
economically dependent on their auto plants – exchanged ideas to protect their plants. 
A delegation of the city of Rüsselsheim including the mayor and the works council of 
the Opel plant visited Trollhättan. As a result of the meeting, the two cities agreed on 
common declaration, which demanded a fair distribution of car production volumes 
adequate to secure the survival of both plants.534 Another agreement made between 
worker representatives of Trollhättan and Rüsselsheim was that they would not 
                                                 
533 Opel: Opel News. Vorstand und Betriebsrat einigen sich in weiten Teilen auf 
Restrukturierungsprogramm. Management press release. December 12, 2004.  
534 Stadt Rüsselsheim: Gemeinsame Erklaerung der Staedt Trollhättan und Rüsselsheim. Collective 
statement. February 7, 2005.  
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undercut the national collective bargaining agreements. Labor representatives did not 
try to prevent competition between the two cities completely – because both plants 
still intended to hand in offers for the Vectra; rather they sought to organize what they 
called a “social competition” through the cooperation between Trollhättan and 
Rüsselsheim.535 
In Germany, management and the general works council reached an agreement 
in March 2005.536 The main component of the agreement was the reduction of the 
higher Opel wages in comparison to the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. 
Between 2006 and 2010, the wage increases of the sectoral collective bargaining 
would be reduced by 1%. According to the works council estimate, the 2005 Opel 
wages were about 15% higher than the sectoral collective bargaining agreement 
(although there were differences across wage categories). By the end of 2010, the Opel 
wages would be close to the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. This agreement 
included an employment protection clause until the end of 2010. This clause referred 
to forced redundancies but allowed voluntary measures for the reduction of the 
workforce.  
After the completion of the agreement, the European management announced 
that the production of the new Vectra in 2008 would be about 200 million euros 
cheaper to produce in Rüsselsheim than in Trollhättan. The company thus allocated 
Vectra production to Rüsselsheim. Trollhättan was promised the Cadillac production 
for Europe.537 
Despite labor’s transnational coordination and the mobilization of politicians, 
management was able to extract concessions  at both plants. Thus, the strategy of 
“social competition” in the bidding process, which was a response to management’s 
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whipsawing strategy – was not successful. The limited success of labor’s transnational 
coordination was a learning experience, and it triggered further debates and 
strategizing within the EWC.538 The goal for the next bidding round was to develop a 
common position in the EWC on the distribution of production, and to negotiate a fair 
distribution of production across affected plants. Labor intended to stop the 
transnational whipsawing practices. Labor regarded the bidding process an unfair and 
blunt form of coercion, while management regarded the bidding process as a 
legitimate instrument to insure that plants were up to the task of producing a new 
model competitively. 539 
Management announced a bidding process for the plants of the delta platform 
in 2007 for the new Astra production. 540 This left labor more time to coordinate a 
response than in the previous two bidding processes. The bidding process affected four 
plants on the delta-production platform: Ellesmere Port (UK), Antwerp (Belgium), 
Bochum (Germany) and Gliwice (Poland). In an attempt to improve the previous 
transnational labor cooperation, the labor representatives decided to build a new 
working group – called Delta Group – for the up-coming bidding process.541 It 
included two representatives from each country, a small number of representatives 
from the EWC, and the head of the EMF. The two representatives from each country 
included a representative of each plant and a representative of the respective national 
union. The latter had the task to control for “plant egoism” by making sure that the 
                                                 
538 General works council interview. Opel. May 3, 2005. 
539 Management interview. GM Europe. November 29, 2005. 
540 In the bidding process, the European management had two goals. First, as already mentioned, 
management intended to extract concessions and push for lower labor costs. Second, management 
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interest of the plant representative would not take place at the expense of other 
plants.542 
An increasing labor concern was to have sufficient financial and organizational 
resources. The EWC meetings and related travel activities were paid for by 
management. It was obvious that the GM management would not pay for the 
organizing of the Delta Group. IG Metall and the EMF supported the EWC through 
some coordination of their bureaucracies, but what was really needed was more money 
for travel and organizing work as well as more organizers. (There was only one 
official charged with the coordination of the international work of the German general 
works council). Communication by e-mail was important, but even more was the 
personal face-to-face contact which nurtured trust and personal relationships.543 
The coordinator of the international work for the German works council raised 
funding – a very exceptional step for a German works council.544 Two funding 
proposals were successful. The international work of the EWC obtained a grant by the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which is an organization affiliated with the German Social 
Democratic Party. The European Commission of the European Union also gave a one-
year grant for international work, which permitted the hiring of two additional 
organizers. These two grants reflect the recognition of the transnational work at GM. 
Parallel to the activities of the Delta Group in 2005 and 2006, the Meriva bidding 
process and the contention about the plant closure in Azambuja took place (cf. chapter 
on GM Spain).  
The foremost goal of the Delta Group was to develop a common position for 
the involved plants and to negotiate a fair distribution of production with the European 
management. The Delta-Group sought to prevent management from whipsawing the 
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different plants in the bidding process. The demand of the Delta Group to negotiate the 
distribution of production was received by management hardliners as a “declaration of 
war.”545 The strategy of management was to break at least one plant out of the 
common labor front, e.g. by negotiating tacitly with one plant.  
The labor representatives of the Delta Group were aware right from the start 
that this would be an uphill struggle. Besides the constant exchange of information 
between worker representatives, two strategic elements were key: First, all members 
of the Delta Group signed a solidarity pledge.546 This solidarity pledge included rules 
of conduct, most importantly, the representatives promised each other not to engage in 
individual negotiations with the European management. Second, the Delta Group 
intended to strengthen the cooperation between the members of the group through 
workshops held at the four plants. These visits to each other’s plants meant that labor 
leaders got to know each other better on a personal level. One worker representative 
explained that they tried to build on the most important capital they had: trust.547 
Initially, there were some doubts if the Polish plants in Gliwice could be fully 
integrated into the Delta Group. Wage levels at the Polish plant were still far below the 
Western European plants, and in the context of the production decision in 2004, the 
Polish workers had expressed the legitimate desire to catch up with the Western 
European plants so that more production would come to Gliwice. The Polish plant 
decided to take part in the effort of the Delta Group, because they had been previously 
whipsawed with the plant in Kaliningrad, Ukraine.548 As in the case of the Western 
European plants, management had threatened the Polish plants with the transfer of 
their production to the east. After this experience, the Polish worker representatives 
                                                 
545 General works council interview 2. Opel. April 18, 2005. 
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547 General works council interview 2. Opel. April 18, 2005. 
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agreed with the logic of the EWC and the Delta-Group that only transnational 
cooperation between labor unions could prevent transnational whipsawing by 
management.  
 
Summary 
During the postwar decades, national employment relations institutions shaped 
employment relations at Opel and the collective ideas and ideologies that underpinned 
the institutions evolved within a national context. Before the lean production debate 
spilled over to Germany from the United States in the second half of the 1980s, 
management governed labor relations hierarchically. Management kept labor at a 
distance as far as German co-determination rules permitted.  
The management of General Motors became more international in the second 
half of the 1980s, which meant that an increasing number of decisions and 
management ideologies of the world headquarters affected national operations, such as 
that of Opel. Management in Detroit sought to promote lean production, which was a 
production system but also a management ideology that sought greater worker 
involvement and a voice in the organization of production. Lean production ideas had 
been distilled into the General Motors – Global Manufacturing System (GM-GMS), 
which was implemented in all GM plants worldwide. An interrela ted production 
strategy was the development of production platforms. Cars developed and produced 
on the same platforms shared a larger number of parts and were only differentiated by 
their exterior design.  
The standardization and integration of production across countries was the 
basis for subsequent changes in labor relations at Opel. The competition became stiffer 
for German producers in Europe in the 1990s. The European Union continued to 
remove non-monetary trade barriers, and overcapacities became a major problem. As 
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management tried to adapt, the management discourse around worker involvement 
became less prominent and management developed new ideas for increasing 
productivity. Management whipsawed the German plants with other European plants 
in 1993, 1995 and 1998. If labor did not agree to labor concessions, management 
threatened to allocate new production to other plants in Europe. These threats by 
management were credible, because the standardization of production and platform 
strategy gave management the capability to shift production across plants and borders. 
The 1993 collective negotiations between management and labor were significant, 
because management stopped for the first time the positive wage drift of Opel wages 
and the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement.  
The continuing transnational whipsawing changed the mindset of the German 
representatives. There was a sense of vulnerability among the labor representatives 
and they recognized that labor strategies based on national institutions did not provide 
sufficient leverage to counter transnational whipsawing. The EWC, founded in 1996, 
became a new forum for labor-side strategizing with GM labor representatives from 
other countries. The German labor representatives engaged in identity work nurturing 
the personal ties to other European works councilors and trying to develop common 
transnational ideas and strategies. Over time, a common narrative about labor’s 
problem emerged and the European works councilors increasingly shared the belief 
that common transnational strategies were necessary in face of GM’s aggressive 
transnational whipsawing.  
In the early 2000s, the EWC’s transnational ideas turned into transnational 
practices. GM Europe engaged in a joint-venture with FIAT in 2000. Management and 
the EWC negotiated a collective agreement, which excluded forced redundancies and 
guaranteed wage levels for the workers of the new joint-venture, while labor agreed to 
actively support the restructuring. Later in 2000, management announced the closure 
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of the Luton plant. Again, the EWC sought to play an active role. The EWC prepared 
for a European Action Day against the plant closures in Luton. Management and labor 
negotiated a second transnational collective agreement, which excluded forced 
redundancies at the Luton plant. In the same year, rumors appeared about another 
plant closure in Europe. The EWC called an emergency meeting. The European works 
councilors did not doubt that GM Europe was in serious economic problems and were 
willing to agree to concessions. The EWC developed the idea to “share the pain.” The 
EWC intended to contribute equally to concessions in order to avoid a plant closure in 
Europe. The EWC and management negotiated a restructuring program, called 
Olympia, which substantially reduced GM’s labor costs in Europe. The common 
transnational collective action and negotiations of the early 2000s helped to develop a 
shared ideology around commonly fighting dismissals and plant closures in Europe.  
Collective negotiations continued at the local level, but they had a transnational 
dimension. GM Europe announced another European restructuring program in 2004, 
as GM was in its fifth consecutive year of losses. The primary target of the 
restructuring was the German operation, but GM Europe also demanded concessions 
from other plants in Europe. The EWC organized another European Action Day, in 
which more than 40,000 workers participated, demanding another European collective 
agreement. At the same time, a wildcat strike at the Bochum plant broke out and 
works councilors organized protests across all German plants. Management agreed to 
negotiate a European collective agreement, which however could not prevent the 
reduction of the workforce by 10,000 employees, about a third of the German 
workforce. This shedding of jobs predominantly took place through voluntary buy-
outs and early retirement.  
Management refined its transnational strategies. Management announced that 
all future production allocation would be based on a bidding process. Plants were 
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supposed to hand in a tender and the plant with the highest productivity or greatest 
labor concessions would get new production. This created a within-company-market 
for the allocation of production at GM Europe. The Rüsselsheim plant was pitted in a 
bidding process against the Gliwice plant (Poland) and against Trollhättan (Sweden) in 
2005, which resulted in labor concessions.  
Worker representatives sought to improve transnational coordination in the 
following bidding process for the plants of the Delta platform. The EWC founded the 
Delta Group, which consisted of labor representatives from the four Delta plants 
Elsmere-Port, Antwerp, Bochum and Gliwice. The EMF also supported the labor side 
coordination. Part of the identity work of the EWC was to sign a solidarity pledge and 
all EWC members committed themselves to not negotiate individual agreements with 
management. The goal was to negotiate commonly with the European management 
and to seek fair distribution of production across all plants, which would allow all 
plants to survive. The intense labor-side coordination also required financial resources, 
as GM’s management only had an obligation to pay for the EWC meeting. 
Consequently, the EWC engaged in funding raising efforts. Two applications were 
successful: the European Commission of the European Union and the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation provided grants for the international labor work. These resources allowed 
the unionists of the Delta-Group to organize visits. These plant visits were supposed to 
strengthen the personal ties between unionists and to build up trust across borders. 
In the meantime, management remained determined to whipsaw the plants of 
the Delta platform and sought to separate individual plants out from the common 
negotiation front. Management’s efforts were successful and the Bochum plant agreed 
to a local deal, undercutting the transnational union cooperation of the Delta-Group. 
Despite the continuing identity work of key German worker representatives, the 
economic interests of the Bochum representatives were stronger than their 
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transnational ideology. That this was not the case in all transnational organizing efforts 
was indicated in the Azambuja case (cf. chapter on GM Spain), in which the Spanish 
unions struck in favor of the ir Portuguese colleagues even though this went against 
their economic interests. In light of the successes and limits of the transnational work, 
key German representatives continued to believe that national strategies were not 
viable and only transnational strategies could counter transnational whipsawing and 
restructuring. The EWC continued to organize European mobilization and work 
stoppages in 2007 and 2008, which however did not prevent labor concessions. 
Transnational labor work remained an uphill struggle in an extremely adverse 
economic context.  
Until the late 1980s, the national employment relations institutions were 
underpinned by management and union ideologies that evolved in a national context. 
Management’s transnational whipsawing of the German plants disrupted previous 
national employment relations practices and labor’s ideology. The works councilors 
believed that transnational whipsawing could not be countered effectively through 
national strategy. German labor representative used the new institution EWC to 
engage in identity work and develop a common transnational ideology around fighting 
dismissals, plant closures and whipsawing in Europe, which led to transnational 
collective action and European collective agreements. As labor adapted to a changing 
socio-economic context, their collective ideas and ideologies, which led to a markedly 
different use of the EWC institutions compared to most other EWCs. Institutions are 
what actors make of them.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
The end of ideology is never possible: 
no social order is given once and for all. 
Adam Przeworski, 1985 549 
 
Labor and management in multinational auto companies in Germany, Spain and the 
United States have continuously re-negotiated and changed employment relations 
since the 1980s. The collective actors adapted to a changing socio-economic context 
such as changing markets and company structures. Ford, GM and VW integrated and 
standardized production by introducing global manufacturing systems and production 
platforms. Market changes included the expansion and liberalization of auto markets 
in North America and Europe, which increased the level of competition for 
management and labor and put pressure on the employment relationship. As the actors 
adapted to a changing socio-economic context their collective ideas and ideology 
changed. This contributed to a different functioning and meaning of institutions, 
because the actors made different use of institutions and developed new institutional 
practices. This analysis of institutional change, which focuses on the interaction 
between ideas and institutions, is summarized below as a constructivist 
institutionalism.  
 
Constructivist institutionalism  
The distinctive characteristic of a constructivist institutionalism, in contrast to 
historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism, is that it focuses on the 
interaction between ideas and institutions that shapes institutional and social change. 
                                                 
549 I found this quote in Blyth’s book Great Transformations (Blyth 2002). 
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This builds on literature that combines ideational and institutional analyses (Hay 2006; 
Herrigel 1996; Katzenstein 1985; March & Olsen 1989; Sikkink 1991) and a literature 
on economic constructivism in political economy (Jabko 2006; McNamara 1998; 
Seabrooke 2006; Woll 2009)550; the term constructivist institutionalism was first 
coined by (Hay 2006). The specific contribution of this study to the emerging 
constructivist institutionalism is the inductive exploration of five mechanisms of 
ideational change that contribute to a different functioning, meaning and enactment of 
institutions: leadership change, identity work, mimicking & learning, collective 
bargaining and generational change. The building blocks of the constructivist 
institutiona lism used in this study are the emphasis on economic uncertainty, the 
regulatory and constitutive affect of institutions, the mutual relationship between ideas 
and institutions and endogenous institutional change.  
The starting point for the analysis of institutional change is economic 
uncertainty (Blyth 2002; Knight 1921). The collective actors adapt to a dynamically 
changing socio-economic context such as changing markets and company structures. 
This can put pressure on the collective actors and previous institutional practices might 
not work any longer. In moments of economic uncertainty, actors do not have 
complete information and neither do they have the rational capacity to calculate the  
best course of action. Instead, in moments of economic uncertainty, actors interpret 
changes in the socio-economic context and wonder about how to adapt based on their 
ideas and ideologies. Institutions do reduce economic uncertainty, however they do 
not completely help to overcome them, as still many possible ways exist to develop 
institutional practices and adapt to a changing socio-economic context. Collective 
actors defend themselves against changes in the world by changing their interpretation 
and ideas about the world.  
                                                 
550 See Blyth for a review of the literature on economic constructivism (Blyth 2003).  
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A constructivist institutionalism differentiates between the regulatory and the 
constitutive effect of institutions. The regulatory effect of institutions refers to 
institutions as a set of rules and laws. The regulatory element of institutions is 
enforced by the state. Rules constrain actors and lead to distinctive actor behavior 
along some dimensions of the employment relationship across countries. A good 
example, of how the regulatory effect of institutions shapes differences in actor 
behavior across countries, are strike rules. German works councils do not usually 
strike as it is forbidden by law, the UAW can strike in the context of collective 
bargaining as it is narrowly defined by United States labor law and Spanish unions 
sometimes engage in industrial action as well as in political strikes as their laws allow 
both. Examining the regulatory effect of institutions on actor behavior is the standard 
approach in the study of employment relations and historical institutionalism. The 
regulatory affect of institutions is important; however, a constructivist institutional 
perspective suggests that in addition the constitutive effect of institutions should be 
taken into account. Institutions constitute the very nature of the collective actors. 
Institutions define the structure of labor organizations, the basic functions of these 
organizations in employment relations and the inner working of these organizations 
(e.g. democratic rules). Institutions define the legal forms of companies, element s of 
their governance structure and they define the basic role and instruments for 
management in employment relations. The constitutive as well as the regulatory affect 
of institutions shape the ideas and ideologies of management and labor, because 
institutions shape in a basic sense what management and labor are and give them a 
sense of their role, possibilities and constraints in the employment relationship.   
However, it would be wrong to cast the relationship between institutions and 
ideas as one-directional and static. There exists a mutual relationship between ideas 
and institutions. Ideas and institutions mutually constitute each other. How actors 
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make use of institutions and develop their functioning and meaning is shaped and 
underpinned by the actors’ ideas and ideologies, which changes over time. The 
collective actors can develop very contentious, cooperative or market-oriented 
employment relationships in similar, or different, institutional settings. Actors can 
make extensive or limited use of their institutional forcing instruments. Management 
has certain ideas and ideologies on how to develop employment relations productively. 
Unions have certain ideas and ideologies on how to reach their goals. Both make use 
of the institutions accordingly within a historically contingent socio-economic context. 
In addition, as only some employment relations practices and instruments are defined 
by institutional rules, there is a lot of leeway for the actors to develop new 
employment relations practices and instruments. These can then in turn change the 
functioning and meaning of the institutions. Although actors can interpret and make 
sense of their institutional and socio-economic context in different ways and develop 
different ideas as to how to adapt, the evolving ideas and ideologies of the actors are 
still a reflection of real world institutional, material and social contexts. These contexts 
impose real constraints and opportunities for the actors, which however can be 
interpreted in different ways. Actors tha t face increasing constraints tend to develop 
defensive ideas and ideologies, as they try to survive and reach their goals in a, for 
them, deteriorating situation; constraining material changes of the world limit the 
development and articulation of more ambitious ideas and ideologies and a more 
forceful use of institutional rights and resources – and vice versa.  
In sum, constructivist institutionalism suggests endogenous institutional 
change (Hay 2006). This stands in contrast to the exogenous institutional change of 
much of the historical institutionalism, in which institutional change takes places 
through external shocks at historical junctures. Constructivist institutionalism suggests 
a dynamic and mutual relationship between actors and institutions. Institutions 
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constitute the role of the actor in employment relations and constrain them through 
regulatory rules. Despite the constitutive and regulatory affect of institutions on actors 
and their ideas, the meaning and functioning of institutions can change over time. As 
actors adapt to a dynamically changing world their ideas and ideologies change. 
Specific mechanisms for ideational changes suggested in this study are leadership 
change, identity work, mimicking & learning, collective bargaining and generational 
change. Changing ideas of the actors contribute to a different use and enactment of 
institutions on the ground, which leads to endogenous institutional changes. External 
factors matter for institutional changes. However, changes in the material and social 
world do not directly translate into a different functioning of institutions. Actors with 
different ideas and ideologies can interpret the changes in different ways, adapt to 
them differently and endogenously develop changing institutional practices.  
 
Changes of employment relations within and across countries  
This section first highlights some of the key longitudinal changes of institutional 
practices and employment relations in the United States, Spain and Germany and then 
describes the emergence of similar employment relations practices across countries 
based on the above described constructivist institutionalism.  
Employment relations institutions in the United States constitute the 
representation of workers by a particular union after a successful organizing drive; 
collective bargaining is supposed to take place at the plant and company level. 
However, in a positive economic environment in the postwar decades, the UAW 
extended collective bargaining in practice to the industry level and negotiated a pattern 
for the whole auto industry. The UAW developed new ideas (cost-of- living 
adjustments, annual improvement factor, retirement after 30 years of factory work) 
and pushed for continuous social and economic improvements; management on the 
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other hand was on the defensive and sought to fend off union demands (Katz, 
MacDuffie, & Phil 2002; Katz & MacDuffie 1994). The socio-economic context 
changed dramatically after the 1980s, and new, non-union competitors entered the 
North American market. Management and labor wondered about how to adapt. In the 
wake of the lean production debate, management sought to make employment 
relations more efficient through a combination of whipsawing and cooperative labor-
management programs. While Ford labor relations became more cooperative after 
some big clashes, labor relations at GM were markedly more contentious with 
numerous local strikes in the 1980s and 1990s, which culminated in the devastating 
Flint conflict of 1998 (Babson 2004). However, United States employment relations 
institutions were also enacted in opposite ways as illustrated by GM’s Saturn project 
(Rubinstein & Kochan 2001; Rubinstein 2001). Management and labor developed a 
cooperative ideology and unionists became co-managers in the governing of the 
company. After the Flint disaster, GM management brought in managers who were 
more open to cooperation with the union, and as a consequence labor relations 
improved. During the dismal economic developments in the 2000s and after a 
leadership change in 2002, the UAW became more market oriented in the sense that it 
took on a much greater responsibility for making the companies more productive (in 
contrast to a narrower focus material outcomes and job control unionism). The UAW 
agreed to unprecedented concessions. In the economic crisis at the end of the 2000s, 
management and labor jointly struggled to keep the companies alive and radically 
adapted employment relations to a radically changing world. 
Spanish employment relations institutions constitute a representative and 
pluralist union representation structure and there are few regulatory constraints on the 
right to strike in collective bargaining. The ideology of the unions was crucially 
shaped by their common fight for democracy and against the Franco dictatorship. For 
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the Spanish unions it seemed to be natural to make extensive use of their right to strike 
and fight for social and material improvements in a contentious manner through 
collective bargaining after the transition to democracy in the 1980s. The local Spanish 
management reciprocated and governed labor relations paternalistically and 
hierarchically. However, employment relations changed significantly in the 1990s and 
the early 2000s as the actors adapted employment relations to changing markets and 
company structures. International management from the headquarters brought in new 
forcing strategies such as whipsawing but also sought to nurture ideational changes of 
the labor unions. The ideological orientation of the unions at SEAT and Ford changed 
in the 2000s. The unions became more market-oriented, helped to make the companies 
more competitive in order to secure production assignments from the headquarters. At 
GM, stronger whipsawing practices by the European management led the unions to 
engage in transnational union cooperation in the EWC, which was underpinned by an 
emerging ideology of the EWC around commonly fighting redundancies and plant 
closures in Europe.  
Employment relations institutions in Germany constitute worker representation 
on the company level through works counc ils with co-determination rights, but they 
have no official role in collective bargaining and no right to strike. However, 
collective bargaining took place not only at VW, where company level collective 
bargaining developed out of particular historic circumstances (Haipeter 2000). The 
works councils at Ford and GM also engaged in company- level bargaining. This 
developed in practice in the 1970s when the works councils had sufficient leverage to 
push for higher wages and social benefits. German works councilors were less 
contentious than the UAW and the Spanish unions and earlier on accepted a role in 
increasing the productivity of the company. These cooperative ideas and ideologies 
seemed indeed to be crucially constituted by the German employment relations 
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institutions (Turner 1991; Turner 1997). However, the ideas and ideologies of labor 
and management that underpinned German employment relations institutions changed 
as the collective actors adapted to stagnating auto markets and underutilized plants in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The meaning and functioning of the German institutions changed 
through the introduction of whipsawing practices in the 1990s. GM began to whipsaw 
aggressively its European plants and extracted concessions from its German plants in 
1993, 1995 and 1998. This disrupted previous institutional practices and the German 
works councilors developed transnational union strategies in the EWC and engaged in 
transnational collective action. Whipsawing at VW emerged in 1999 and led in 2001 
to the introduction of a second tier wage system in the Auto 5000 project, which was a 
renegotiation by management and labor of the institutional rule “same pay, for same 
jobs.” In 2005, the VW management began to whipsaw its German plants in the 
context of production decisions. At Ford labor relations developed along the previous 
practices as the ideology of the unions did not change and management appreciated 
the stability of labor relations avoiding to challenge labor to the extreme. Labor 
concessions took place at all three companies. The wage differential between sectoral 
collective bargaining agreement and company level wages was about 25% in the early 
1990s, while at the end of the 2000s the company level wages were converging 
towards the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement.  
Focusing on the within country changes of employment relations has the 
problem of losing sight of the increasing cross-country similarities of employment 
relations. Despite remaining institutional differences, the similarities of employment 
relations practices have increased since the 1980s. The transnational interaction, 
relations and interdependence have all increased and contributed to a diffusion of ideas 
and employment relations practices within and between MNCs across countries. For 
most of the postwar decades, national markets, national institutions and national ideas 
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and ideologies more tightly overlapped. Ideas and ideologies were worked out in 
relationship to other national actors. The greater coherence of national employment 
relations system in the postwar decades cannot only be explained by national 
institutions, as has often been assumed in the employment relations literature, but I 
would argue that that these institutions were also underpinned by more coherent 
national ideas and ideologies. This changed over the last three decades as auto 
production and social relations became more transnational. Examples are the 
expansion of auto markets, the standardization and integration of production across 
borders, increasing international placement of managers, transnational benchmarking, 
the introduction of the EWC and transnational whipsawing. Management and labor did 
not any longer develop employment relations merely in a national context, but they 
related what they were doing to actors across borders. Management systematically 
benchmarked plants and sought to spread what they identified as successful ideas and 
employment relations practices. Unions increasingly related what they did to unions in 
another country, e.g. they wondered how their competitive position within a company 
would change through a collective bargaining outcome in the context of transnational 
whipsawing and production allocation. National institutions were not only 
underpinned by ideas and ideologies developed in a national context, but the evolution 
and development of ideas and institutional practices were increasingly developed in a 
context that had an important transnational dimension. The remainder of this section 
describes the development of similar employment relations practices across countries: 
the standardization of production, whipsawing, two-tier wage systems, outsourcing, 
night shifts and voluntary-buyouts.  
In the wake of the lean production debate, GM, Ford and VW began to 
standardize production across countries. Part of this standardization of production 
took place through the development of production systems. GM followed Toyota in 
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the United States and developed its own production system, the “General Motors – 
Global Manufacturing System” (GM-GMS), in the late 1980s. GM’s production 
system laid out rules and norms of how production and work was supposed to be 
organized at all its plant worldwide, e.g. the production principles aimed at common 
health and safety standards as well as the reduction of waste in the production process, 
which was one of the principles of lean production. GM’s benchmarking teams 
regularly analyzed and assessed progress on the introduction of common production 
principles GM-GMS. Work organization in plants, particularly in older plants, grew 
out of historical processes. Changing work rules and norms is a complicated social 
process, but regular benchmarking tended to increase adaptation to work rules and 
norms over time. It was easiest to introduce the complete production system at 
greenfield sites such as Lensing in the United States or Rüsselsheim in Germany. Ford 
and VW had similar production systems in place, but pursued it less vigorously than 
GM. Another dimension of the standardization was the introduction of common 
production platform within and across countries, which became more prominent in the 
1990s. Different car types share many common auto parts and were only differentiated 
by the exterior design. Sharing common auto parts on common production platforms, 
allowed bulk purchase of auto parts and drove down purchasing costs significantly.  
The standardization and integration of production within and across countries 
made it easier for management to assign the production of cars to different plants and 
shift production volume between plants. In this context, whipsawing became more 
widespread and management played off different plants against each other in the 
context of new investment or production decisions (Moody 1997). Whipsawing 
became a widespread practice in the auto assembly sector in the United States in the 
mid to late 1980s. Management at Ford and GM sought to introduce lean production 
and whipsawed different plants in order to gain work rule concessions. In the 1990s, 
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whipsawing continued to be an important practice at GM, which sparked regular 
conflicts with labor, while Ford pursued a more cooperative approach with the UAW. 
Whipsawing practices in the auto assembly sector emerged later in Europe. Some 
whipsawing had taken place in the 1980s in the context of engine investments at Ford 
in 1985 and 1988 as well as at GM in 1988 (Mueller & Purcell 1992). GM 
spearheaded whipsawing at the assembly plants and won local concessions in 1993, 
1995 and 1998 by playing off different plants against each other in Europe. Similar 
whipsawing practices took place at Ford in 1996/1997. The German based MNC VW, 
which traditionally pursued a more cooperative relationship with labor, started 
whipsawing later than the two American companies. It was only in 1999 when VW 
began more forcefully whipsawing its German plants. Whipsawing practices in auto 
assembly started later in Spain than in Germany. In 1998, Ford threatened to transfer 
production from its Valencia plant to Saarlouis during a collective bargaining round. 
GM started to whipsaw its Spanish plant in 1999 and VW whipsawed its SEAT plant 
during the collective bargaining round in 2002. The most far-reaching development of 
whipsawing practices took place at GM in Europe. GM announced in 2003 that all 
new production decisions would solely be based on productivity comparison. Plants of 
the same platform were supposed to hand in a tender and the plant with the best offer 
(higher productivity, which often meant labor concessions) would be assigned new 
production. This created in effect a within-company-market for the assignment of new 
car production in Europe. In all three countries, whipsawing became a powerful new 
instrument for management in collective negotiations with labor. The basic 
functioning of whipsawing seemed to be little influenced by institutional rules, 
although labor used different forcing strategies to respond to whipsawing across 
countries.  
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Another employment relations practice that emerged across countries was the 
two-tier wage systems. Management sought to cut wage costs by introducing lower 
wage tiers. Lower wage tiers undercut the principle “same pay, for same 
employment,” which was important for unionists in all three countries. Surprisingly, 
lower wage levels for some assembly workers appeared first at VW and GM in 
Germany in the early 1990 in the context of German unification. Both companies 
opened plants in East Germany and were eager to avoid the higher wage structures of 
their plants in West Germany and settled for the wages of the sectoral metal collective 
bargaining agreement of Sachsen, which were about 20% below the pay level of VW 
and GM’s assembly plants in Western Germany. In Western Germany, the practice of 
paying lower wages for the same type of jobs was first introduced in 2001. At about 
the same time, the practice of lower-tier wages was introduced in Spain in 2001. 
However, it was differently organized. Newly employed workers started on lower tier 
wages; but their wage levels converged to the standard wage levels of the collective 
bargaining agreement with increasing seniority. The UAW was able to hold on the 
longest to the principle “same pay, for same job.” In the 2003 collective bargaining 
round the UAW negotiated lower tier wages for their suppliers Visteon and Delphi. It 
was only in 2007 that the UAW agreed to the introduction of lower tier wages for 
some assembly workers (Katz 2008).  
Outsourcing had already been an issue in the 1980s but it became significantly 
more important in the 1990s as a much larger number of workers were affected. A 
guiding tenet for management is to reduce the number of well-paid assembly jobs. 
Outsourcing was partly organized through building supplier parks in close proximity 
to the assembly plants. For example, Ford introduced such a supplier park at its 
Valencia plant in Spain in 1995 and at its Cologne plant in Germany in 2001. In 
addition, the producers spun-off their parts division. In the United States, Ford and 
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GM spun off their parts division in 1998 and 1999 and created the new auto parts 
companies Delphi and Visteon. The spin-off of Visteon and Delphi also had 
repercussions in Europe as the newly created companies had many plants in Europe 
(Greer 2006). In comparison to GM and Ford, management at VW outsourced less 
production. VW pitted its internal parts plant in bidding processes against external 
suppliers. Only if the internal suppliers produced the products more expensively, did 
VW outsourced production. Outsourcing decreased the number of assembly workers 
in all three countries. 
Another employment relations practice that spread across countries was the 
introduction of night shifts. Up to the 1980s a widespread belief was that auto 
assembly is physically too demanding and technologically too complex for round the 
clock production. GM negotiated for the first time a night shift at its Saragossa plant in 
Spain in 1998. Night shifts were first introduced in auto assembly in the United States 
and Germany in the early 1990s. The position of labor unions towards night shifts 
changed. Labor unions firmly opposed night shifts in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
demanded night shifts in the 1990s and 2000s in order to secure employment at their 
plants. Ergonomic improvements, tighter auto markets and the related under-
utilization of plants contributed to the reevaluation of labor’s position on night shifts.  
Another employment relations instrument that emerged in all three countries 
were voluntary-buyouts, which became a more important instrument for the reduction 
of employment across the three countries in the 1990s and 2000s. Differences existed 
with respect to the employment protection of workers across countries. In the United 
States, there were few constraints on labor shedding through labor law. The 
employment protection for workers at the Big Three was negotiated by the UAW and 
formed part of the collective bargaining agreements. In Germany labor laws stipulated 
that the more seniority a worker has, the more difficult and expensive it gets for a 
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company to make a worker redundant. In Spain management was obliged to negotiate 
the terms of dismissals with the labor unions, which had to be approved by the state. 
Although employment protection differed across countries, ultimately, the functioning 
of voluntary buyouts was similar across countries. Management negotiated voluntary 
buyout programs with the labor unions. The compensation packages offered to 
individual workers had to be high enough, so that a sufficient number of workers 
would voluntary give up their respective employment protection rights.  
 
Changes of employment relations and contemporary capitalism  
The picture of contemporary changes in employment relations described in this study 
might be discomforting for those who think that employment relations can neatly be 
categorized by causally linking national institutions to national patterns of 
employment relations. This study presented evidence that runs counter to national 
models categorization, e.g. co-management at Saturn in the United States, whipsawing 
of plants within German, Spanish labor unions engaging in productivity coalitions 
with local management, European works councilors cooperating across borders and 
emerging similar employment relations instruments across countries. Institutions are 
what the actors make of them. Even though institutions regulate and constitute actors, 
there is a lot of leeway to develop and change employment relations across time and 
companies. As the actors adapt to a changing socio-economic context, the ideas and 
ideologies of the actors change and they make different use of institutions and develop 
new employment relations practices, which can change the functioning and meaning 
of institutions. The ‘noise’ and variation within models has increased, partly because 
national institutions, national ideologies and national markets no longer overlap to the 
same extent as they did in the postwar decades. From the 1980s on, actors adapted 
employment relations to some extent to a transnational context and new ideas and 
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employment relations practices were brought into national contexts from other 
countries. This contributed to the development of institutional practices and 
employment relations that no longer neatly fitted into national patterns.  
Is a convergence of employment relations taking place? There will continue to 
be cross-national differences based on institutions and some dimensions of the 
employment relations will continue to differ, for example the structure of labor 
representation or strike rules. However, this study showed that despite these 
institutiona l differences, very similar employment relations practices, though not 
identical, can emerge across countries, which I would depict neither as a path-
dependent development nor as a convergence of employment relations. This study 
argues that changes in employment relations are shaped by the interaction between 
national institutions and ideas that are based on past experiences and current 
contingencies developed in a local, national and transnational context.  
The study chose a bottom-up approach to trace the changes of employment 
relations and a grounded approach to theory building. The evidence compiled of the 
longitudinal changes within countries and changes across countries does not allow us 
to aggregate the observed employment relations practices into national patterns or to 
propose claims of sweeping convergence. This study loses out against theses of 
convergence and national models literature in terms of coherence and simplicity. What 
has been gained is a more finely tuned understanding of the changes of employment 
relations across countries and a more dynamic understanding of institutional change 
based on the interaction between ideas and institutions This constructivist 
institutionalism moves beyond a purely rational foundation of actor behavior, 
emphasizing economic uncertainty and suggesting endogenous institutional change 
(Blyth 2002; Hay 2006).  
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The lessons of this study can also be incisive for looking at contemporary and 
past changes in capitalism. Not only are employment relations institutions enacted by 
actors with ideas and ideologies; the same applies for other institutions in the political 
economy, e.g. central banks. This was illustrated through the memorable questioning 
of Alan Greenspan, the long-term chair of the Federal Reserve, in the United States 
Congress following the 2008 economic and financial crisis. In the hearing, House of 
Representative member Henry Waxman asked Alan Greenspan about the role of the 
Federal Reserve and his evaluation of the crisis: 
”Referring to his free-market ideology, Mr. Greenspan added: “I have found a 
flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very 
distressed by that fact.” Mr. Waxman pressed the former Fed chair to clarify 
his words. “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your 
ideology, was not right, it was not working,” Mr. Waxman said. “Absolutely, 
precisely,” Mr. Greenspan replied. “You know, that’s precisely the reason I 
was shocked, because I have been going for 40 years or more with very 
considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well.” (Leonardt 
2008) 
Although Greenspan had always seemed to be a very rational actor, this quote reflects 
that his rationality was underpinned by an economic ideology. 551 This ideology 
influenced the development of institutional practices and rules of the Federal Reserve 
during Greenspan’s tenure from 1987 to 2006. The socio-economic context is 
currently undergoing dramatic change and actors in capitalist society such as 
politicians, managers, central bankers and unionists are wondering how they can 
adapt. As their ideas and ideologies are based on past experiences and current 
contingencies, they develop new economic ideas and ideologies, which will change 
capitalist institutions. The current material and ideological turbulence led central 
bankers to reconsider their ideas on free markets and the regulation of the economy, 
which will lead to different institutional practices of central banks.  
                                                 
551 See Cornelia Woll on how ideas underpin rationality (Woll 2009).  
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It has already been demonstrated, in previous historical moments, how changes 
in the socio-economic context triggered ideological changes and transformations of 
capitalism. The economic crisis in 1929 and the following Great Depression led to a 
re-thinking of the role of the state in economic governance and Keynesian economic 
ideas crucially reshaped capitalist institutions in the following decades (Hall 1989). In 
the United States, the changing mindset of key actors led to the New Deal and 
unprecedented social and economic rights for workers and labor unions, which was the 
basis for an upswing of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s. It seems possible 
that the current economic crisis will lead to a re-regulation of current capitalism, more 
favorable labor rights (such as the Employee Free Choice Act in the United States) and 
the development of more advantageous institutional practices for workers; however, 
this cannot be predicted with certainty in an uncertain economic world. It seems clear 
though that this would not simply be a ‘turning of the clock back’ to the golden age of 
capitalism, because current capitalist actors have to adapt to a historically contingent, 
and in this sense unique, social and economic world, which is markedly different from 
the postwar decades.  
  
 
311 
APPENDIX 
DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES  
 
This appendix discusses the data of this study, the applied research methods and some 
of the research strategies for the data collection. The empirical evidence of this study 
is mainly based on qualitative data, although some quantitative data was collected. The 
two most important sources were interviews and archival documents of labor 
organizations.  
The field research for this study was conducted between 2003 and 2007. I 
conducted one-year of field research in Germany in 2005, where I was based at the 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. In Spain, I undertook field research in 
the first half of 2006, while I was based at the Juan March Institute. In the United 
States, I made a number of research trips in 2003 and 2004 and conducted archival 
research in 2007.  
 
Interviews  
I conducted interviews with managers and unionists, these being the practitioners who 
were directly involved in the different negotiations related to the collective bargaining 
agreements. In addition, I interviewed people who were not directly involved in the 
negotiations but had good knowledge of the examined cases, including representatives 
from national labor unions, academics and industry experts. I refer to the latter as 
informed observers in the table below. They had a good knowledge of the different 
companies and the industry in general and thus they served as a source for all cases in 
one country. The following table differentiates between practitioners involved in 
collective bargaining and informed observers and shows the distribution of the 
interviews conducted across the different case studies and countries. The interviews 
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were semi-structured and open-ended. Some interviews took only thirty minutes while 
other lasted up to four hours. The great majority of the interviews lasted about one and 
a half hours. I recorded the interviews with a digital voice recorder and took notes 
during the interviews. I fully transcribed about one/ third of the interviews. I regarded 
these interviews as the most important. I used a snowball sampling method asking 
each interviewee at the end of an interview for further contacts.  
 
Table 1: Interviews conducted 
 Company Practitioners Informed observers 
Opel (GM) 17 
Ford 9 
 
 
Germany 
VW 15 
 
 
12 
GM 16 
Ford 13 
 
 
Spain 
SEAT 14 
 
 
9 
 
GM 13  
USA 
Ford 12 
 
12 
  Total number of interviews: 142 
A number of the interviews were conducted together with research colleagues, with 
whom I worked together on related projects. Pursuing field research in partnership 
made it possible to compare interview notes and have in-depth discussions about the 
findings. I interviewed most of my interviewees on only one occasion; however, I 
identified one or two key contacts in each of my case studies. These key contacts were 
reliable, very knowledgeable about the case study and granted me full access (also in 
terms of archival sources). I conducted several rounds of follow-up interviews with 
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some of them and kept in touch with them throughout my study, which allowed me to 
ask follow-up questions, fill gaps in my data and ask for additional documentation 
even after I had returned from the field.  
Interviewees have different perceptions of reality and thus describe the same 
issues in different ways. In addition, sometimes interviewees tend to blend out issues 
and aspects that do not represent them in a favorable light. Because of that I sought to 
look at the evidence from different angles. Unionists, managers and union dissidents 
obviously have very different perspectives and talking to each of them helped to better 
fit together what actually happened. The evidence gathered in interviews was further 
cross-checked with newspaper articles and archival sources, to which I turn next.  
 
Archival Sources 
After getting to know labor representatives better, I asked for access to the archives of 
the labor organizations at the company level. These archives contained leaflets, 
collective bargaining agreements, union publications and protocols from meetings. 
This kind of data was very important for a number of reasons. Leaflets and union 
publications inform the workers about the most important issues relating to 
employment relations and collective bargaining. In addition, this documentation 
reflects the dynamic inner- life of labor unions and provides information about 
conflicts, union elections and policy changes. Thus, this documentation allowed 
tracing changes in collective bargaining outcomes, union responses and union 
ideology. The union documentation proved particularly useful for the earlier research 
period. I sought to capture the process and dynamics of the collective bargaining 
rounds; however, labor representatives – like all of us – tend to forget the more distant 
details and issues. Union leaflets and publication helped to reconstruct these more 
distant collective bargaining rounds and union ideas. In addition, collective bargaining 
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agreements and summaries of collective bargaining agreements provide information 
about the substantive outcomes of collective bargaining. The time I spent on each case 
varied depending on the level of access and to what extent I had to copy the materials 
by myself. Usually, labor representatives still had union leaflets and documentation 
available for the last couple of years. For the period before, I copied the 
documentation myself. The following table gives an overview of the most important 
union documentation I collected.  
 
Table 2: Collected union publications and leaflets  
Case Sources Location of Archive 
 
 
 
 
Opel (GM) 
Germany  
· Union and works council leaflets “Wir IG 
Metaller informieren“/ “Der Betriebsrat 
informiert“ (plant Rüsselsheim, 1987 – 
2006)  
· Union and works council leaflets “Der 
Betriebsrat informiert“/ “Blitz Info” 
(Bochum, 1989-2006) 
· Union and works council leaflet “BR Info” 
(plant Kaiserslautern, 1996 – 2006) 
· Union leaflet “Scheibenwischer“ (plant 
Eisenach, 1995-2003) 
Office of the central 
works council at the 
Rüsselsheim plant 
collects leaflets from 
all the different 
plants. 
In addition, the 
individual plants 
(Bochum, Eisenach, 
Kaiserslautern) have 
their own local 
archives. 
 
Ford 
Germany  
· Central works council leaflet “Betriebsrat 
Information” (Cologne, 1991 – 2007) 
· Works council leaflet “BR Info“/ Ford 
Aktuell (Saarlouis, individual issues 
between 1992 – 2007) 
Office of the central 
works council, 
Cologne. 
Office of the works 
council, Saarlouis.  
 
 
Volkswagen 
Germany  
· Central Works Council leaflet “BR 
Kontakt” (Wolfsburg, 1987 – 2005) 
· Union leaflet “Wir Metaller”/“Metall 
Nachrichten“ (IG Metall, Wolfsburg, 
Hannover, 1987 – 2006) 
· Union and works council leaflet “Wat 
Gifft Nees” (Emden, 1987 -2005) 
 
Office of the central 
works council, 
Wolfsburg 
 
Office of the works 
council, Emden 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
 
GM  
Spain  
· UGT union publication “Avanzar” 
(Saragossa, issues on collective 
negotiations, 1990 – 2006)  
· CCOO union publication “Pausa” 
(Saragossa, issues on collective 
negotiations, 1988 – 2006) 
· CGT union leaflet (Saragossa, issues on 
collective negotiations, 1992 – 2006) 
 
Offices of the local 
unions at the plant in 
Saragossa 
 
 
 
 
Ford   
Spain  
· CCOO union leaflets “CCOO informe”/ 
Informatiue Laboral de CCOO 
(Almussafes, issues on collective 
negotiations, 1989 – 2006) 
· UGT union leaflet “Nuestra Opinion” 
(Almussafes, issues on collective 
bargaining, 1993 – 2006)  
· CGT union leaflet “CGT informa” 
(Almussafes, issues on collective 
bargaining round, 1993 – 2006)  
 
 
 
Offices of the local 
unions at the plant in 
Almussafes 
 
 
 
SEAT 
Spain  
· CCOO union leaflet “Assamblea Obrera” 
(Zona Franca, Martorell, SEAT, 1990 – 
2006)  
· Central works council (Comite 
intercentros) leaflets “Communicado a la 
plantilla” (Zona Franca, Martorell, 1990 – 
2006)  
· UGT union leaflet “Auto Gestion” 
(Martorell, Seat, issues on collective 
bargaining rounds between 2000 – 2006) 
· CGT union leaflet (Zona Franca, 
Martorell, Seat, issues on collective 
bargaining rounds between 2000 – 2006 
“Memorial 
Democratico 
Trabajadores de 
SEAT” (worker-
organized archive 
that collects 
documentation about 
the labor history of 
SEAT) 
In addition, the union 
locals UGT, CCOO 
and CGT at the plant 
in Martorell collect 
union leaflets. 
 
Ford US 
GM US 
· UAW magazine “Solidarity” (Detroit, 
1988 -2007, since 2000 also online 
available: www.uaw.com  
· UAW publication “Ammo” (Detroit, 1988 
– 1997) 
· “UAW Washington Report” (Detroit, 1988 
– 1998) 
 
 
 
ILR School 
Catherwood library 
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The table does not include collective bargaining agreements, as I was able to 
collect them consistently across my company cases. In some cases, management 
distributes its own leaflets during collective bargaining rounds to inform the 
workforce. I did not gain access to these leaflets through management, but via the 
labor organization that file these documents as well. I shipped six boxes (each 20 kg) 
of documentation after my field research in Germany and Spain to the United States, 
where I organized the union documentation chronologically in file cabinets for easy 
access during the write-up period. 
The data in the United States cases differs in some respects from the European 
cases. In the European cases, the local company representatives conducted collective 
bargaining and thus the labor documentation was based either in union or works 
council offices within the company or in labor archives in the respective city. In the 
United States, the national union UAW conducts the collective bargaining at the Big 
Three. I focused on the national level and did not systematically collect leaflets or 
publications from the UAW locals. Conveniently for me, the Catherwood library of 
the ILR School collects many union publications of United States unions including the 
UAW.  
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